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Abstract
The papers in this thesis study distortions and inefficiencies that impede the cor-
rect functioning of democratic systems. I specifically focus on two phenomena:
organised crime and media bias. The first paper presents an analysis of the con-
sequences of the collusion between criminal organisations and politicians on the
allocation of public resources and the collection of fiscal revenues. To measure the
presence of criminal organisations it exploits newly collected data on public spend-
ing, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences
estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments not only spend more on average
on construction and waste management and less on police enforcement, but also
collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, I uncover key elements of local elections
associated with mafia-government collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinu-
ity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties
win local elections. The second paper moves on to the study of media bias and
persuasive communication. In democracies voters rely on media outlets to learn
about politically salient issues. This raises an important question: how strongly
can media affect public perceptions? This paper uses a natural experiment – the
staggered introduction of the Digital TV signal in Italy – to measure the effect
of media persuasion on the perceptions individuals hold. It focuses on crime per-
ceptions and, combining channel-specific viewership and content data, this paper
shows that the reduced exposure to channels characterized by high levels of crime
reporting decreases individual concerns about crime. The effect is particularly
strong for the elderly who are more exposed to television and less to other sources
of information. Finally, it shows that such change in crime perceptions is likely to
have relevant implication for voting behaviour. The third paper continues on the
study of persuasive communication by investigating whether the amount and the
type of news related to sovereign debt might have played a role in the triggering
of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty among investors. In order to
test these claims empirically, I collect a unique and new dataset on news from
the main media outlets in a set of 5 European Countries from September 2007 to
September 2014. I restrict my search to news related to sovereign debt and, in
particular, to media stories related to political aspects of the debt. Time series
and dynamic panel regressions reveal that, conditional on a full set of controls
and falsification tests, the frequency of news is correlated to an increase in bond
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prices. Both time series and panel analysis reveal a certain extent of country het-
erogeneity in the effect. In particular, an increase in the number of news leads to
an increase in bond yields of peripheral countries. Finally, this paper also shows
how it is not just the amount of news that matters, but also their tone. More
precisely, negative news in country i at time t − 1 increases significantly the
sovereign bond yield of country i at time t. On the opposite positive news leads
to a decrease in sovereign bond yields.
In sum, the three chapters of this thesis aim to contribute to the academic
study of organised crime and media bias. First, this thesis provides new con-
ceptualisation in the study of these phenomena. Second, it exploits set of newly
collected dataset which will eventually constitute a public good for all the re-
searchers interested in the study of these topics. Finally, to overcome the difficult
identification challenges that the above questions pose, this thesis contributes to
the literature by proposing a set of rigorous ways to claim causality in the results.
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1 Introduction
Philosophers (Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1675; Rousseau, 1762) taught us that only a
voluntary agreement between individuals to devote power to a legitimate supe-
rior political authority might prevent “men to be wolves to other men”.1 This is
the essence of the social contract upon which the modern notion of democracy is
based. Elected representatives act in the interest of citizens, and citizens moni-
tor and judge the elected government through their voting rights. However, are
modern democracies immune from what Hobbes described as “the solitary, poor,
nasty, brutal and short” aspects of human nature?2 This fundamental question
inspires the work that I present in my thesis, where I study distortions and ineffi-
ciencies that impede the correct functioning of democratic systems. I specifically
focus on two phenomena: organised crime and media bias. Both represent institu-
tional failures which have the potential to undermine the social contract between
citizens and public officials (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Glaeser and
Saks, 2006). In the public domain, illegal agreements between elected representa-
tives and colluding parties may alter the legislative process, compromising policies
that aim to improve the welfare of citizens. Similarly, in a fast-changing world,
exposure to biased media not only affects the beliefs and decisions of individuals,
it also limits their capacity to monitor the actions of politicians and therefore to
hold them accountable.
The main goal of this thesis is simple. First, I provide new measures of both
organised crime and media bias. Second, I analyse how these concepts influence
public policy decisions. To address such a wide and complex subject in a rigorous
way, I have operationalised the key concepts and identified a set of precise research
questions. What is the impact of organised crime on the provision of public goods
and on the allocation of public resources? How strongly can media affect public
opinions? What is the role of information in fostering coordination?
These questions are examined in three different papers that constitute the
chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Marco Di Cataldo), I
present an analysis of the consequences of the collusion between criminal organi-
sations and politicians on the allocation of public resources and the collection of
fiscal revenues. By using sophisticated econometrics strategies, Chapter 2 not just
1Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, 1651
2Ibidem
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proposes a new way to measure organised crime presence, but also sheds light on
the consequent impact on public policy decisions. The collusion between criminal
organisations and local politicians does not have an effect on total spending, but
it does affect the allocation of public resources towards sectors of specific inter-
ests for criminal organisations. In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn my attention to the
second important theme of this thesis: media bias and persuasive communica-
tion. Chapter 3 (co-authored with Luigi Minale) presents a study of the impact
of information on individuals’ perceptions of salient topics in the political debate
and how this might affect their ultimate voting decisions. We show that, when
individuals are less exposed to bias news, they appear to be less concerned about
crime. In Chapter 4, I investigate the impact of information on perceptions but
in a very different setting. I study the case of the European Sovereign Crisis and
I test whether different amount and type of news media might be correlated with
the outbreak of the crisis.
Answering the above questions poses significant theoretical and empirical chal-
lenges. In particular, the identification of causal mechanisms is not trivial. My
thesis consequently uses innovative micro-level data and advanced econometric
techniques to draw policy relevant conclusions from observational data. The core
of my work is empirical and, as a consequence, the choice of the setting is cru-
cial. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the case of Italy. There are a number of reasons
why the Italian context represents a compelling case study to tackle my research
questions. In the analysis of collusion between members of criminal organisations
and local politicians (Chapter 2), Italy represents an ideal testing ground not just
because it is home to the first form of organised crime, but also because of its
unique institutional and regulatory setting which, combined with distinctive data
availability, constitutes the core of our identification strategy. Chapter 2 argues
that the choice of Italy does not represent a threat to the external validity of the
results. The presence of criminal organisations is an important phenomenon in
a variety of different settings. Particularly in developed, countries the nature of
the relationship between organised crime and politics has evolved over time and
it is now less straightforward than what it is used to be. Chapter 2 will present
evidence of how countries such as Japan, US, Russia and Spain show similar over
time trends in the number of illegal earning re-invested into the legal economy.
Chapter 3 continues in the study of Italian case by investigating the influence of
news media on individuals’ beliefs and perceptions about crime. The reason for
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choosing Italy is twofold. First, for over a decade, Italy presented an incredibly
concentrated television market with a tendency to over-report crime-related news.
Second, to identify the causal effect of biased news on individual perceptions we
rely on the peculiar implementation of a television reform which has been intro-
duced across Italian Regions at different points in time. However, similarly to
Chapter 2, the external validity of the results is not limited to the Italian case.
The mismatch between perceptions and reality is extremely relevant and applica-
ble to a number of different countries (Della Vigna and Kaplan„ 2007; Enikopolov
et al., 2011; Durante and Knight, 2012). In chapter 4, I investigate the impact of
a variation and amount of information on financial investors’ behaviour. In this
paper I move from the Italian setting to a cross-country approach and I study the
case of the European Sovereign Crisis and, more precisely, I focus on the following
five countries: Italy, France, Greece, Spain and Germany. I argue that, in order
to understand the outbreak of the crisis, there is a need to go beyond a mere
analysis of the economic fundamentals, and I study whether the amount and the
type of news related to sovereign debt might have played a role in the triggering
of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty among investors.
The three chapters of this thesis add different types of contribution to the
academic study of organised crime and media bias. The first important contri-
bution born out of my doctorate is a new conceptualisation in the study of these
phenomena. Second, I build my analysis on a set of newly collected dataset which
will eventually constitute a public good for all the researchers interested in the
study of these topics. Finally, to overcome the difficult identification challenges
that the above questions pose, this thesis contributes to the literature by propos-
ing a set of rigorous ways to claim causality in the results. In the remainder of
this introductory chapter, I discuss the core themes in more detail, and highlight
the substantive contributions that each paper makes to the existing literature. I
then discuss the data that I use and the methodological contribution of the thesis.
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1.1 Dissertation in Summary
ORGANISED CRIME, CAPTURED POLITICIANS AND THE ALLOCATION
OF PUBLIC RESOURCES
Organised crime is a widespread phenomenon in both developed and developing
countries (Gambetta, 1993; Pinotti, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2013). Its presence
reflects institutional failure and has the potential to influence key aspects of le-
gal economic activity, ultimately undermining the long term development of any
society (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). Its
strength, as well as its influence on the legal economy, relies on diffused external
complicity, i.e. an increasingly close relationship between organised crime groups
and public officials (Dickie, 2005). Thanks to the development of such networks,
organised crime has become highly pervasive and fully integrated into the every-
day socio-economic and political life of many countries in the world (Triglia, 2001;
Allum and Sieber, 2003). Yet, an understanding of the extent to which these dy-
namics condition the choices and activities of policy-makers is still lacking. What
impact does collusion between members of criminal organisations and politicians
have on important public policy decisions such as the allocation of public resources
and the collection of fiscal revenues? In chapter 2 (co-authored with Marco Di
Cataldo), we tackle this question by investigating a particular aspect of organised
crime activity: its “infiltration” within local governments. Such infiltration occurs
when criminal groups manage to capture local politicians who in turn manipulate
policy decisions in their favour. We study the case of Italy and, more precisely, we
focus on three Southern regions over the period 1998 – 2013. To capture the pres-
ence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of a national law
allowing for the dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion
between elected officials and a criminal organisation. We then compare municipal
governments with and without infiltration before and after such infiltration oc-
curs. Difference–in–differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments
not only spend more on average on construction and waste management and less
on police enforcement, but also collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, we un-
cover key elements of local elections associated with government-mafia collusion.
In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltrations are more
likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections. This work belongs to
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a growing group of studies on organised crime, conflict, state capacity and cor-
ruption. Chapter 2 contributes to this literature in several dimensions. First, it
introduces an innovative way to measure the collusion between criminal organi-
sations and politicians. Most of the literature has so far measured the presence
and intensity of mafia activity by employing proxies such as the number of mafia-
related crimes, murders, and violent attacks (Alesina et al., 2016; Daniele and
Marani, 2011; Olivieri and Sberna, 2014; Barone and Narciso, 2015), historical
or geographical indicators (Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012; De Feo and De
Luca, 2013; Buonanno et al., 2015; Buonanno et al., 2016), or artificial constructs
for counterfactual analysis (Pinotti, 2015). These measures aim to capture the
impact of organized crime in a broad sense, encompassing the entire range of pos-
sible actions perpetrated by such criminal groups. They do not, however, take
into consideration an important fact: particularly in developed countries, organ-
ised crime has evolved over time, progressively reducing the use of violence and
becoming increasingly integrated within the boundaries of democratic society, to
the point that mafia activities may no longer even be recognisable as criminal
enterprises. As a consequence, organised crime uses violence only as a last resort
when previous strategies have failed. Indeed, violence is a suboptimal strategy
in that it attracts too much attention from enforcement authorities, undermining
the primary objective of influencing policy decisions. Hence, the consequences of
successful criminal strategies that do not employ violence have yet to be empiri-
cally identified. By focusing on collusion between organised crime and politicians,
we contribute to the current literature by shedding light on this more silent but
equally dangerous phenomenon and, in doing so, assess its impact on economic
and political outcomes.
The second important contribution of Chapter 2 is indeed the identification
of the consequences for public policy of the collusion between criminal organisa-
tions and politicians. Thanks to an innovative and unique disaggregated dataset
on public spending, we are able to show precisely that the main objective of or-
ganised crime is to bias the allocation of resources towards specific sectors (i.e.
construction, waste management and police enforcement) which in turn benefits
the firms under their control. In addition, this study provides an analysis of the
welfare effect of such collusion by showing that infiltrated municipalities collect
fewer fiscal revenues. Finally, chapter 2 uncovers several important empirical
regularities between the characteristics of local elections and the probability of
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collusion between organised crime and local politicians. More precisely, we focus
on the systematic correlation between collusion and elections won by right-wing
parties, implementing a regression discontinuity based on close elections. Our re-
sults show that the probability of infiltration increases when the right-wing party
barely wins an election. We contribute to the literature that studies how criminal
organisations choose their political counterparts (Alesina et al., 2016; Pinotti and
Stanig, 2016; De Feo and De Luca, 2013) by providing evidence of a causal link
between organised crime and local politicians. In sum, this chapter represents the
first empirical study which measures the non-violent collusion between criminal
organisations and local politicians, and identifies its consequences for important
public policy decisions such as the allocation of public resources and the collection
of fiscal revenues.
THE EFFECT OF NEWS MEDIA ON ATTITUDES: EVIDENCE FROM CRIME
PERCEPTIONS IN ITALY
The second main theme of my dissertation is media bias. In a representative
system of government, policy outcomes are affected by the political preferences
and beliefs of voters. Voters in turn rely on media outlets to learn about politically
salient issues. This raises an important question: how strongly can media affect
public perceptions? In Chapter 3 (co-authored with Luigi Minale), we tackle this
question by investigating the influence of news media on beliefs and perceptions
individuals have about crime.
We do so in the context of Italy, a country where, for over a decade, a significant
share of traditional analogue TV channels has been under the influence of Silvio
Berlusconi in his dual role as media tycoon and Prime Minister. We document how
these TV channels systematically over-represent crime news compared to others.
We then study if and to what extent individuals revise their crime perceptions
once exposure to news provided by this group of channels is reduced.
We focus on crime perceptions for two reasons. First, crime is at the top of
people’s concerns in many countries, and is thus often at the centre of the political
debate.3 Secondly, there is evidence of a puzzling mismatch between individual
perceptions and actual data when it comes to crime rates. This is most probably
3As Appendix Figure A1 shows, people rank consistently crime among the first five (out of 15)
most important perceived problems in a number of European countries. Source: Eurobarometer.
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due to the fact that people, by having little observational experience about crime,
might tend to collect a relevant share of information about it through indirect
and secondary sources. Thus the providers of such information (i.e. the media)
are likely to play an important role in the formation of crime perceptions.
However, estimating the causal effect of the exposure to specific media on
individuals’ beliefs poses difficult identification issues, as people self-select news
media according to their news content (see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Durante
and Knight, 2012). We identify the causal effect by exploiting the staggered
introduction of the digital TV signal across Italian regions. Between 2008 and
2012, Italy gradually shifted from analogue to digital TV transmission: on specific
dates, which varied by region, the analogue signal was switched off and substituted
with the digital one. Around the digital switchover dates, the number of nationally
available free TV channels increased from about 7 to more than 50 within days.
Such a supply shock was accompanied by a drastic drop in the viewing shares
of the six main traditional analogue channels (Rai and Mediaset) from 82% in
June 2008 to 60% in June 2012, mostly in favour of the newly available digital
channels.4 We exploit the exogenous shift in viewing shares described above
to study if and to what extent individuals revise their perceptions about crime
when exposure to potentially biased news is reduced. We find that the increase
in the number of available TV channels - and the consequent lower exposure
to news broadcast by partisan ones - led individuals to revise downward their
perceptions of crime. The estimated negative effects of crime concern are larger for
individuals who spend more time watching television while using less frequently
other media such as the internet, radio and newspapers. Such individuals, by
gathering information mainly through TV and placing high weight on information
coming from it, were likely to be more exposed to the potential pre-reform bias,
thus responded more to changes in TV content. Older individuals spend more
time watching TV and have much less frequent access to other media than their
younger counterparts. In fact, individuals aged above 65 (and above 51 in some
specifications) drive most of our estimated effect. Crime is a salient topic of
the political debate and, as a consequence, is likely to be one of the drivers of
voters’ decisions. We indeed provide evidence that high concerns about crime are
correlated with support for the centre right coalitions. Then, using survey data we
4Source: AUDITEL data. http://www.auditel.it
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provide descriptive evidence to show that 2.4% of individuals older than 51 would
have changed their vote from centre right to centre left once they were exposed
to a reduced amount of crime news.
This paper fits into the growing literature of media bias and persuasive com-
munication. Most of these studies have investigated the impact of news media
on political outcomes (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikopolov et al., 2011;
Durante and Knight; 2012). Yet the mechanisms through which news affects in-
dividual voting decisions are still unclear. We contribute to these studies looking
at attitudes and perceptions of politically salient topics. More precisely, by pro-
viding causal evidence of the impact of news media on individual perceptions, we
shed light on one of the possible mechanisms through which media might ulti-
mately affect voting outcomes. Moreover, by exploiting unique viewership and
news content data, we are able to take the first step toward a measurement of
the elasticity of individuals’ beliefs to specific news reporting intensity. Individual
perceptions and beliefs are a central theme of my dissertation. The next chapter
will indeed investigate the role of news media in affecting investors’ opinions and
in anticipating the beginning of the European Sovereign Crisis.
THE POWER OF NEWS: COORDINATION AND CRISIS
Chapter 4 of my dissertation further explores the study of the economics and
politics of information. In particular, I theoretically and empirically assess the
impact of political information flows on sovereign volatility during the European
Debt Crisis. The European Sovereign Crisis presents an interesting case study due
to the challenge of explaining its outbreak through a simple analysis of economic
fundamentals. Why, for example, did the Greek spread escalate from 140 basis
points in early November 2009 to nearly 600 basis points in late March 2010?
In this paper, I tackle this question by arguing that, in order to understand
the outbreak of the debt crisis, there is a need to go beyond a mere analysis of
economic fundamentals. First, I present evidence that a significant part of the
surge on government bond spreads in the Eurozone was disconnected from un-
derlying changes in a number of economic indicators.5 I then study whether the
5The analyis will cover the standard measure of economic fundamentals (De Grauwe 2012).
Precisely: Budget Deficit (as % of GDP); Debt (as % GDP); current account; inflation; unem-
ployment. Also I look at measure of international risks such as VIX Index, CDS derivatives
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amount and the type of news related to sovereign debt might have played a role in
the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty among investors.
Precisely, I focus on political information which, by its nature, is not immedi-
ately quantifiable, more subjective and difficult to interpret. I define political
information as all the news about political stories/events related to the country’s
sovereign debt. This includes, but is not limited to, news reports on economic
policy uncertainty, stability of the government, policy making and legislative be-
haviours. I document a change in the frequency of this type of news related to
sovereign debt in the months and weeks preceding the crisis (when markets were
not in turmoil) and I investigate, theoretically and empirically, whether the noise
and uncertainty generated by these information flows might have anticipated the
outbreak of the debt crisis.
In order to test these claims empirically, I collect a unique and new dataset on
news from the main media outlets in a set of 5 European Countries from September
2007 to September 2014. Precisely I focus on Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany
and France. I then restrict my search to news related to sovereign debt and, in
particular, to media stories related to political aspects of the debt. Furthermore,
I also gathered data on “opinion pieces” written by prominent opinion makers.
An opinion piece is an article, published in a newspaper or magazine, that mainly
reflects the author’s opinion about the subject. Opinion pieces are featured in
many periodicals. In order to select which authors to follow, I have run qualitative
interviews among a sample of traders and asked them to provide a list of opinion
makers which are most commonly read by investors. I then manually coded the
tone of each news and opinion in my dataset.
Time series and dynamic panel estimations reveal that, conditional on a full
set of controls and falsification tests, the frequency of news is correlated to an
increase in bond prices. Specifically, dynamic panel regressions show a positive
and significant variation of the bond yield in countries where there was a change
in the number of sovereign debt related news items per day, compared to countries
where there was no change. The estimates reveal a significant correlation between
both news at time t and t-n on variation of spreads at time t. Interestingly, I find
a similar effect when I analyse the correlation between articles written by a set of
opinion makers which are daily followed by traders and the movements in spreads.
market.
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The results are robust to the introduction of a full set of controls, past values of
the dependent variable and of the explanatory variables, country fixed effects,
time fixed effects and linear time trends. Both time series and panel analysis
reveal a certain extent of country heterogeneity in the effect. More precisely, both
an increase in the total number of news and an increase in the country related
news do have a differential effect with peripheral countries exhibiting more severe
consequences on the spread.
It is not just the amount of news that matters, but also its tone. Basman
et al. (2015) investigate the effect of the tone of news on investors’ expectations
and beliefs. I adopt a similar approach by studying whether positive news has a
different impact on bond yields than negative news. I find that the tone of the
news does indeed have a significant effect on bond yields. More precisely, negative
news in country i at time t-1 increases significantly the sovereign spread of country
I at time t. On the contrary, positive news leads to a decrease in sovereign spread.
The results are remarkably stable across specifications and to the introduction of
a full set of controls, municipal fixed effects, time fixed effects and linear time
trends.
This paper fits into the literature looking at the determinants of bond yields
(Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2014; Manganelli and Wolwswijz, 2009; Alesina et
al., 1992, Bayouni et at., 1995) and aim to contribute to it. Most of the studies
have indeed focused on two main factors to explain the sovereign debt crisis.
First, they look at measures of international risk such as the Vix index or the
derivatives market, arguing that a high value of international risk leads to an
increase in yields spread (Geyer et al., 2004, Longstaff et al. 2007, Favero et al.,
2010, Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Second is the fiscal position of a country, and in
particular the measures of debt and deficit, and their impact on the credit risk of
the sovereign debt. These set of studies share two common characteristics. First,
in both these clusters politics is not considered as an important factor. Second,
they rely on the assumption that markets have perfect information about the
status of fundamentals. The global financial crisis, and the European Debt Crisis,
have challenged the heart of these assumptions: developed economies are not
immune from the financial markets contagion and volatility triggered by political
uncertainty (Leblang and Satyanath, 2013 and Phillips, 2014).
This paper differs from these studies in several dimensions and it makes a
number of contributions. First, it provides evidence that, although important in
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the unfolding of the crisis, neither proxies of economic fundamentals nor measures
of international risk can be used to explain the outbreak of the European sovereign
crisis. Second, it incorporates the important role of politics in the analysis of the
onset of the European crisis. It does so not by looking at standard institutional
proxies but rather at the day to day policy making processes. Third, it provides
a new dataset to measure the political uncertainty generated by variation in the
frequency, types and availability of information flows.
1.2 Data
Another important contribution of this thesis is the collection and analysis of new
datasets that will constitute a public good for other scholars interested in tack-
ling similar but also other research questions. The analysis presented in chapter 2
relies on an innovative and newly collected dataset of temporal and geographical
variations of infiltrated municipalities. In order to measure the collusion between
criminal organisations and politicians, we identified all the municipalities that
experienced government dissolution due to mafia infiltration from 1991 to 2013,
exploiting information on the date of the dissolution available from the Italian
Ministry of the Interior. The treatment variable, i.e. the number of infiltration
years, was manually created as a dummy variable taking value 1 from the year of
the last regular election before the dissolution, until the moment at which the mu-
nicipal government was dissolved, and zero otherwise. Importantly, the outcome
variables in chapter 2 are based on non-digitalised data from the Italian Ministry
of the Interior’s Financial Statements database. It contains yearly statistics on
the public finances of Italian Municipalities for a number of different spending cat-
egories. In order to ensure capture of the true effect under investigation, Chapter
2 also draws on a number of municipal level time-varying characteristics obtained
by multiple sources and, importantly, on measures of mafia violence and the local
level.6
In Chapter 3, our primary data source is the Multipurpose Household Survey,
by the Italian National Statistical Agency (ISTAT). From this survey, we employ
two measures of perceptions about crime. The first is the answer to the question
that asks “What do you think are the priority problems of the country?” We con-
struct an indicator variable for the individuals reporting crime as one of the three
6Italian Ministry of Interior, Italian Ministry of Justice, FBI, UNDC, DIA, DEA
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priority problems in Italy. These variables capture individuals’ concern about
crime, or, in other words, the level of salience of crime as a priority problem to be
tackled at the national level. In Chapter 3, we also attempt to quantify the effect
of exposure to crime news on crime perceptions. To do so, we combine unique data
on prime-time news programs for each TV channel with: a) the monthly amount
of crime-related news reported; and b) the region-specific monthly viewership. To
measure the shift in audience shares induced by the Digital Reform, we gathered
unique data about monthly, region-specific, viewing shares for each TV channel
available from 2007 until 2013. The data have been extracted from the official
Auditel dataset. To measure the number of crime news items reported by each
TV channel, we use data on prime-time newscasts collected by the “Pavia Ob-
servatory”, an independent research institute specializing in media analysis that
works in collaboration with the University of Pavia. We obtained data on the
monthly number of crime-related news items broadcast during primetime news
programs for each one of the main traditional TV channels and some others, from
2007 until 2013.
In Chapter 4, I study whether the amount and the type of news related to
sovereign debt might have played a role in the triggering of the crisis by increasing
the level of uncertainty among investors. Measuring uncertainty is not trivial. I
present a new dataset by focusing on news related to sovereign debt and, in
particular, to media stories on political aspects of the debt. Political news is less
straightforward to interpret since it encompasses elements of subjectivity and time
inconsistency. I apply two different research methodologies to collect a unique and
new dataset. The first method involved the analysis of professional databases such
as Factivia Dow Jones. I retrieved articles from two major newspapers in every
country under analysis. I then formulated a query looking at specific keywords.
The second research methodology involves the use of social media and, more
precisely, Twitter. Using Phyton programming language, I interacted directly
with the twitter API interface and, using a set of given keywords, I retrieved
3,640 news items. In addition, I have set the search to collect data on articles
written by prominent opinion makers. In order to select across opinion pieces, I
have run interviews with a sample of traders and asked them to provide a list of
opinion makers which are more commonly read. The analysis then benefits from
a variety of data sources which are listed and explained in details in chapter 4.
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1.3 Methodology
As argued by Falleti and Lynch (2009), “a recent surge of interest in the expla-
nations of mechanisms and the concomitant increase in the level of sophistication
of qualitative positivist methodologies, have given political scientists new tools to
bring to bear on the search for causal explanations”.7 This paper fits into the
“causality turn” of modern political science and it contributes to it by proposing
rigorous methodological approaches. More specifically, as seen previously, all three
chapters put forth and test causal hypotheses using observational data. Tackling
the research questions that this thesis studies poses significant theoretical and
empirical challenges. The identification of causal mechanisms is not trivial. This
is particularly the case in observational studies where the treatment assignment
cannot be controlled by the researcher and, as a consequence, the identification
of a causal effect is complicated because the selection of treatment might be bi-
ased. To address this challenge, my thesis uses innovative micro-level data and
advanced econometric techniques to identify causal effects from which to draw
policy relevant conclusions.
In Chapter 2, the ideal setting to study the effect of the collusion between
criminal organisations and local politicians would be to randomise organised crime
across municipalities. This, of course, cannot be done. The approach of this the-
sis is therefore to set up the best identification strategy to replicate as closely as
possible a randomised experiment. In Chapter 2, we employ a Difference – in
– Differences design to compare the effect of criminal collusion in municipalities
with and without the infiltration before and after such infiltration is terminated by
the national government. We are careful in testing that the assumptions behind
this model are well-respected. We show that there is no statistical difference in
pre-trends between treatment and control groups and that our results are robust
to changes in specification, Placebo tests, and the introduction of a full set of con-
trols. Chapter 2 also investigates the relationship between organised crime and
local politics. We show that municipalities where the right-wing parties win the
elections are positively correlated to criminal infiltrations. Although interesting,
this result cannot be interpreted causally. The electoral victory of a right-wing
candidate is plausibly correlated with a wide range of socioeconomic character-
istics of the municipality. To address this topic in a more causal fashion, we
7Falleti and Lynch (2009), p. 1143
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implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on close elections. We
investigate whether the probability of infiltration is a function of the victory of
right wing parties. We compare municipalities where right wing parties won local
elections by a narrow margin to municipalities where right-wing parties lost by
a narrow margin. The underlying assumption of this empirical exercise is that
municipalities where right-wing candidates won or lost by a narrow margin are
similar across all characteristics, except for the ideological leaning of the incum-
bent politician.
Chapter 3 faced a similar problem. Understanding the impact that the media
have in affecting individuals’ beliefs is a difficult task. Estimating a causal effect
poses difficult identification issues, as people self-select news media according to
their news content (see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010 and Durante and Knight,
2012). To overcome this problem, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment, i.e. the
staggered introduction of the Digital TV signal in Italy. We employ a Difference –
in – Differences strategy to test if individuals revise their perceptions about crime
when exposure to news programs broadcast by such specific groups of channels is
reduced, identifying a reduced-form (Intention to Treatment) effect of the Digital
Reform. In the second part of the paper, we attempt to quantify the effect of
exposure to crime news on crime perceptions. To do so, we combine unique data
on prime-time news programs for each TV channel in terms of: a) the monthly
amount of crime-related news reported; and b) the region-specific monthly view-
ership. We use the switch to digital signals to predict exogenous changes in the
exposure to crime news induced by the policy, and estimate the effect on crime
perceptions through a two-step method (Instrumental Variables).
In Chapter 4 I employ different techniques to investigate whether a different
type and tone of news media might have anticipated the beginning of the crisis.
Given that I am working with high frequency data, I employ different Time Series
techniques. I used AROMA and GARCH models to control for non-stationarity
in the data. Time series help to control for seasonality, autocorrelation across
time, and non-stationarity across the errors. However, conditional on controls, the
resulting variation in outcome variable would suffer from an omitted variable bias.
Precisely, these estimations do not take into account time-varying specific factors,
country-level fixed characteristics and any shocks that vary across countries. For
this reason, Chapter 4 also employs Dynamic Panel Regressions conditional on
fixed effects, time effect and linear and non-linear time trends.
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1.4 Road Map
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 studies the collusion
between criminal organisations and politicians and its impact on public policy
decisions and on local political outcomes. Chapters 3 presents our study of the
impact of media bias on individuals’ attitudes and on voting. In Chapter 4, I study
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and I attempt to provide an explanation of its
outbreak. Finally, in Chapter 5, I present my conclusions where I will summarise
the main results of each chapter and I will also consider the wider significance of
the findings for future research and their policy relevance.
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2 Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the
Allocation of Public Resources
2.1 Introduction
Organised crime is detrimental to the efficiency of any democratic or economic sys-
tem (Gambetta, 1993; Pinotti 2015, Acemoglu et al., 2013). Its presence reflects
institutional failure and has the potential to influence key aspects of legal economic
activity, ultimately undermining the long run development of any society (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). Its strength, as well as
its influence on the legal economy, relies on the diffused external complicity, i.e.
an increasing close relationship between organised crime groups and public offi-
cials such as national or local politicians and public administrators (Dickie, 2005).
Thanks to the development of such networks, organised crime has become highly
pervasive and fully integrated into the everyday socio-economic and political life
of many countries in the world (Trigilia, 2001; Allum and Sieber, 2003).
Yet understanding the extent to which these dynamics condition the choices
and activities of policy-makers is far from easy. What impact does collusion
between members of criminal organizations and politicians have on the allocation
of public resources and on the collection of fiscal revenues? In this paper, we tackle
this question by investigating a particular aspect of organised crime activity: its
“infiltration” within local governments. Such infiltration occurs when criminal
groups manage to capture local politicians who in turn manipulate policy decisions
in their favour. We study the case of Italy, country home to the first form of the
organised crime, by using a unique yearly municipal-level dataset for the three
Italian regions where organised crime is most widespread and rooted: Calabria,
Campania and Sicily.8
In order to measure the presence of organised crime, we exploit the stag-
gered enforcement of National Law 164/1991, which allows for the dissolution of
a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected officials and
8A focus on southern regions rather than on Italy as a whole has the advantage of restricting
the sample to a relatively homogenous area in terms of unobservable elements such as culture or
social capital, traditionally considered as highly diversified across this country (Putnam, 1993).
Municipalities are chosen as the unit of analysis because infiltrations often occur at the local
level, where the central State’s control over electoral and legislative processes is weaker (Cantone
and Di Feo, 2014). The dataset is available from 1998 to 2013.
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criminal organisations. Importantly, the enforcement of this law within a given
municipality at a specific point in time represents a sudden shock to both the
local political establishment and the organised crime group, given that its occur-
rence and timing is solely determined at the national level and kept secret until
its implementation.
More specifically, we exploit the enforcement of this policy to identify and
compare municipal governments with and without infiltration before and after
such infiltration occurs. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that the cap-
ture of local governments by organised crime does not affect the total level of
public spending but does have consequences both for the allocation of public
resources and the collection of fiscal revenues. In particular, infiltrated local gov-
ernments modify capital account expenditures in sectors that are strategic to the
interests of organised crime. For example, according to our estimates, infiltra-
tion leads to a 14% increase in the share of total investments in construction
and waste management. This effect is economically sizeable since it translates
into approximately an additional 180 euros per capita allocated to this spending
component. In addition, infiltration leads to a 29% decrease in the annual share
of investment in police force. In practice, considering that average investment in
law enforcement across municipalities is relatively low (0.4% of total investment
spending), during infiltration years such investments are nearly absent. Moreover,
infiltrated municipalities exhibit a lower ability to collect fiscal revenues, with the
effect primarily driven by a 15% decrease in revenue inflows from the waste and
garbage tax, translating into a loss of 130 euros per capita in collected revenues
on a yearly basis. We show that there is no statistical difference in pre-trends
between treatment and control group and that our results are robust to changes
in specification, Placebo tests, and the introduction of a full set of controls.
Our estimates could pick up some non-mafia related effects (e.g. low quality of
politicians, unstable governments) or be determined by political characteristics of
the municipal elections correlated with infiltrations. To address this issue, we per-
form a series of further tests, ensuring that our results are driven by mafia collusion
and not by any of these potentially unobserved components. More specifically,
we identify a set of political characteristics of municipal elections that could be
correlated with the probability of infiltration. Although descriptive, this exercise
is noteworthy in that it uncovers several interesting empirical correlations, namely
a relationship between infiltrations and elections where (1) there is just one can-
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didate running for office, (2) the mayor is running for her second and last term,
and (3) the right-wing party wins the election. Using our differences-in-differences
setting, we show that none of these factors have an impact on public spending or
on revenue collection.
In the final part of the paper, we focus on the systematic correlation between
collusion and elections won by right-wing parties, implementing a regression dis-
continuity design based on close elections. Our results show that the probability of
infiltration increases when the right-wing party barely wins an election. However,
closely elected right-wing governments are not systematically related to variations
in public spending during infiltration periods. These results further corroborate
our main hypothesis that the observed variation in public spending is due to collu-
sion between organised crime and politicians as opposed to any other unobserved
factors.
We are not the first to empirically study the presence and effect of organised
crime. An important strand of the economic literature focuses on the impact
of mafia-government linkages on political and electoral outcomes. For example,
Alesina et al. (2016) investigate how criminal organisations strategically use vi-
olence to influence elections and get captured politicians elected. Pinotti and
Stanig (2016) exploit as-if random variation in the presence of organised crime
in northern Italy, so as to study its impact on the quality of local governance.
Other studies have examined how criminal organisations choose their political
counterparts (Acemoglu, 2002; Dal Bo’, 2006; Buonanno et al., 2015), uncovering
different strategies. De Feo and De Luca (2013) argue that the mafia sells votes
to the party that has more core supporters and it is therefore expected to win.
Buonanno et al. (2016) find a systematic correlation between the strength of Cosa
Nostra and the proportion of votes for the main Italian conservative party.
The large majority of these studies have measured the presence and inten-
sity of mafia activity by employing proxies such as the number of mafia-related
crimes, murders, and violent attacks (Alesina et al., 2016; Daniele and Marani,
2011; Olivieri and Sberna, 2014; Barone and Narciso, 2015), historical or geolog-
ical indicators (Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012; De Feo and De Luca, 2013;
Buonanno et al., 2015; Buonanno et al., 2016), or artificial constructs for coun-
terfactual analysis (Pinotti, 2015). These measures aim to capture the impact
of organized crime in a broad sense, encompassing the whole range of possible
actions perpetrated by such criminal groups. They do not, however, take into
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consideration an important fact: organised crime in Italy has evolved over time,
progressively reducing the use of violence and becoming increasingly integrated
within the boundaries of democratic society, to the point that mafia activities
may no longer even be recognisable as criminal enterprises. While in conflict with
the State, criminal organisations do not wish to displace the latter but rather to
co-exist with it through the creation of a network based on mutual interests. As
a magistrate member of the AntiMafia District Directorate (DDA) commented,
“Today’s mafia no longer kills, no longer makes noise, and this makes it less iden-
tifiable as a criminal group. Our fight against them has therefore never been so
difficult”.9 Criminal organisations use violence only as a last resort when previous
strategies have failed. Indeed, violence is a suboptimal strategy in that it attracts
too much attention from enforcement authorities, undermining the primary objec-
tive of influencing policy decisions. The use of violence may reveal the extent, but
not the real strength, of organised crime. More importantly, the consequences of
successful criminal strategies that do not employ violence have yet to be empiri-
cally identified. By focusing on collusion between organised crime and politicians,
we aim to shed light on this more silent but equally dangerous phenomenon and
in doing so, assess its impact on economic and political outcomes.
Although there exists a large body of evidence on the distortion effect of cor-
ruption and the quality of governance for government spending (e.g. Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Gupta et al., 2001; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008;
Bandiera et al., 2009; Gennaioli and Onorato, 2010; Coviello and Mariniello, 2014;
Crescenzi et al., 2016), empirical research investigating the rent-seeking behaviour
of organised crime is relatively scarce. A notable exception is the recent paper
by Barone and Narciso (2015), which argues that the presence of organised crime
affects the distribution of national public funds to firms.10 However, the degree to
which the allocation of public resources is influenced by organised crime remains
a puzzle. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing the first empirical
analysis of the impact of collusion between organised crime and local politicians
9Interview with Giuseppe Borrelli, member of the Naples AntiMafia District Directorate
(Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia), on the italian television program ‘Report’, May 5th, 2016.
10More specifically, the paper analysed the role of organised crime in the allocation of national
public subsidies to businesses, with a focus on Sicilian Municipalities. Their dependent variable
is both the probability of receiving funding (extensive margin) and the amount of the margin
(intensive margin). Organised crime is measured by number of mafia related crimes. The case
study is Sicilian municipalities. Results show that organised crime positively affects both the
probability of obtaining funding and the amount of public funds.
33
on public spending, showing that rather than aiming to affect the overall level of
public spending, or engage in patronage by providing jobs in the public adminis-
tration, the main objective of illegal organisations is to re-direct resources towards
specific investment sectors.
The national law 164/1991 examined here has previously been employed in the
empirical literature (Acconcia et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015, 2016; Galletta,
2016).11 Our approach differs, however, from previous studies in that we aim
to capture the impact of organised crime infiltrations within local governments
rather than evaluate the effect of the 1991 law. More specifically, our focus is
on the period before the enforcement of the law, i.e. before the dissolution of
mafia-infiltrated municipalities took place.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides background
on organised crime infiltrations and local public spending; section 3 focuses on
the institutional setting used as a basis for the difference-in-differences analysis,
as well as discusses our identification strategy and the quasi-natural experiment
we rely on; section 4 discusses the data and section 5 presents the main results;
section 6 reports a set of robustness tests so as to demonstrate that the estimated
effects are truly driven by the mafia and studies in-depth the relationship between
right-wing parties and infiltration; section 6 concludes.
11Acconcia et al. (2014) exploit temporary contraction in public investment occurring in
post-dissolution periods to obtain estimates of the fiscal multiplier for Italian provinces. Daniele
and Geys (2015; 2016) provide an assessment of the impact of the 1991 law on different post-
dissolution outcomes, such as elected politicians’ levels of education and turnout at local elec-
tions. Galletta (2016) empirically investigates the presence of spillover effects resulting from the
strengthening of law 164/1991.
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2.2 Organised Crime and Political Capture
According to recent estimates, the total combined annual revenue of the Italian
mafia is €10.7 billion, with the Camorra and the ’Ndrangheta being the most prof-
itable organisations (Figure 2.11).The main sources of revenue are illegal activities
such as drug trafficking, extortion and corruption (Figure 2.2). These activities
generate a turnover approximately equal to 1.6% of the Italian GDP which, in
per capita terms, translates into 400 euros per year.
However, as stated by Schelling (1971), burglars may operate in the under-
world, but they seek to govern the real world. In fact, since the 1970s, organised
crime groups have become increasingly sophisticated and their business model has
shifted from one based on extortion to one based on entrepreneurship (Gambetta,
1993; Mete, 2016; Varese, 2000). The nature of the relationship between the mafia
and the State has consequently also changed: rather than representing an enemy
to fight, the government has instead become an opportunity to exploit. As Figure
2.3 shows, as a result of this shift a significant portion of the massive liquidity
generated by illegal activities is then re-invested into the legal economy, not just
in Italy but also in the United States.
A very high share of criminal organisations’ profits thus come from public
investments. Indeed, public finances are seen in the literature as one of the areas
most severely affected by the presence of corruption and collusive behaviour.12
However, empirical evidence on whether and how government expenditures are
conditioned by collusion between politicians and criminal organizations remains
limited. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying a specific activity of criminal
organisations: infiltration within local municipal governments.
According to Italian National Law 164/1991, infiltration occurs when organ-
ised crime captures local politicians in order to manipulate policy decisions in
their favour. This criminal strategy can be perpetrated in different ways. It can,
for example, occur directly, as in the case of Pompei (in the province of Naples)
12While the effect of corruption on overall level of public spending has been reported as
insignificant (Mauro, 1997), there is a substantial body of evidence emphasizing how collusion
or corruption impact the cost-effectiveness of public investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993;
Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Cadot et al., 2006; Crescenzi et al., 2016) as well as the specific
spending sectors in which governments decide to invest (Mauro, 1998; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999;
Gupta et al., 2001; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). Coviello and Mariniello (2014) exploit sharp
discontinuities in the values of auctions to test whether publicizing a public procurement auction
affects entry and the cost of procurement.
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where “the speaker of the municipal council has been identified as the main link be-
tween the local administration and the local mafia boss, who has also been arrested
in the same investigation”.13 Alternatively, it can be indirect, such as through
contamination of the electoral competition. This was the case in Plati’ (in the
province of Reggio Calabria), where “the party winning the electoral competition
benefitted from electoral favours from the local mafia group, who was able to divert
a large number of votes and aimed to mantain political control of the territory”.14
Finally, infiltration can occur simply through the use of threats and intimidations.
To this regard, Africo (in the province of Reggio Calabria) was dissolved because
“the policy decisions of the municipal council were not made freely and without
bias because local politicians were repeatedly intimidated and threatened by crimi-
nal organisations”.15 These examples are crucial to clarify just how infiltration is
defined: it is not simply the physical presence of criminal members within the lo-
cal government, but also any direct or indirect link between criminal organisations
and politicians.
Perhaps most importantly, the cases described above have in common the
absence of violence. Violence can, in fact, be seen as the failure of an effective
threat. More specifically, it is a suboptimal strategy in that attracts too much
attention from enforcement authorities thus undermining criminal groups’ main
objective, that of influencing policy decisions. Criminal organisations are now less
explicit, more subtle, and comparable to special interest groups (Grossman and
Helpman, 2001; Dal Bo and Di Tella, 2006; Wolton 2016), who through use of
intimidation and threats aim to protect and promote their interests by influencing
and manipulating official policy makers to their own advantage.16 The impact,
however, of an effective and successful threat remains unclear and is thus precisely
the empirical question we attempt to tackle in this paper.
13Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic no. 133 of
June 2001: http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2001/20010223/01A10530.htm
14Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic no. 119 of
Marzo 2012: http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2012/20120093/12A04237.htm
15Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic:
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2014/20140194/14A06583.htm
16The main difference between the Mafia and a “legal” interest group is the use of violence,
intimidation and physical punishment. For a good review on related theoretical models, see Dal
Bo, 2007. Wolton (2016) argues that “only a strong pro change special interest group is willing
to bear the cost of outside lobbying activities”. In this paper, we argue that organised crime,
with its range of strategies used to influence policy making, can be seen as a special form of
outside lobbying.
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We test whether elections represent the main opportunity for criminal organi-
sations to infiltrate local governments. Elections could be seen as a “recruitment
process” whereby a new bargaining table between criminals and politicians is es-
tablished (Dal Bo, 2006). This might particularly be the case in Southern Italy
where political turnover is very high: 71% of local administrators leave local
politics within 5 years and 93% within 10 years (Daniele and Geys, 2015). If
compliance with the mafia’s will is functional to the future political career of cor-
rupt mayors (Cantone and Di Feo, 2014), it can be expected that collusions would
bring about a system in which local politicians respond to the interests of criminal
groups, rather than those of the local community of citizens. Control over local
politicians facilitates the capture of public procurement contracts, in turn enabling
criminal organisations to provide business opportunities to the firms they control
as well as reinvest liquidity generated from illicit activities and, more broadly,
strengthen their control over the local territory.17 Infiltration consequently has
the potential to systematically distort policy-making throughout the entire period
in which corrupt politicians are in power.
In this paper, we empirically estimate the impact of this distortion on local
public finance and, in doing so, aim to gain a deeper understanding of the strate-
gic behaviour of criminal groups when they infiltrate local governments. Does
organised crime affect the overall level of public spending and the efficiency of the
administration? Does mafia patronage inflate the hiring of new personnel within
the public sector? Or do criminal organisations try to bias the allocation of in-
vestment expenditures towards specific sectors? It is difficult a priori to identify
a mafia modus operandi and the impact of the latter on the allocation of public
resources and on revenue collection at the local level. These are ultimately the
empirical questions we aim to address in this paper.
17Although the economic dimension of these organisations is global, the heart of their business
model is still very much based on the social consensus and legitimisation they enjoy at the local
level (Mete, 2015).
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Law 164/1991: dissolution of municipal governments due to
mafia infiltration
The rise in mafia infiltration within local administrations throughout the 1980s led
the Italian central government to introduce a tougher set of anti-mafia measures in
the early 1990s. In an effort to end collusion between local politicians and members
of organised crime, a new law was introduced in 1991, imposing the dissolution of a
city council upon evidence of ‘mafia infiltration’ within the local government; that
is, electoral competition contaminated by the mafia and/or policy decisions taken
by the government but clearly rigged by a criminal organisation (D.L. 31/05/1991
n.164).18 According to law 164/1991, the national government can decree the
dissolution of a municipal government “when evidence emerges regarding direct or
indirect links between members of the local government and criminal organisations
[. . . ] jeopardising the free will of the electoral body and the sound functioning of
the municipal administration”.19
The dissolution of a local government requires a number of steps. First, a
proposal for dissolution must be put forth by the provincial prefect, who has been
informed by either magistrates or the police of the risk of infiltration of a municipal
government. The prefect then establishes a commission composed of the vice-
prefect and officials from different law enforcement bodies (the Polizia di Stato, the
military Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza). The commission investigates
the local government’s activity over a period of three to six months, producing
a report which the prefect sends to the Ministry of Interior. Any proposal for
dissolution signed by the Minister must also be approved by the Cabinet (Council
of Ministers - Consiglio dei Ministri) and the President of the Republic before
being implemented. Municipalities where the local government is dissolved are
therefore those where the mafia infiltration has been attested to by the Italian
judicial system and confirmed by multiple political institutions. Importantly,
infiltrated municipalities are unaware that they are under investigation, as the
18Some of the most common reasons for dissolving a local government under law 194/1991
include: administrators or bureaucrats having an affinity with/kinship relation to members of
the criminal organisations or individuals with recurrent criminal records; permits awarded ille-
gitimately due to bid rigging; severe infringement of building regulations; absence of rigorous
inspections in the execution of public works; significant flaws in tax collection; cases of clien-
telism; illegal elections.
19http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2001/20010223/01A10530.htm
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process of dissolution is kept fully secret until its implementation. Once the
investigation is concluded, both the members of the criminal organisation and the
local politicians are arrested.
Upon removal of the infiltrated local administration, the central government
appoints three non-elected, external commissioners, who govern the municipality
for a period of 12 to 24 months and often make significant cuts to financial flows
into public investment projects (Acconcia et al., 2014; Galletta, 2016). At the end
of the transition period, regular elections are held.
As shown in figure 2.4, the large majority (and in some years all) of the dis-
solutions occurred in the three regions which form the focus of our study. Figure
2.5 illustrates the number of dissolved municipal governments due to mafia infil-
tration from the introduction of the law up until 2015. In total, there have been
258 detected cases of mafia infiltration into local governments over this period.
That said, within these three regions, the geographical distribution of dissolu-
tion varies significantly. As shown in figure 2.4, detected cases of mafia infiltration
tend to be clustered in several specific areas within these regions. In Campania,
the large majority of dissolutions occurred in the north-west, particularly in the
provinces of Caserta and Naples – the area where the Camorra is traditionally
strongest. Similarly, in the region of Calabria most detected infiltrations were lo-
cated in the south, in the provinces of Reggio Calabria and Vibo Valentia, where
the ‘Ndrangheta is known to be centred. Finally, while dissolutions in Sicily are
more widespread, the majority are concentrated in the province of Palermo, the
heart of Cosa Nostra.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
We rely on law 164/1991 to identify cases of mafia infiltration within local gov-
ernments of the municipalities in our sample regions. Our identification strategy
is based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting and exploits the time and ge-
ographical variation of dissolutions over time. The impact of criminal infiltrations
is estimated by comparing municipal governments with and without infiltration
before and after such infiltration is ended by the national government. We use
the dissolution of a municipal government to identify our treatment period. For
example, as shown in figure 2.6, the municipality of Casoria, in the province of
Naples (Campania), held local elections in 2002. The elected government was
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later dissolved at the end of 2005 and commissioners took over until the follow-
ing elections, at the beginning of 2008. Our treatment period thus ranges from
the election in 2002 to the dissolution in 2005. This decision reflects our aim to
identify the period of time during which organised crime was plausibly colluding
with the local government.20 The control group is composed by all non-dissolved
governments and by dissolved governments before the infiltration started and af-
ter it was ended. In this example, all years before 2002 and after 2007 make up
the control period.21 Crucially, due to the fact that external commissioners have
specific duties regarding the administration of public finance, all years between
the dissolution of a government and the subsequent elections are excluded from
the sample. Therefore, in the case of Casoria, the years 2006 and 2007 are not
considered in the estimations.
Unlike classic DiD strategies, our setting is based on a treatment period be-
ginning at different points in time for the treated municipalities. This framework
has the advantage of allowing us to restrict the full sample to those municipal-
ities that experienced at least one dissolution due to criminal infiltration. Such
an approach makes it possible to obtain a sample of very similar municipalities,
minimising unobservable heterogeneity. This is also the reason why we always run
our analysis with both the full (all municipalities of all our regions) and restricted
sample (only the dissolved municipalities of our sample). Performing this sample
restriction is indeed important because as seen in figure 2.4, the geography of
dissolutions reflects significant concentrations in specific provinces of the sample
regions. More specifically, the figure indicates that there are provinces with very
few or no dissolutions at all and that the intensity of mafia activities in these
territories is lower with respect to the core areas where the criminal organisations
are primarily based.22 Finally, an additional peculiarity of our setting is that the
treatment period turns on and the off, i.e. municipalities remain infiltrated until
they are dissolved.
Threats to identification. There are some potential concerns relative to our
20In both Daniele and Geys (2015; 2016) and Galletta (2016) the treatment period refers to
the years after the enforcement of the policy.
21We also perform an analysis where we limit the control to the years before infiltration (i.e.
excluding the years after dissolution). Estimates are reported in appendix A.15
22On a more technical note, this could present a concern for the other coefficients in the
regression analysis. However, once controlled for municipality fixed effects, the coefficient of
interest is not affected by never dissolved municipalities.
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identification strategy. First, the application of law 164/1991 may be imperfect.
Some municipalities could have been infiltrated but not dissolved because judicial
authorities did not detect the collusion. Similarly, some dissolutions may have
been done erroneously if there was no real infiltration. Fortunately, these issues
do not represent a concern for our estimation strategy. Infiltrated municipal
governments that are not dissolved would indeed belong entirely to the control
group, causing attenuation bias in the empirical results. Similarly, periods of
erroneously detected infiltration would instead belong to the treated years, again
biasing the estimated impact of infiltrations towards zero. This means that the
point estimate of regression coefficients is likely to be larger (in absolute value)
than the one observed.23
Econometrically, an additional concern for our analysis is that judicial in-
vestigators might start their investigations precisely in those municipalities that
present anomalies on their balance sheets. In this case, selection into treatment
(i.e. being dissolved by the national government) would be correlated with the
outcome variable (i.e. public spending and revenue collection). We tackle this
important issue in Section 2.6 showing that our results do not change, when we
exclude from sample those municipalities for which the main motive driving the
investigation and dissolution was related to either public spending or revenue
collection.
Another potential issue for our estimates could arise if the dissolution of mu-
nicipal governments has been manipulated politically. In other words, it may be
that the decision over which local governments to dissolve – or not to dissolve – is
driven by political considerations. If, for example, the main party of the national
government does not want to ‘lose’ the control of a local government ruled by the
same party or an allied party of the same political coalition.
This distorted use of law 164/1991 is, however, unlikely to happen for several
reasons. First, the dissolution process is initiated and carried forward by the
Italian Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia),
one of the most efficient investigative bodies of the Italian State.24 This is an
23For further discussion of this issue, refer to is results section.
24The Anti-Mafia Investigation Department (DIA) was founded in 1991, under the authority of
the Minister of Interior and the coordination of the National Anti-Mafia Directorate (Direzione
Nazionale Antimafia). The DIA’s operations include pre-emptive investigations and judicial
investigations. They also study the characteristics, objectives, and methods of organised crime
as well as examine the latter’s domestic and international contacts.
41
organisation composed of highly trained and specialised individuals from the three
main polices forces (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza),
whose experience is often valued and requested by other countries and institutions
needing consults on the fight against organised crime.25
In addition, the multiplicity of actors involved in the dissolution decision, from
national MPs to the Minister and the Cabinet to the President of the Republic,
makes any form of manipulation of the law improbable.26In order, however, to
provide as much evidence as possible, we perform a test to rule out the possi-
bility of systematic political manipulations. If dissolutions were manipulated, we
would expect to observe that the political colour of provincial and national gov-
ernments is significantly associated to the political colour of dissolved municipal
governments. As shown in Appendix A1, which refers to the restricted sample of
dissolved municipalities in the 1998-2013 period, there is no statistically signifi-
cant correlation between the colour of national or provincial governments and that
of municipal governments. Indeed, given the political cost generated by a dissolu-
tion for the national government –e.g. high national media coverage and political
competitors exploiting the latter by asking for the government’s resignation – it
is extremely unlikely that the national government would strategically choose to
dissolve municipal governments governed by opposing parties. It is important to
note, however, that even if this was true, our estimates would bias downwards,
since strategically manipulated dissolutions would be coded as treated, causing
an attenuation bias of coefficients.
25For example, the Italian Prosecutor Antonio Ingroia, who extensively investigated the Si-
cilian Mafia, was appointed Director of the United Nation-backed judicial watchdog in Guata-
mala, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatamala (CICIG). Another example
is Judge Giovanni Falcone, who in 1989 established the AntiTerrorism Unit in Quantico, Vir-
ginia, in collaboration with then Attorney Rudolph Giuliani. It is highly unlikely that these
professionals, together with other judges and prosecutors, would allow their investigations be
strategically used by politicians.
26The only case where a dissolution did not follow the normal legislative process is that of
Fondi. The local prefect, together with enforcement agencies, drafted a 500 page proposal
for the dissolution of this municipality. The Ministry of Interior then opted for a political
solution, asking the municipality to proceed immediately with new elections without sending
any commissioners and therefore officially dissolving the government. Fondi does not, therefore,
appear as a case of infiltration in our dataset. The case was covered by the Italian press and TV
news for weeks. The large amount of attention it drew leads us to two considerations: a) the
Government will try to avoid these situations and b) when they happen, they create so much
noise, that it is very easy to correct for them in our dataset. Finally, and more technically, given
that the press and opposition parties were concerned that new elections would not be sufficient
to get rid of the criminal infiltration, we would see an additional downward bias in our setting.
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Moreover, as mentioned, Italian local governments can also be dissolved for
reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration (e.g. resignation of the mayor, resigna-
tion of more than 50% of council members etc.). Hence, for politicians wishing
to undermine the stability of a given municipality ruled by an opposing party,
such routes would certainly represent cheaper and easier options than trying to
establish a false mafia case.
A final potential issue with our empirical setting is that the definition of our
treatment and control observations is based on the assumption that the entire
period between the election of a local government and its dissolution consists
of infiltration years. This implies that the infiltration began at the moment of
election of a later-dissolved government. While this hypothesis may be true for
many infiltrated municipalities where electoral manipulation brought to power
local governments subject to the conditioning of the mafia from the very moment
they took office, it may not hold for other dissolved municipalities where the
timing of the infiltration was different. It is therefore important to test whether
we find any effect on our outcome variables in the years preceding the elections.
We deal with this issue in the empirical analysis.
2.4 Data and Estimating Equation
2.4.1 Data
Local public spending. Our primary data source is the Italian Ministry of In-
terior’s Financial Statement Certificates (Certificati Consuntivi) database, which
contains yearly statistics on the public finances of Italian municipalities for a num-
ber of different spending categories.27 The full dataset is disaggregated into capital
account and current account expenditures. These are further disaggregated into
six specific spending categories.28 These different categories reflect the services
27In Reading Appendix A.2.1, we provide a short overview of the political system of Italian
municipalities.
28Capital account and current account are further sub-divided into three spending sections:
spending decisions, year-over-year spending and residuals. Spending decisions correspond to
the amount of financial resources a municipality plans to spend over the course of the following
year, determined at the end of the current year. Year-over-year spending refers to that which the
municipal government has actually spent, calculated at the end of the year. Residuals consist of
the resources that have not been spent. Throughout our analysis, we adopt spending decisions
as a spending proxy as data on residuals and year-over year spending is much more fragmented,
less reliable and less homogeneous. In addition, in some cases year-over-year spending includes
expenditures planned by previous governments, while our intention is to capture the conditioning
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and functions to which the resources have been allocated and spent and include:
general administrative functions, social sectors, construction and waste manage-
ment, transportation, public education and municipal police.29 This dataset is
available for the 1998-2013 time period.
Table 2.1 and appendix A2.2 illustrate average per capita spending for the
municipalities in our sample over the 1998-2013 period. The resources spent by
the municipalities amounts to a yearly average of €543 per inhabitant for the
capital account (i.e. investments) and a yearly per capita average of €731 for the
current account (i.e. salaries and services). Summing these two figures we obtain
the average total spending per municipality, €1,274 per inhabitant. As shown
in Table 2.1, the spending function to which the most annual resources are allo-
cated is construction and management, which makes up 34% of the annual capital
account budget.30 As for the current account, spending is highest for adminis-
tration, followed by construction and waste management. The municipalities are
also responsible for tendering and awarding public procurement contracts to the
contractor company in charge of carrying out the work.
Infiltrated municipalities. In order to measure the infiltration of organised
crime within local governments, we identified all municipalities that experienced
government dissolution due to mafia infiltration from 1991 to 2013, exploiting
information on the date of the dissolution available from the Ministry of the
Interior. The treatment variable was created as a dummy taking value 1 from the
year of the last regular election before the dissolution until the moment in which
the municipal government was dissolved, and zero otherwise. Data on the date
of local elections before dissolutions were obtained from the Historical Archive of
Local Elections, publicly available from the Italian Ministry of the Interior.
Mafia homicides and other control variables. Data on mafia-related
homicides in each province and year of our sample were provided by the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The data were collected by the Ministry
of Interior and classified according to the Italian Penal Code.
A number of municipal level time-varying characteristics were also obtained
from the ISTAT Censuses including unemployment rate, percentage of industry
role of mafia infiltrations on policy decisions taken specifically by the infiltrated governments.
29Refer to Reading Appendix A.2.2 for additional details.
30Average spending for construction and waste management is €382 per year, €217 for the
capital account and €147 for the current account. The second largest investment sector is
transportation, the third is administration.
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employment, percentage of agricultural employment, and percentage of tertiary
education degree holders.31
2.4.2 Estimating equation
We exploit a difference-in-differences setting to test whether mafia infiltrations
have an impact on the public spending allocations of local governments in Cam-
pania, Calabria and Sicily. To this end, we compare municipal governments with
and without infiltration before and after such infiltration is ended by the national
government through the application of law 164/1991.
We estimate various versions of the following model:
ym,t+1 = α + βInfm,t + γMafiap,t + δXm,t + ϕm + τt + εm,t (2.1)
Where ym,t+1refers to public spending in municipality m at time t+1.32
More precisely, ym,t+1is PSc,m,t+1∑
c
PSm,t+1
, i.e. the spending allocated to component
c as a share of the total spending committed to the next financial year. Total
spending is calculated per capita.33
The key variable in the model is Infm,t, a dummy taking value one if a mu-
nicipality is led by a government dissolved for mafia infiltration in year t, and
zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β which captures the impact of the
infiltration at time t on the public spending allocation at time t+1.
As our main aim is to identify the effect of a specific activity part of organised
crime – the impact of temporary infiltration on governments’ spending decisions
– we need to control for the underlying strength of the mafia groups across mu-
nicipalities. This is necessary as, otherwise the observed effect on public spending
allocation would not be driven by the mafia-government collusion but by some
pre-existing trend. This issue is tackled in two ways. First, we include in the
model a control variable Mafiap.t, referring to mafia-related homicides and used
as a proxy for the underlying strength of the mafia in the province of the mu-
nicipality at time t. Second, we always test the results by performing a second
estimation where we restrict our sample to municipalities that have seen their
31See Appendix A2.3 for the descriptive statistics.
32The time lead derives from the fact that our dependent variable is based on spending
decisions defined at the end of the financial year,. This reduces issues of reverse causation as
our main variable of interest is measured at time t.
33
∑
c
PSm,t+1
popm,t
is the total per capita spending allocated by a municipal government
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government dissolved at least once. This allows us to both reduce unobservable
heterogeneity and conduct the analysis on a sample of more similar municipali-
ties.34 Hence, in the empirical analysis, we always perform two estimations: one
with the full sample and one with the restricted sample.
Vector Xm,t denotes a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics
of municipalities in the sample regions. The data are drawn from the 1991, 2001
and 2011 ISTAT Censuses interpolated over time.
The model is completed by municipality dummy variables, controlling for time-
invariant unobservables correlated with the timing of the infiltration (ϕm), and
time fixed effects, controlling for year-specific shocks (τt). Finally, εm,t is an
idiosyncratic error term. Throughout the empirical analysis we cluster standard
errors at the municipal level.
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Does the infiltration of organised crime affect the overall level
of public spending?
We begin by presenting the estimates of the effect of mafia infiltration on total
municipal spending (Table 2.1). In columns (1) and (2) we focus our attention
on total spending commitments per capita. The model is initially estimated for
the full sample of 1,350 municipalities from Calabria, Campania and Sicily (col-
umn (1)). In column (2) we restrict the sample to a group of more homogeneous
municipalities – those 182 having experienced at least one government dissolution
for mafia infiltration. In the following columns, we sub-divide total overall spend-
ing into total capital account spending per capita (columns (3)-(4)) and total
current account spending per capita (columns (5)-(6)). All estimations include
municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables.
Throughout all the different specifications, the coefficients of the infiltration
dummies in Table 2.1 are not statistically significant. The highest point estimates
(in absolute value) are obtained in column (1), a lower public spending for infil-
trated municipalities by 28 euros per capita. Yet, as for all the other coefficients,
this is not statistically different from zero. Hence, the results provide evidence
34This estimation does not, however, rule out the possibility that in some municipalities the
effect of infiltration is stronger because the presence of organised crime is also stronger in that
particular location.
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that, other things equal, infiltration periods are not associated with significant
variations in the total amount of local government expenditures, either for public
investments (capital account) or for services and maintenance (current account).
Our findings differ from those of Olivieri and Sberna (2014), who report a pos-
itive relationship between pre-electoral mafia violence and total public investment
in local municipalities in Southern Italy. The difference may be due to the fact
that we do not focus on violent attacks on the part of organised crime, but on
criminal infiltration within politics. Accordingly, one interpretation of our results
is that when mafia groups infiltrate local governments, they are not interested in
forcing a modification of overall aggregate spending. Indeed, if municipal gov-
ernments were running constant budget deficits during infiltration periods, they
would risk being taken over by the central government for reasons of financial
instability, thus leaving the criminal organisation without reliable political con-
nections within the local council.35 Rather, a way to coercively condition the
public financing of infiltrated governments may be to modify their investment
policies precisely in those sectors that are strategic to protecting the interests of
organised crime. One might thus ask, when infiltrating local governments, does the
mafia engage in patronage behaviours? Or does it bias the allocation of resources
toward specific spending components? In an effort to answer these questions, we
break down total spending into different items of expenditure.
2.5.2 Does the infiltration of organised crime affect specific spending
components?
We test whether criminal infiltrations significantly affect the allocation of public
resources by comparing each of the spending items of infiltrated governments with
those of non-infiltrated governments before and after this infiltration is terminated
ended.36
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Each spending
item is measured as a share of the total annual spending. The main variable of
interest is Infm,twhich takes value one if the municipality m is infiltrated at time
t.
35Article 244 of the Unified Text Governing Local Authorities (Testo Unico Enti Locali -
TUEL) foresees the possibility of declaring a municipalities as financially instable (dissesto
finanziario) when they are unable to provide basic functions, services and public goods.
36As mentioned above, the six fundamental areas of municipal public finance are: administra-
tion, social sector, construction and waste management, transportation, public education, and
local police.
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For each spending item, the model is estimated both for the full sample of
municipalities and for the restricted sample of municipalities who have had their
government dissolved at least once. Note that most of the current account spend-
ing components (Table 2.4) display insignificant coefficients. Particularly interest-
ing is the administration spending component. If organized crime had invested in
patronage behaviour, thus inflating the hiring of public administration personnel,
the coefficient would have been positive and significant.37 We do not observe this
effect. The only significant effect is on municipal police.
When we turn our attention to capital spending (Table 2.3), i.e. investments,
we find that on average infiltrated municipalities spend more on construction and
waste management (columns (5)-(6)) and less on municipal police (columns (11)-
(12)). These results are consistent across both specifications, remaining significant
and with similar magnitude. A first look at these results indicates that upon
infiltration, organized crime’s main strategy is to bias the allocation of resources
towards specific sectors rather than affect total spending or engage in patronal
behaviours. We provide a more comprehensive interpretation of these results
below.
Construction and waste management. According to the estimates in Ta-
ble 2.3, infiltrated governments increase investment spending on construction and
waste management. The estimated effect is economically relevant: infiltrated mu-
nicipalities increase spending on construction and waste management by 0.0448
percentage points, corresponding to about a 14% change compared to average
spending on construction and waste management in non-treated municipalities
(equal to 0.34).38 This is a large figure if we consider that functions related to
constructions and waste management already account for the largest part of the
capital account budget (Table 2.1). Moreover, there is an average annual effect
that is distributed over the entire period a government is in control. Municipal
administrations can last up to five years, and the average infiltration period in our
sample of municipalities is 2.7 years.39 Therefore, any additional resources these
37One of the strategies commonly employed by organized crime is to offer employment within
the public sector in exchange for various forms of support (Gambetta, 1993)
38In appendix Table 2A.1we replicate our analysis, gradually increasing the number and type
of controls and including linear time trends. We then present the results for both the full and
restricted sample over the period 1998-2013.
39At the end of each fiscal year, local governments must approve plans for the financing of
public works, set to be realised either within the same year or part of a three-year plan. Annual
plans include all projects below 100,000 euros, while three-year plans are for projects above
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governments allocate to this sector during a period of infiltration can be substan-
tial. In per capita terms, given an average yearly total spending of 1,273 euro per
capita, infiltrated municipalities redirect an additional 179 euros to construction
and waste management (Table 2.1).
This particular spending item includes all expenses for waste collection and
the construction of new buildings, bridges, streets and highways. This represents
a strategic sector for the interests of criminal organisations for many important
reasons. First, mafia groups need to find an outlet for profits obtained from ille-
gal activities and the construction sector represents an easy and highly profitable
option for money laundering. In addition, the technological and financial barriers
to entry are relatively low, making this an ideal area for long-term investment.
Second, the area of construction and waste management is associated with a set
of activities that are deeply embedded within the local territory. Seizing control
of these activities is crucial for the mafia, so as to establish and expand a wide
network of relationships, allowing the latter not only to survive, but to prosper.
The construction of new buildings and the collection of waste involve many agents:
political leaders in charge of awarding public work tenders, contractor enterprises
responsible for delivering the project, and a labour pool to carry out the work.
Members of organised crime groups may be involved at all levels of this chain,
and in the fashion of most traditional of interest groups, they exploit the polit-
ical connections they have in order to rig public work bids to the advantage of
the enterprises they control, or intend to favour. Moreover, access to privileged
information on future bids and winning contractors allows the mafia to offer em-
ployment, therefore directly managing an important portion of the local labour
market (Sciarrone, 2011).
This is thus the context in which infiltrations occur, and highlights the im-
portance of being able to reproduce this cycle. Having political referents within
local governments translates into the possibility of steering the outcomes of public
work tenders and increasing the profits of affiliated firms. The more buildings to
be constructed, the more contracts that will be awarded and the higher the po-
tential gains for the criminal organisation. Figure 2.7 shows the number of firms,
disaggregated by business sector, confiscated by police due to collusion with or-
this figure. While yearly plans are binding, three-year plans can annually be updated with new
projects. Urban planning interventions represent a key prerogative of local administrations, and
regional or national level governments have little say over these kinds of policy initiatives.
49
ganised crime. In line with the above estimates, the majority operate in the
construction and waste management sector. The creation of collusive cartels be-
tween politicians, mafiosi, and entrepreneurs in the construction market not only
causes distortion in the competition for public works, but also seriously inflates
expenditures in this particular sector.
Municipal police. The second significant variation in the local public fi-
nances of infiltrated governments is spending on municipal police. A significant
decrease is seen both for the capital account and for the current account spending
in this sector. Our estimates in Table 2.3 report an annual reduction in the share
of total capital account spending for municipal police.40 While this might seem
like a low figure, it should be compared to the average share of investment in local
police forces made by municipal governments in our sample. As shown in Table
2.1, the proportion of capital account resources that local governments allocate
to this sector is about 0.3% of the total for the full sample of municipalities, and
0.7% for the municipalities who had their government dissolved at least once.
Therefore, an average annual reduction of about 0.2 percentage points, as per our
estimates (column 11), represents a considerable change, equal approximately to
29%. In practice, given that police expenditures are typically low, they are thus
nearly absent in infiltration years.
According to the estimates in Table 4, infiltrations also lead to a significant
reduction in spending on municipal police as part of the current account. This
corresponds, however, to a less radical change in budget decisions with respect
to that reported for capital account, given the average share of current account
expenditures allocated to municipal police (Table 2.1).
And yet, if we add up the current and the capital account effects, a clear pat-
tern emerges indicating that infiltrated governments tend to refrain from making
expenditures on local police forces. A reduction of resources directed towards
law enforcement bodies such as the municipal police may directly benefit the
criminal organisations, facilitating their illegal activities. Indeed, the local police
are responsible for maintaining public order and security, a task shared with the
national police (Polizia di Stato) and low-quality equipment may imply a lesser
ability to fight crimes such as drug trafficking, usury and murders. Perhaps most
40In appendix Table 2A.2 we replicate our analysis, gradually increasing the number and
type of controls and including linear time trends. We present the results for both the full and
restricted sample over the period 1998-2013.
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importantly, local police are also responsible for so-called ‘administrative police’
functions, including surveillance over construction works and abidance with build-
ing regulations. Given that a lack of compliance with building regulations is one
of the most frequent motivations for government dissolutions, allocating fewer re-
sources to municipal police forces may also be one of the ways in which corrupt
local politicians attempt to prevent dissolutions.
2.5.3 Does the infiltration of organised crime affect local revenue col-
lection?
We now turn to whether infiltration also has an impact on the ability of the
local governments to collect fiscal revenues. Given the quasi-federal structure
of the Italian State, municipalities are expected to maintain a certain level of
independence and autonomy in collecting their own financial resources. Hence,
local taxes represent an important source of income for municipalities.41
In order to assess the performance of municipal governments, we follow Drago
et al. (2014), constructing a measure of efficiency in revenue collection calculated
as the ratio between collected revenues and the total amount of forecasted revenues
that the municipality should collect within the budget year. We focus on the two
main local taxes, i.e. property tax and waste tax, and on total taxes and total
collected revenues.42 As Figure 2A.8 shows, property tax and waste tax are the
main source of income in the municipal budget.
Exploiting our difference–in–differences setting, we present our analysis in Ta-
ble 2.5. The estimation includes municipal fixed effects, time fixed effect and a
wide range of control variables including a measure of criminal violence. For each
outcome variable, we estimate our model with the full and the restricted sample.
In both cases, infiltrated local governments exhibit a lesser ability to collect fiscal
revenues. Indeed, although (barely) not significant, the coefficients for Total_tax
and Total_revenues are both negative.43 More importantly, the coefficient on
41Local revenues correspond on average to 52% of the entire budget for Italian municipalities
(Daniele et al., 2016, IFEL, 2014).
42Our data come from Certificates on Financial Statements (Certificati Consuntivi - quadro
2 ). This analysis is based on a panel dataset that began in 1999 and ended in 2012. Total taxes
represent the total fiscal inflows for a municipality. Total Revenues also include transfers from
the National Government.
43Although not significant, the direction of our coefficient is in line with results from Daniele
et al. 2016. They focus on the period post dissolution and after commissioning, uncovering that
a newly elected local government has a lesser ability to collect fiscal revenues.
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Waste Tax (Column 7) is negative and significant. The effect is economically
sizeable: according to our estimates, infiltrated municipalities collect 15% less
taxes on waste and garbage compared to the average of non–treated municipali-
ties (baseline average is 0.14), translating into a loss of approximately 130 euros
per capita every year. The result is stable to the inclusion of our set of controls
and to the restriction of the sample (Column 8). The interpretation of this result
is twofold. First, the direct or indirect presence of criminal organisations within
the municipal government is a silent metastasis that has a profound impact on
the performance of the local government. Indeed, tax evasion generates significant
losses and distortions in government revenues; the ability to efficiently enforce tax
collection is one of the fundamental components of state capacity (Casaburi &
Troiano, 2016). As shown in Figure 2A.8, Waste Tax represents 22% of the mu-
nicipal budget (total revenues are on average 2.8 million euros per year). Second,
lower fiscal revenues correspond to a precise strategy on the part of criminal or-
ganisations ( Barone & Narciso, Daniele & Geys, 2016; Trocchia 2009) who aim to
weaken the presence and reputation of the State in order to open up the possibil-
ity of substituting it through a system of provision of private favours. Moreover,
this result, together with the evidence on spending on construction and waste
management uncovered in section 5.2, seems to confirm the well-known presence
of criminal organisations within the waste management sector.44
Finally, we also exploit another measure of state efficiency. In 2007, the Italian
government instituted a nationwide anti-evasion policy, the Ghost Buildings pro-
gram. The program identified ghost buildings — properties not listed in the land
registry and thus hidden from tax authorities — by overlaying aerial photographs
and digital land registry maps (Casabury & Troiano, 2016).45Municipalities play a
44The connection between the waste hauling industry and organized crime dates back decades.
In the U.S., Cosa Nostra has been part of New York’s commercial sanitation system since at
least the 1950s (personal trash is hauled by the city’s Department of Sanitation). “Carters”, or
trash haulers, have always been able to carve out and sell routes to one another, making the
system vulnerable to strong-arm tactics. The Camorra is said to have controlled garbage in
the city of Naples since the early 1980s. The poorly run system attracted worldwide attention
when, back in 2008, uncollected garbage piled up on the city’s streets for more than two weeks
because the Mafia had closed the dumps.
45The Regional Agency (Agenzia del Territorio) coordinated the effort. The Agency first
juxtaposed land and building registry maps to obtain an Official Building Map. It subsequently
compiled high-resolution (50 cm) aerial photographs of the entire country so as identify the
ghost buildings. Appendix Figures A.1A-A.1C summarize the identification steps. First, the
aerial photograph of a particular location was created. Then, the pictures were matched with
the official building map for the corresponding area. Finally, the ghost buildings were identified
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key role in identifying ghost buildings in their respective territories. The intensity
of such identification varies significantly, however, across municipalities. Following
Casaburi & Troiano (2016), we use a measure of Ghost Building Intensity, or the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program,
to measure the tax enforcement attitude of each municipality.46 More specifically,
we use the number of identified ghost buildings as a proxy for the civic sense and
civic duty of the local municipal government. Using our difference–in-differences
setting, we present the results in Table 2.6. The negative coefficient reveals that,
on average, infiltrated municipalities register and declare fewer ghost buildings.
We interpret this result as in line with our previous findings. When local govern-
ments are captured by criminal organisations, the efficiency of the administration,
its civic sense, and its compliance with rules decrease. This undermines the entire
social welfare of the local community.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present a selection of important tests used to verify the robust-
ness of our design and our estimates. Additional robustness checks are presented
in appendix A.3.47
Infiltration period starts with the elections. As discussed in section
2.3.2, the starting assumption of our identification strategy is that the period of
infiltration begins at the moment of the election of later-dissolved governments
and ends with the dissolution. We test the validity of this assumption in Table
7, where we perform a placebo experiment on our full sample.48 If significant
variation in both public investments and revenue collection starts in the period
preceding infiltration, the decision to infiltrate a government might be taken as a
result of this variation. This would occur if the criminal organisation were select-
ing municipalities where to extract rents on the basis of pre-determined variations
(Casaburi & Troiano, 2016).
46Casaburi and Troiano (2016) use a difference-in-differences approach, to test the impact
of the antievasion policy on the reelection of local incumbents by exploiting cross-municipality
variation in the Ghost Building Intensity
47Appendix 2A.1/2/3 presents the following tests for all our results. a) We present the analysis
with both the full and the restricted sample; b) for each of these estimations, in columns 1 to
3, we gradually increase our controls and include linear time trends; c) in column 4, we change
the specification and let the infiltration dummy enter with a one-year lag. Section 2A.1/2/3 in
the appendix provides a full explanation of the estimations.
48The same analysis of the restricted sample can also be found in Table 2.7.
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in public expenditures or local taxes, made by governments with no links with or-
ganised crime. If this is the case, public spending decisions are the cause, not the
consequence, of organised crime infiltrations. Our placebo test verifies the spend-
ing behaviour and the revenue collection of those governments later dissolved for
mafia infiltration. In Table 2.7, for each of our outcome variables, Column 1 re-
ports the result of our full model as expressed in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Columns 2
and 3 introduce two new dummy variables taking value 1 respectively 1 year (Col-
umn 2) and 2 years (Column 3) immediately before the election of later-dissolved
government. All years coded as ‘infiltration years’ – from election to dissolution
– are excluded from the sample. We expect to find no significant correlation be-
tween pre-infiltration governments and any form of public spending or revenue
collection distortion. All the coefficients in Columns 2 and 3 are insignificant,
suggesting that the observed effects on public spending and revenue collection are
significantly affected only during infiltration years.
Although we cannot reject with full certainty the possibility that infiltrations
begin before elections, the results of our placebo test seem to follow the theoretical
framework of Dal Bo (2006), according to which elections constitute a “recruitment
process” whereby a new bargaining table between crime and politics is established.
This might particularly be true in the case in Southern Italy where the political
turnover is very high: 71% of local administrators leave local politics within 5 years
and 93% within 10 years (Daniele and Geys, 2015). In this context, elections are
crucial because they can constitute a turning point whereby the “criminal interest
groups” select the political counter-parties that best suit their interests. Hence,
the striking difference in all the coefficients from column 1 to column 2 – 3 in Table
2.7 might be explained as a newly renovated agreement between mafia members
and politicians which in turn leads to a distortion in the allocation of public
resources and revenue collection.
Parallel trend - full dynamic specification. When the sample includes
many years, the DiD model lends itself to a test of causality in the spirit of Granger
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). More specifically, a Granger causality test (or full
dynamic model) allows us to observe whether causes happen before consequences,
or vice versa. It therefore provides an additional control for simultaneous causality
that analyses the dynamic evolution over time of the local spending determined by
the infiltration. In this specific context, Granger causality testing means checking
whether there is any statistically significant difference between infiltrated and
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non-infiltrated municipalities before the infiltration takes place. In order to do
this, a set of dummy variables is created for each and every year of the treatment
period, i.e. the period from the governments’ election to their dissolution. Similar
dummy variables are also constructed for pre-treatment years, while one additional
dummy is created for the whole post-treatment period.
Formally, we estimate the following equation:
Ym,t+1 = ϕm + τt +
ρ∑
τ=0
δ−τInfm,t−τ +
q∑
τ=1
δ+τDm,t+τ +Xm,tβ + εm,t (2.2)
Where ρ represents the post-treatment effect and q represents the anticipatory
effect.49 We have thus re-estimated the model for the main dependent variables
(capital account spending for construction and waste management and for mu-
nicipal police) by including this set of leads and lags, again controlling for fixed-
time effects and municipality time trends.Figures 2A.3 and 2A.4 in the Appendix
display the result of the analysis for both public spending and for revenue col-
lection.We assess the evolution of municipal spending: up to 2 years before the
election of an infiltrated government, during the period in which the infiltrated
government was in charge, and in the post-dissolution years. Each point in the
Figures refers to the estimated coefficient for a given year. 50
Importantly, for all our results, the estimates reveal no statistical difference in
the pre-treatment trends between control and treatment group. In all the Figures,
the 2 pre-treatment years show that, before the infiltrated governments, there is
very limited and not significant variations in either the share of public investments
(in construction, waste management and police) or in the collection of fiscal re-
sources. Hence, there is no evidence that the significant change in the proportion
of investments and revenues precedes the election of an infiltrated government.51
49Given that some municipalities experienced more than one government dissolution, the post-
treatment period cannot be codified as continuous in these cases. As a result, all municipalities
with more than one infiltrated government in the 1998-2013 period have been excluded from
the sample for this test. In the case of municipalities that experienced a government dissolution
prior to 1998, the post-treatment dummy takes value 1 for the entire period of analysis.
50The number of years of legislature - and corresponding number of municipalities - before
dissolutions are as follows: 1 year - 117 municipalities; 2 years - 110 municipalities; 3 years -78
municipalities; 4 years - 49 municipalities; 5 years - 23 municipalities.
51Figure 2A.3 shows a jump in investments in construction and waste management in the first
year after local election. This may be due to the fact that the second budget year is also the last
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This is a fundamental test not just because it addresses an important criteria
of the Difference – in – Differences estimation, but also because it provides the
highest level of transparency of the dynamicity of the effect before and after the
beginning of the treatment.
Selection into treatment correlated with outcome variable. Our re-
sults indicate that infiltrated local governments spend on average more on con-
struction and waste management and less on municipal police. One concern,
however, is that judicial investigators might choose to investigate precisely those
municipalities that present anomalies in their balance sheets. If this is the case,
selection into treatment would be correlated with the dependent variable, and
there would therefore be bias.
In order to tackle this issue, we reproduced our analysis excluding from the
sample all those municipalities for which the main reason for dissolution was re-
lated to distortion in the allocation of resources.52 Table 2A.7 provides the results,
showing that reductions in police force investments and increases in construction
and waste management don’t just remain significant but they also increase in
magnitude. Columns 1 and 3 provide the point estimates for both capital spend-
ing in police and construction. The only coefficient that turns insignificant refers
to the current account spending for municipal police.53 Hence, according to the
estimates in Table 2A.7 we can safely dismiss the concern that our results were
driven by a bias in the selection into treatment.
Placebo test: organised crime - unrelated dissolutions. One concern
related to the changes in the public spending of infiltrated governments is that,
rather than being caused by the mafia, they might be driven by some inherent
characteristics of dissolved local governments. These may include the degree of
political instability, or the quality of politicians governing these local councils. In
one in which governments can promote three-year investment plans of public works and hope to
see the end of construction work while still in office. These medium-term investment initiatives
are potentially very appealing to the mafia due to their higher monetary value as compared to
single-year plans – as mentioned, three-year plans concern public works over 100,000 Euros.
52To perform this test, we exploit official statements on the dissolutions. These documents
contain precise descriptions not only of the final reason for the dissolution, but also why the
investigation was begun. We exclude from our sample all the municipalities for which a) the
investigation started and/or b) the reason for the dissolution was due to spending related dis-
tortions. In doing so we excluded 14% of the sample.
53This does not come as a surprise because this result was very weak in the main analysis as
well. We do not know if the loss of significance is simply due to the lower statistical power or if
it is related to a bias in the selection into treatment.
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order to test for this, we exploit the fact that in Italy local governments can be
dissolved for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltrations, including: failure to approve
the financial budget, resignation of the mayor, resignation of more than 50%
of the council members, vote of no confidence. These dissolutions are in fact
relatively common in our sample and time-span – in the period from 1998 to 2013
there were 463 cases of municipal government dissolutions unrelated to the mafia
within the three Regions of analysis. We use these dissolutions as proxies for
unstable governments and for low quality of elected politicians, replicating the
estimates of model (1) using DissNomafiam,tas the main explanatory variable,
a dummy taking value 1 for all years in which governments later - dissolved for
mafia-unrelated reasons were leading the municipalities.54 If the results in section
V were driven by local government characteristics unrelated to the mafia - rather
than by infiltrations - we would expect to obtain similar effects as those presented
above.
The results of this placebo test are presented in Appendix 2A6. We exclude all
infiltrated governments and compare dissolved governments for mafia-unrelated
reasons with other governments, before and after the dissolution takes place. We
do so using the entire sample of municipalities from Calabria, Campania and
Sicily from 1998 to 2013, including linear time trends and controlling for time and
municipality fixed effects, and all other controls. Table 2A.8 includes our main
results as outcome variables. There are no statistically significant coefficients,
suggesting that the observed differences between infiltrated and non-infiltrated
governments is truly produced by the presence of the mafia.
In this section we tested the robustness of our estimates. In the section that
follows, we further investigate the complex relationship between politics and or-
ganised crime.
2.7 Organised Crime and Politics
Our results have thus far revealed that collusion between criminal organizations
and politicians has a significant impact on both the allocation of public resources
and on local taxes. Both public spending and revenue collection can, however, be
54This type of dissolution is indubitably a bad outcome for a newly elected local government.
When, in fact, the government is dissolved for non-mafia related reasons, the elected politicians
cannot run again in the following election. Thus, they have every incentive to avoid this scenario.
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affected by a multiplicity of factors. The most intuitive and important of which is
politics. Hence, a legitimate question is whether our results so far are truly driven
by criminal infiltration or simply by some unobserved political characteristics of
the local elections of infiltrated municipalities?
The objective of this section is to provide an answer to this fundamental ques-
tion. In doing so, we inevitably investigate a new empirical relationship between
organised crime and politics. This section consequently not only provides a crucial
test for the validity of our results, but also offers further insight into infiltration
phenomenon.
2.8 Robustness check: politics, organised crime and state
capacity
Politics and Organised Crime. Theoretically, there are different political
characteristics that might be associated with cases of collusion. One of which is
certainly electoral competition. Electoral competition may give rise to opposition
parties that can inform the electorate about corruption or collusion (Schleiter
and Voznaya, 2014) or, alternatively, more competitive elections may make it
more difficult for voters to identify who is responsible for government policy and
to coordinate in selecting the best politicians, hence increasing collusion (Lewis-
Beck, 1988; Anderson, 2000). We assess whether mafia infiltration is related to the
degree of electoral competition by exploiting the fact that there have been cases in
which local elections in Southern Italy have been non-competitive; that is, only one
candidate was potentially eligible for mayor because no other electoral lists were
presented.55 A lack of electoral competition may be associated with infiltration
if pre-electoral intimidation on the part of the mafia limits the participation of
other candidates, or if the absence of political opposition within local councils
facilitates opportunities for the mafia to find valuable political referents.
Another political element, which may be associated with infiltration, is the
mandate limit of incumbent mayors. We look at different terms of office first or
second term as mayor? to examine when and if incumbents may be more likely
to engage in collusion behaviours. The literature suggests that binding term
limits tend to affect the behaviour of politicians (Besley and Case, 2003; List and
55In such cases, the only condition necessary to valid the election is a voter turnout above
50%.
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Sturm, 2006; Alt et al., 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2011) and may increase cases
of corruption and collusion (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). We exploit the fact that
up until 2014 all mayors had a maximum limit of two consecutive terms in office
and examine whether infiltration is associated with the fact that mayors have
no possibility of being immediately re-elected.56 A lower degree of accountability
towards the citizens may facilitate the propensity to collude with organised crime.
Finally, infiltrations may be systematically correlated with the political colour
of governments. We explore this relationship by verifying whether there is a
particular political party recurrently chosen by the mafia when political support
is offered in exchange for favours. To perform this test, we divide the political
spectrum into three categories: left-wing parties, right-wing parties, and centre
parties. A separate classification is used for civic lists, i.e. those electoral lists
which differ from the traditional political parties and are often created ad hoc for
the local election. 57
In order to investigate whether any correlation exists between cases of criminal
infiltration and the political characteristics of municipal elections, we regress a
set of indicators for our Political Factors on a dummy equal to one (Infiltration)
if the municipal government is infiltrated. 58 Political Factors is sub-divided
into a set of variables referring to key political features of the local government,
namely: only one candidate running for election (Single Candidate), incumbent
running for the second and last mayoral mandate (Last Mandate) and political
56While mayors can run for a third term after a term break, third-term candidacies are
extremely rare.
57Recent evidence has shown that the mafia sells votes to the party that has more core
supporters and it is therefore expected to win (De Feo and De Luca, 2013). In Sicily, the
strongest political relationships developed by the mafia have been with the Christian Democrats
(Democrazia Cristiana, DC) (De Feo and De Luca, 2013) and then after the DC’s demise in 1994,
with the conservative party Forza Italia (Buonanno et al., 2016). Daniele and Geys (2016) find
that in the elections immediately following mNote: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration refers to infiltration dummy; all municipalities
for which the main reason for dissolvement was related to distortions in the balance sheets are
excluded. Commissioning years excluded in all specifications.afia dissolutions, voters are more
likely to vote for centre-left parties and less for civic lists.
58We exploit the same dataset used in the Section 3, augmented with data on election char-
acteristics for all the municipalities of Calabria, Campania and Sicily from 1998 to 2013. Our
primary data source is the Historical Archive of Local Elections of the Italian Ministry of Interior.
We focus on the 182 municipalities that experienced at least one dissolution for mafia infiltration
between 1998 and 2013. Descriptive statistics for all political variables are displayed in Table
2.A7 in the Appendix. The variables are reported for both the full sample of municipalities
having experienced at least one dissolution, and for the infiltration years.
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colour of the winning party (Right Party, Centre Party, Civic List).59 Table
2.8 reports linear probability estimates from this regression. Each of the columns
refers to different political variables of interest. The coefficient of Single Candidate
(Column 1) is positive and strongly significant. One interpretation of this finding
is that due to mafia-government agreements, the mafia operates to reduce political
competition, up to the point that only their preferred candidate is running for
mayor. Alternatively, it may be that infiltrations are more likely to occur if the
local council lacks any political group potentially contrasting the decisions of the
government.
Moving to Column 2, the coefficient of the Last Mandate dummy variable is
positive and highly significant, suggesting that mayors in their last term of office
are more likely to collude with organised crime (Besley and Case, 2003; List and
Sturm, 2006).
In columns (3) to (6) we look for a “partisanship effect”, i.e. a systematic
relationship between infiltrations and certain types of parties. The result of a
positive and significant coefficient for the Right Party dummy variable suggests
that infiltration is significantly correlated with the probability of having a right-
wing party winning the local election and controlling the infiltrated government.
The coefficients for Left Party, Centre Party and Civic List are not statistically
significant.60
Taken together, the estimated effects uncover some important empirical reg-
ularities of infiltrations and political and electoral factors. Although we cannot
establish the direction of causality of the relationships discussed, the results seem
59When estimating the model with Party Colour variables, we excluded the few governments
whose administration cannot be classified among these three categories of parties. In addition,
commissioning years are excluded from the analysis, where the municipal government was taken
over either for reasons due to mafia infiltration or for other motives. Civic List is a dummy vari-
able taking value one if the winner of the election in municipality m and leading the government
at time t is a civic list, that is, a different political formation from any existing traditional party.
Although civic lists are not incorporated in any party, they very frequently form multi-party
coalitions made of groups of traditional parties.
60Political conditions may influence the allocation of public expenditures (Johnston, 1977;
Besley and Coates, 1998). The expectations and resultsof electoral contests may be drivers of
the territorial allocation of public investments if, for example, incumbent governments allocate
public resources with the aim of extracting the highest electoral benefits (Cadot et al., 2006;
Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2016), or if public investments are seen as a means to reward voters
for electoral support (Golden and Picci, 2008). While this is a possibility, there is substantial
evidence suggesting that the distribution of public expenditures is not always influenced by pork-
barrel politics or strategic electoral considerations (Larcinese et al., 2012; Luca and Rodriguez-
Pose, 2015).
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to confirm the structural integration of organised crime groups within the political
system and suggest that they are either able to influence electoral outcomes (if
collusions happen in pre-electoral periods), or that infiltrations are more likely
to occur under some specific political circumstances (if collusions happen after
elections).
Political factors and public spending in infiltrated municipalities. All
the political and electoral elements discussed so far may not only be correlated
with infiltrations, but also with the investment decisions of local governments.
This is a very serious concern since it would imply that the estimated effect
on the composition of the local budget in Section 5 may be the consequence of
political elements such as strategic redistributions and pork-barrel politics, rather
than the result of an infiltration. Hence, for any uncovered correlation between
infiltration cases and political conditions, we need to verify that infiltrations, and
not these political factors, are the drivers of the significant changes in public
spending discussed in the previous section of the paper.
We do so by estimating the following models:
Ym,t+1 = α+β1Infm,t+β2PoliticalFactorsm,t+γMafiap,t+δNatGovt+ϑXm,t+ϕm+τt+εt
(2.3)
Ym,t+1 = α+βPoliticalFactorsm,t+γMafiap,t+δNatGovt+ϑXm,t+ϕm+τt+εt
(2.4)
Where Ym,t+1represents the main results of Section 5, i.e. local public expen-
ditures on capital account spending for construction and waste management, for
municipal police and local fiscal revenues (waste tax and total tax). As above,
PoliticalFactorsm,tis sub-divided into a set of variables referring to key political
features of the local government, namely SingleCandidatem,t, and PartryColourm,t.
As in the previous empirical analysis,Mafiap,t represents a control variable for
the underlying strength of the mafia. NatGovet is a dummy variable controlling
for the political colour of the national government at time t – left or right-wing
governments. Xm,t is a vector of socio-demographic municipal control variables
at the municipality level. ϕm and τ t respectively represent municipality and time
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fixed effects. εm,t is an idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level.
Exploiting our difference - in - differences setting we present the results of
model (3) in Table 2.9 and those of model (4) in table 2.10. In Table 2.9, we
run our main estimating equation from Section 5 but control for all the political
factors correlated with the infiltrated local government. The infiltration dummy
remains significant and confirms all of our results. None of the political factors
are significant. The same is true in Table 2.10 where we provide the estimate for
equation 4: again, none of the estimated coefficients report significant correlation
between key political factors and the spending components on which government
spending varies during infiltration periods.61 These crucially important tests con-
firm, as hypothesised, that the variations in public spending are not determined
by any of the political elements linked with infiltrations.
2.9 Partisanship effect, organised crime infiltration, and
public spending
2.9.1 RDD setting
The previous section uncovered a systematic correlation between criminal infil-
trations and governments ruled by conservative parties. This may imply that
the mafia is more likely to provide electoral support to right-wing candidates, or
that candidates belonging to right-wing parties are more likely to collude with
criminal organisations. Although interesting, this result cannot be interpreted
causally. The electoral victory of a right-wing candidate is plausibly correlated
with a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality. Thus,
a simple comparison of the probability of infiltration in municipalities with and
without right-wing incumbent mayors may confound the effect of other municipal
characteristics. We consequently cannot be fully certain that our main results on
public spending are not driven by conservative parties winning the elections.
In order to address this issue, we implement a regression discontinuity design
61As a further check that the relationship between infiltration and local public finances is not
driven by political conditions, we restrict the sample to infiltration years and focus only on the
governments that were dissolved for mafia infiltration during the 1998-2013 period. The results,
shown in Table 2.A8 in the Appendix, corroborate the hypothesis that political factors are not
linked to expenditure shares of infiltrated governments.
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(RDD) based on close elections, investigating whether the probability of infil-
tration is a function of the electoral victory of right-wing parties. We compare
municipalities where right-wing candidates won local elections by a narrow margin
to municipalities where right-wing candidates lost by a narrow margin. The un-
derlying identification assumption of this empirical exercise is that municipalities
where right-wing candidates won or lost by a narrow margin are similar across
all characteristics, except for the ideological leaning of the incumbent politician.
Table 2.A9 in the Appendix provides evidence that key covariates (socio-economic
variables, mafia strength, local election characteristics) are not significantly dif-
ferent in treatment and control groups used for the RDD.
The empirical approach therefore focuses on the sample of electoral races in
which the right-wing candidate is either the election winner (treatment group) or
the runner-up (control group).62
Let Xm,t be the vote share of the right-leaning candidate minus the vote share
of the non-right candidate, Rm,t be the treatment dummy variable referring to
electoral victories of right-wing parties, and Pr(Inf)m,t the probability of infil-
tration. We then have Rm,t = 1 if Xm,t > 0 and Rm,t = 0 if Xm,t < 0. We focus
on the set of electoral races where Xm,t is lower than a bandwidth h, such that
the outcome of those races can be considered as good as random. Our treatment
effect is the average difference between Pr(Inf)m,t of a municipality where the
right narrowly wins and Pr(Inf)m,t of a municipality where the right is narrowly
defeated.
Formally:
Pr(Inf)m,t = αRm,t + f(Xm,t) + εm,t (2.5)
for all electoral races, such that −h < Xm,t < h
with Rm,t = 1if Xm,t > 0,and Rm,t = 0if Xm,t < 0
We estimate α = E[Pr(Inf)m,t|Rm,t = 1] − E[Pr(Inf)m,t|Rm,t = 0]. α is
62As a robustness check, we replicate the RDD estimates comparing all the close electoral
races where the right barely wins or loses against the left party only. The results are remarkably
similar to those obtained when all non-right parties belong to the control group. Estimation
results available upon request.
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estimated both parametrically and non-parametrically.63 We report estimates
under two choices for the local polynomials: linear and quadratic.
In order to obtain reliable RDD estimates, we need to ensure that there is an
absence of non-random sorting around the cutoff.64 To this end, we perform a
McCrary density test, making sure that there is no significant jump in the density
of observations at the cutoff point. Figure 2.A.5 in Appendix 2.A9 exhibits a very
small discontinuity at the threshold, which is statistically insignificant (Table
A9.4).
2.9.2 Results
Table 11 presents our main results, obtained with the full sample of municipalities
from Campania, Calabria and Sicily, using both non-parametric and parametric
estimation methods. Columns (1) and (2) present the results when using, respec-
tively, a linear and quadratic functional forms. The optimal bandwidth used is
0.075, meaning that the sample is made up of governments whose election was
characterised by a difference in votes - between the right-wing party and other
parties - below 7.5%. We remove assumptions of linearity in columns (3)-(5). In
all cases we find clear evidence of a positive and significant correlation, indicat-
ing that the probability of infiltration increases when right-wing parties win local
elections by a small margin over other parties.
63In the choice of optimal bandwidth (h), we face a trade-off between efficiency and bias. With
very small bandwidths, we are more likely to approximate the quasi-experimental assignment
of the treatment variable and to attain balance in the other observable covariates. Very small
bandwidths often, however, lead to small sample problems and imprecise estimates. To address
this issue, we use the optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2014), which addresses
the bias in the confidence interval and the point estimator.
64If the density of Xm,t for each municipality is continuous, then the marginal density of
Xm,t over the sub-sample of municipalities used for the RDD study should be continuous as
well (McCrary, 2008). If, for example, close races are disproportionally resolved in favour of
right wing parties – e.g. via manipulation of electoral outcomes, electoral fraud, etc.– this
would challenge the idea that the outcome of these electoral races is as good as random, and
indicate some degree of sorting around the threshold. While to a given extent mafia groups
are indeed expected to manipulate electoral results by re-directing voting to their preferred
candidates, the results of the tests reported in Appendix 2.A9 suggest that this is not the case
in our sample of close elections. One possible interpretation may be that if the mafia actively
distorts electoral results, this is unlikely to bring victory to the preferred party by a small
margin. Electoral manipulations normally come with abnormal numbers of non-valid or white
ballots. As a descriptive indication that electoral manipulation is not occurring in the RDD
sub-sample, the average proportion of non-valid ballots in infiltrated municipalities won by the
left is 4.4% whereas it is 3.8% when the right-wing party wins and the government is infiltrated.
The number of white ballots are respectively 1.6% and 1.4%.
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Figure 8 illustrates these findings graphically, where observations are fitted
with polynomials of order two, using Calonico et al.’s (2014) bandwidths, and
adding confidence interval bands. A statistically significant increase in the number
of infiltrated municipalities on the right-hand side of the threshold is evident,
indicating that the probability of infiltration increases when right-wing parties
marginally win the election. These findings nicely complement those of Buonanno
et al. (2016) and Alesina et al. (2016) who focus on national elections rather
than local elections and report a systematic correlation between mafia-plagued
municipalities and the main Italian right-wing party during a similar period of
analysis.
Figures 2A.6 and 2A.7 in Appendix A9 confirm the robustness of these results
by showing point estimates at different cutoff points and with different band-
widths. As expected, the effect is statistically insignificant at placebo cutoffs.
The results remain significant when we increase the bandwidth and when we de-
crease the bandwidth to elections where the margin of victory was as low as 4%.
2.9.3 Partisanship and public spending
Such a significant relationship between right-wing parties and the probability of
infiltration may imply that changes in public spending are not caused by mafia
infiltrations but rather by right-wing local governments. To address this concern,
we replicate RDD estimates by using capital account spending on construction and
waste management and for municipal police as dependent variables. We estimate:
Ym,t+1 = αRm,t + f(Xm,t) + εm,t (2.6)
Where Ym,t+1represents our main results: a) capital account expenditures on
construction and waste management or on municipal police, as a share of total
capital account spending and b) our measure of efficiency for Waste Tax.
Table 2.12 reports the results. The insignificant coefficients of right-wing par-
ties reveal that there is no statistically significant variation in construction and
waste management and police spending on the part of municipal governments
ruled by right-wing parties that barely won the election. The same is valid for
the Waste Tax, which reports a non-significant coefficient. Figure 2.9 reproduces
the estimation results in graphical forms, providing evidence that no discontinuity
around the threshold is present for either of the two key spending components or
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for waste tax. Hence, this test supports our hypothesis arguing that the signif-
icant variation in construction and waste management and police expenditures
and waste tax in infiltrated municipalities are due to the presence of organised
crime and not to other unobserved or confounding factors.
2.10 Conclusion
Collusion and corruption distort the correct functioning of democratic systems.
Such institutional failures have the potential to influence key aspects of eco-
nomic activity, undermining the long run development of any society (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). A particularly danger-
ous form corruption is that perpetrated by organised crime. Differently from the
more common white-collar crimes, criminal groups seek profit through illegal busi-
ness and frequently employ physical intimidation. Illegal and secretive agreements
between elected officials and colluding parties may alter the legislative process,
compromising the definition of policies aimed at the welfare of citizens. Yet the
mechanisms through which this negative impact takes place are still unclear. In
this paper, we explored one possible channel: collusion between organised crime
and politicians. Our study is among the first in the literature to extensively study
the phenomenon of infiltration, analysing both the conditions that make such
collusions more likely and their possible consequences.
Using disaggregated municipal data from three regions of Southern Italy, we
find that the collusion between organised crime and politicians affects the al-
location of public resources and the ability of local governments to collect re-
sources. Our analysis suggests that while the overall amount of financial re-
sources that local governments spend remains unaltered, expenditures for specific
components of public finance vary significantly as a result of infiltrations. In
particular, difference-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated municipalities
invest higher shares of resources in construction and waste management and re-
duce annual investment shares in municipal police forces. Moreover, infiltrated
municipalities collect on average fewer revenues, in particular waste taxes. These
results are robust to changes in specifications and to a series of robustness checks.
Furthermore, we have identified a set of political characteristics of municipal
elections that are correlated with infiltrations. We find that both the absence of
competition at local elections, as well as having a mayor running for her second
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and last mandate, are linked with infiltrations. This seems to suggest that there
may be some recurrent electoral patterns associated with mafia-government col-
lusions. Importantly, we find no evidence of a correlation between these political
conditions and spending decisions. This provides additional evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that variations in public spending decisions are determined by in-
filtrations. In addition, we tested for a systematic correlation between infiltrated
governments and political parties of a specific colour, uncovering a positive and
significant association between infiltrations and elections won by right-wing par-
ties. This may imply a preference on the part of the mafia for Italian right-wing
parties when looking for political referents. We further investigated this relation-
ship by testing the effect of right-wing narrow electoral victories on the probability
of infiltration. The evidence suggests that infiltrations are more likely to occur
when governments are controlled by right-wing mayors.
In conclusion, this paper provides an assessment of the strategy of organised
crime when it endeavours to take control of local politics and consequences for local
state capacity. Criminal groups neither seem to impose generalised inflations of
public expenditures, nor do they seem to be interested in conditioning the current
account budget. Rather, local finances are modified only in the key and strategic
sectors where the mafia has interests to protect. In addition, we show that there
may be some political parties that are systematically more likely to collude with
organised crime.
In sum, our analysis has unveiled the important distortionary effect that mafia
infiltrations may have on politics and policy choices. Our study may help to gain
a deeper understanding of such phenomena and possibly aid in the prevention of
mafia infiltrations.
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2.11 Figures and Tables
2.11.1 Figures (in the text)
Figure 2.1: Yearly earning (bn EUR) by mafia organisation
	 0	 0.5	 1	 1.5	 2	 2.5	 3	 3.5	 4	
Other		
Cosa	Nostra	(Sicilia)	
Ndrangheta	(Calabria)	
Camorra	(Campania)	
Note: Source: Transcrimine – Gli Investimenti delle Mafie 2013 – authors’ own elaboration.
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Figure 2.2: Mafia investments by sector
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Note: Source: Transcrimine – Gli Investimenti delle Mafie 2013 – authors’ own elaboration.
Figure 2.3: % Illegal profits re-invested into the legal economy
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Figure 2.4: Geographical location of the dissolutions
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Note: Source: Italian Ministry of Interior – maps are authors’ own elaboration.
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Figure 2.5: Number of dissolved municipal governments for mafia infiltration
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Figure 2.6: Organised crime controlled firms investments by sector
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Figure 2.7: RDD – right-wing party victory and probability of infiltration
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Figure 2.8: RDD – right-wing party victory and current account spending com-
ponents and waste tax
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.
0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
.0
0
4
.0
0
6
.0
0
8
C
A
 s
p
e
n
d
in
g
 f
o
r 
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l 
p
o
lic
e
-.07 0 .07
Vote_share
.2
.2
5
.3
C
A
 s
p
e
n
d
in
g
 f
o
r 
c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 w
a
s
te
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Vote_share
Construction and waste management 
 
Municipal Police 
 
Waste Tax 
 
 
Note: polynomial fit of order2. vote share>0 refers to elections won by right-wing parties; vote
share<0 refers to elections barely lost by right-wing parties.
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2.11.2 Tables (in the text)
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics - public spending
	
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total per capita spending
Total 21,156 1273.8 1129.9 2,678 1020.3 930.96
Capital Account 21,156 542.82 1002.7 2,678 354.98 821.98
Current Account 21,156 730.97 394.43 2,678 665.3 267.2
Capital Account component (share of total)
Administration 21,037 0.152 0.217 2,648 0.168 0.214
Social sector 20,901 0.063 0.134 2,625 0.055 0.123
Territory and environment 21,143 0.342 0.292 2,660 0.320 0.277
Transports 21,090 0.232 0.242 2,653 0.228 0.233
Education 20,844 0.084 0.153 2,637 0.104 0.165
Municipal police 20,474 0.003 0.019 2,588 0.007 0.025
Current Account component (share of total)
Administration 21,240 0.429 0.095 2,675 0.400 0.093
Social sector 21,243 0.073 0.058 2,675 0.086 0.061
Territory and environment 21,239 0.228 0.085 2,675 0.267 0.090
Transports 19,909 0.082 0.040 2,507 0.068 0.037
Education 18,557 0.083 0.041 2,335 0.074 0.038
Municipal police 21,239 0.059 0.027 2,675 0.058 0.024
Full sample Restricted sample
Descriptive statistics - public spending
Note: Full sample refers to all the municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily. Restricted
sample refers to the municipalities of these regions that experienced at least one government
dissolution for mafia infiltration. The sum of the means of all capital account or current account
spending components does not sum up to 1 due to the fact that there are some other minor
spending.
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Table 2.2: Effect of infiltration on total public spending
Effect of infiltration on total public spending
	
(1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8)
Infiltration -28.55 -15.85 -27.30 -14.59 -1.249 -1.253
(33.02) (34.55) (30.37) (34.53) (10.27) (8.236)
Mafia Homicides ✓ ✓ ✓
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Full sample ✓ ✓ ✓
Restricted sample ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 20,893 2,582 20,893 2,582 20,893 2,582
R-squared 0.356 0.441 0.290 0.305 0.604 0.783
Municipalities 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182
Dependent Variable:
Total per capita spending Total p/c spending - Capital Account Total p/c spending - Current Account
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Inf refers
to infiltration dummy; Inf before dissolution takes value one in the year before commissioning
and zero otherwise. Other controls: agricultural employment, industry employment, tertiary
education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample: 1350 municipalities of Campania, Cal-
abria and Sicily; restricted sample: municipalities that experienced at least one government
dissolution for mafia infiltration.
Table 2.3: Effect of infiltration on capital account spending by component
	
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Infiltration -0.0115 -0.0146 -0.00494 -0.00674 0.0448** 0.0442** -0.0206 -0.0220 0.00633 0.00949 -0.00262** -0.00222*
-0.0143 (0.0139) (0.00746) (0.00764) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.00126) (0.00118)
Mafia Homicides            
Other controls            
Year dummies            
Municipality 
dummies            
Full sample      
Restricted 
sample      
Observations 20,682 2,554 20,551 2,535 20,783 2,559 20,735 2,559 20,490 2,541 20,126 2,496
R-squared 0.260 0.219 0.135 0.138 0.205 0.227 0.173 0.152 0.115 0.140 0.169 0.235
Municipalities 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182
Dependent variable: share of spending in the following component
Administration Social sector Constructions - Waste Management Transports Education Municipal police
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; other controls: agricultural employment, industry employment,
tertiary education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample: 1350 municipalities of Cam-
pania, Calabria and Sicily; restricted sample: municipalities having experienced at least one
government dissolution for mafia infiltration.
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Table 2.4: Effect of infiltration on current account spending by component
	
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Infiltration -0.00538 -0.00623 -0.00163 -0.000277 0.00545 0.00530 -0.00105 -0.000947 0.000219 0.000599 -0.00256** -0.00217*
(0.00497) (0.00484) (0.00512) (0.00429) (0.00489) (0.00491) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00168) (0.00174) (0.00130) (0.00123)
Mafia 
Homicides            
Other controls            
Year dummies            
Municipality 
dummies            
Full sample      
Restricted 
sample      
Observations 20,881 2,579 20,884 2,579 20,880 2,579 19,582 2,427 18,235 2,242 20,880 2,579
R-squared 0.736 0.698 0.650 0.612 0.732 0.687 0.752 0.752 0.816 0.787 0.622 0.665
Municipalities 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182 1,350 182
Dependent variable: share of spending in the following component
Administration Social sector Constructions - Waste Management Transports Education Municipal police
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; other controls: agricultural employment, industry employment, ter-
tiary education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample: 1350 municipalities of Campania,
Calabria and Sicily; restricted sample: municipalities that experienced at least one government
dissolution for mafia infiltration.
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Table 2.5: The effect of the infiltration of local revenue collection, 1998 - 2013
	
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Infiltration -0.0127 -0.0123 -0.001 -0.0069 0.0349 0.0337 -0.0210** -0.0185**
(0.0111) (0.0114) (-0.011) (0.0107) (0.0412) (0.0421) (0.00912) (0.00961)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality 
dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Full sample ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Restricted sample ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 18,464 2,299 18,475 2,299 17,383 2,170 17,103 2,122
R-squared 0.314 0.374 0.670 0.655 0.395 0.351 0.502 0.470
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182
Dependent variable: 
Total revenues Total taxes Property tax Waste tax
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; other controls: agricultural employment, industry employment, ter-
tiary education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample: 1350 municipalities of Campania,
Calabria and Sicily; restricted sample: municipalities that experienced at least one government
dissolution for mafia infiltration.
Table 2.6: Ghost Buildings
	
(1)
VARIABLES GhostBuildings
Infiltration -402.7*
(243.1)
Municipal Dummies ✓
Time Dummies ✓
Municipal Controls ✓
Observations 2,667
R-squared 0.516
Ghost Buildings
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; Commissioning years are excluded from the estimation. Ghost
Buildings data are provided by the Agenzia dell’Entrate.
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Table 2.7: Robustness check: Timing of the Infiltration (Full Sample)
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Table 2.8: Infiltrations and political factors, 1998-2013
 
Single Candidate Last Mandate Right Party Left Party
Centre 
Party
Civic List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infiltration 0.0474** 0.189*** 0.0942** -0.0682 0.0351 -0.0414
-0.0194 -0.0506 -0.0516 -0.0464 -0.0327 -0.0383
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
NatGov (Left) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,582 2,582 2,582 2,582
R-squared 0.259 0.22 0.455 0.468 0.417 0.63
Dependent variable:
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of
all municipalities from Campania, Calabria and Sicily that experienced at least one government
dissolution for mafia infiltration.
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Table 2.9: The effect of the infiltration on public spending controlling for political
factors, 1998 -2013
	
VARIABLES Constructions and Waste Management Municipal Police Waste Tax
Infiltration 0.0483* -0.00222** -0.0163*
(0.0235) (0.0010) (0.0086)
Right Party -0.00440 0.000213 0.0352
(0.0139) (0.0019) (0.053)
Last mandate -0.00757 0.000878 -0.00106
(0.0171) (0.00091) (0.0185)
Single Party -0.0862 0.000218 0.00700
(0.0515) (0.00199) (0.0317)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓
National government (Left) ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality control ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 2,536 2,470 2,087
R-squared 0.231 0.237 0.093
Table 2.10: Political factors and public spending components, 1998-2013
	
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single candidate -0.0647 -0.00044 0.0376
(0.0448) (0.00239) (0.0567)
Last mandate 0.0015 0.00045 -0.00334
(0.0161) (0.00136) (0.0299)
Right party 0.015 0.00014 -0.00198
(0.0136) (0.00203) (0.0183)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
National 
government (Left) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality control ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality 
dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 2,778 2,778 2,408 2,717 2,717 2,351 2,302 2,302 2,005
R-squared 0.225 0.224 0.233 0.234 0.234 0.239 0.451 0.451 0.465
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Dependent variable:
Revenues collectionPublic spending
Construction and waste management Waste taxMunicipal police
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of
municipalities having experienced at least one government dissolution for mafia infiltration.
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Table 2.11: Effect of right-wing close electoral victory on the probability of infil-
tration
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Right-w ing w inner 0.0751* 0.0846* 0.0722** 0.0722** 0.101*
(0.0399) (0.0524) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0604)
Bandw idth 0.0751 0.124 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751
Observations 911 911 911 911 911
Dep. variable: probability of infiltration
Non - parametric Parametric
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Forcing variable
coefficients not displayed. Column 1: rddrobust Linear; column 2: rddrobust Polynomial;
column 3: linear regression with kernel weights; column 4: linear regression varying linear
slopes; column 5: polynomial regression of order 2 with interaction with the forcing variable.
All the estimations use Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwith.
Table 2.12: Effect of right-wing close electoral victory on public spending
	
Construction and waste 
management Municipal police Waste_tax
(1) (2) (3)
Right-wing winner -0.0194 0.048 -0.0641
(0.0263) -0.0551 (0.0564)
Bandwidth 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751
Observations 620 620 580
Dep. variable: capital account spending in the following component
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2.12 Appendix
Figure 2A.1: Correlation between dissolved municipal governments and national
government
	
no of dissolutions Municipal  government Right Left
67 Righta -0.108 0.061
43 Leftb 0.139 -0.047
6 Centrec -0.068 -0.011
National government
Note: no statistically significant coefficient. Right-wing national governments: Berlusconi 2001-
2005 and Berlusconi 2008-2011; Left-wing national governments: Prodi 1998, D’Alema 1999,
Amato 2000, Prodi 2006-2007, Letta 2013; Centre national governments: Monti 2012. a / Right-
wing municipal governments during infiltration period; b / Left-wing municipal governments
during infiltration period; c / Municipal government ruled by a Centre party during infiltration
period.
Figure 2A.2: Correlation between dissolved municipal governments and provincial
governments, 1998-2013
	
Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left
Righta -0.143 / 0.277 / 0.233 / N/A / -0.154 /
Leftb / -0.149 / 0.194 / 0.14 / 0.239 / N/A
Municipal 
government
Province and provincial government
Caserta Napoli Reggio Calabria Vibo Valentia Palermo
Note: no statistically significant coefficient. None of these provinces had governments from the
‘Centre’ over the 1998-2013 period. Vibo Valentia only had left-wing governments while Palermo
only had right-wing governments. a / Right-wing municipal governments during infiltration
period in given province. b / Left-wing municipal governments during infiltration period in
given province.
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A2. Municipal institutional setting and public spending.
A2.1 Italian municipalities institutional setting. As of 2016, there were 8,010 mu-
nicipalities in Italy, 1,350 of which are found in the regions of analysis, varying considerably
by area and population. The institutional setting of the municipalities is centred on the figure
of the mayor, who heads the local government and leads along with the legislative body, the
local council, and the executive body, the local giunta. The mayor and members of the council
are elected together by resident citizens. The giunta is chaired by the mayor, who appoints its
members. Elections of local councils are staggered over time and not held at the same time for
all municipalities.
A2.2 Public spending components. General functions of administration include all
expenses related to the management of offices coordinating the internal activities of the munici-
pality; (2) social sectors include all expenses for the provision of social services and the creation
of infrastructure to that aim (kindergartens, retirement homes, rehab centres); (3) construction
and waste management refers to all expenses for urban planning – adoption of construction
plans and building regulations, maintenance and construction of all new buildings (all part of
capital account spending), waste collection and disposal (current account spending); (4) trans-
portation includes expenses to guarantee local public transportation, public lighting, provision
of local road infrastructure; (5) public education includes all expenses for all education infras-
tructure, school maintenance and school transportation; (6) functions of local police include the
acquisition and maintenance of goods and equipment, cars and office structures
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Descriptive statistics – control variables
  Full sample Restricted sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Percentage of agricultural employment 21,594 4.592 3.382 2,912 4.303 4.066 
Percentage of citizens holding tertiary 
education degrees 
21,594 6.06 2.62 2,912 5.687 2.272 
Percentage of industry employment 21,594 6.489 2.128 2,912 5.894 1.693 
Unemployment rate 21,594 7.609 2.518 2,912 8.89 2.646 
Mafia-related homicides at province level 21,600 0.0058 0.0082 2,912 0.0095 0.0092 
 Note: Full sample refers to all municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily. Restricted sam-
ple refers to municipalities of these regions that experienced at least one government dissolution
for mafia infiltration. Source: Istat and Ministry of Interior
A3 Robustness Checks - Effect of Infiltration on Public Spending
Results
Gradually increase control variables.From Table A3.1 to Table A3.3 we provide
a series of robustness checks for our main results, i.e. capital spending on construction
and waste management (A3.1) and on capital (A3.2) and current (A3.3) spending on
municipal police. In all estimations, the sample is restricted to the municipalities that
experienced at least one dissolution. This is important because we control for unob-
served heterogeneous effects that might be present across municipalities. In the first
column, a parsimonious specification is presented, including time fixed effects and no
other controls. The second column adds mafia-proxies and municipal socio-economic
factors as controls. In practice, the results in column (2) of table A3.1 – A3.3 replicate
those in columns (6) and (12) of Table 3 and column (22) in Table 4. In the third
column of Tables A3.1 – A3.3, we include a full set of linear time trends for each munic-
ipality, accounting for any previously omitted factor potentially affecting the temporal
development of municipal governments and correlated with infiltrations. This specifica-
tion represents our preferred one and reports a coefficient for the infiltration dummy of
similar magnitude of those in the previous columns. The effects are economically size-
able. Investments in construction and waste management increase by over 4pp of total
spending per year, equal to an increase of 12.5% over the average value of non-treated
municipalities. The reduction of capital and current spending for police is respectively
0.004pp and 0.0007pp per year, equal to 9.8% (capital spending) and 1.2% (current
spending) over non-treated municipalities.
Infiltration with a one year lag. We relax this assumption in column (4) of
Tables A3.1 – A3.3 where the infiltration dummy enters with a one year lag. This
classifies infiltrations as if they initiated in the year after the elections. This classification
introduces one additional lag between the moment of infiltration and the moment in
which the financial resources were actually spent by local governments (recall that
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the spending variable is measured at period t+1). As shown in Tables A3.1 – A3.3
this alternative definition of infiltration periods is even more robustly correlated with
higher proportions of investment in construction and waste management and with a
reduction of both current and capital spending in police forces. According to this result,
governments infiltrated by the mafia annually invest 19% more in construction and waste
management compared to the average spending of non-infiltrated municipalities.
Table 2A.1: Effect of infiltration on capital account spending in Construction and
Waste Management, 1998-2013
	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration 0.0448** 0.0424** 0.0414**
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0179)
Lagged Inf 0.0668***
(0.0245)
Mafia homicides   
Other controls   
Year dummies    
Municipality dummies    
Time trends  
Observations 20,783 20,777 20,777 19,531
R-squared 0.205 0.206 0.296 0.306
Municipalities 1350 1350 1350 1350
Dep. Variable: Capital Account spending for 
Construction and waste management
Full	Sample	
Restricted	Sample	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration 0.0469*** 0.0442** 0.0466**
(0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0200)
Lagged Inf 0.0674***
(0.0249)
Mafia homicides   
Other controls   
Year dummies    
Municipality dummies    
Time trends  
Observations 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,405
R-squared 0.220 0.227 0.333 0.348
Municipalities 182 182 182 182
Dep. Variable: Capital Account spending for 
Constructions and Waste Management
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged by one period. Com-
missioning years excluded in all specifications. Infiltration years excluded in specification (5).
In the top table the estimation reports the results using the Full Sample. In the bottom table,
the estimation reports the results using the restricted sample (dissolved municipalities).
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Table 2A.2: Effect of infiltration on capital account spending in Municipal Police,
1998-2013
	
Full	Sample	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration -0.00262** -0.00254** -0.00473***
(0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00157)
Lagged Inf -0.00341*
(0.00212)
Mafia homicides   
Other controls   
Year dummies    
Municipality dummies    
Time trends  
Observations 20,126 20,120 20,120 19,539
R-squared 0.169 0.171 0.291 0.295
Municipalities 1350 1350 1350 1350
Dep. Variable: Capital Account spending for 
Municipal Police
Restricted	Sample	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration -0.00277** -0.00222* -0.00467*
(0.00125) (0.00118) (0.00242)
Lagged Inf -0.00335*
(0.00206)
Mafia homicides   
Other controls   
Year dummies    
Municipality dummies    
Time trends  
Observations 2,496 2,496 2,496 2,412
R-squared 0.230 0.235 0.419 0.431
Municipalities 182 182 182 182
Dep. Variable: capital account spending for Municipal 
police
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged by one period. Com-
missioning years excluded in all specifications. Infiltration years excluded in specification (5).
In the top table the estimation reports the results using the Full Sample. In the bottom table,
the estimation reports the results using the restricted sample (dissolved municipalities).
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Table 2A.3: Effect of infiltration on Waste Tax, 1998-2013
		
Full	Sample	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration -0.0219** -0.0203** -0.001
(0.00898) (0.00908) (0.0109)
Lagged Inf -0.0202**
(0.00938)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time trends ✓ ✓
Observations 17,106 17,103 17,003 15,747
R-squared 0.520 0.521 0.565 0.545
Municipalities 1350 1350 1350 1350
Dep. Variable:Waste Tax
Restricted	Sample	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Infiltration -0.0190** -0.0176* -0.0025
(0.00896) (0.00951) (0.0309)
Lagged Inf -0.0192**
(0.00957)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time trends ✓ ✓
Observations 2,122 2,122 2002 1,954
R-squared 0.472 0.472 0.388 0.488
Municipalities 182 182 182 182
Dep. Variable:Waste Tax
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged by one period. Com-
missioning years excluded in all specifications. Infiltration years excluded in specification (5).
In the top table the estimation reports the results using the Full Sample. In the bottom table,
the estimation reports the results using the restricted sample (dissolved municipalities).
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Figure 2A.3: Parallel Trend - Full Dynamic Model
 Effect of Infiltration on Constructions and Waste (Capital Account) 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
        Effect of Infiltration on capital account spending for municipal police 
	
Source: own elaboration with Ministry of Interior data. Granger Causality Test estimated with
2 leads and 2 lags. Municipalities dissolved more than once have been dropped from the sample.
The estimation includes time and municipalities dummies, linear time trends, socio-demographic
controls and mafia controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Figure 2A.4: Parallel Trend - Full Dynamic Model
Effect of Infiltration on Waste Tax 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 Effect of Infiltration on Total Revenues 
	
Source: own elaboration with Ministry of Interior data. Granger Causality Test estimated with
2 leads and 2 lags. Municipalities dissolved more than once have been dropped from the sample.
The estimation includes time and municipalities dummies, linear time trends, socio-demographic
controls and mafia controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Effect of Infiltration on Capital Account Spending Components by Mu-
nicipal Population, 1998-2013
Our analysis has unveiled that mafia infiltrations determine important modifications in
the investment policies of local governments in Southern Italy. However, the impact
of the mafia on public finance allocations is likely to vary according to some charac-
teristics of the local context, which are more or less suitable to the development of
mafia-government collusions. One aspect we investigate in this section is whether the
intensity of the effect depends on the size of the municipalities whose governments are
infiltrated. We hypothesise that the largest absolute variation in spending allocations
are found in smaller municipalities. Small towns are where the power of the mafia can
be more pervasive, due to the high control of territory it exercises and to the greater dis-
tance from the central State felt by the citizens. In the context of small localities where
the presence of the mafia is more diffused, collusion is expected to lead to a stronger
predatory behaviour – i.e., more public work tenders awarded to mafia-controlled firms.
We test this by sub-dividing the entire sample into municipalities with less than 2,000 in-
habitants, between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, and above 5,000 inhabitants, replicating
the main estimates. As shown in Table A5 below, the data confirm our hypothesis. In-
flations in capital account spending for construction and waste management are higher,
the smaller the population of a municipality. The coefficient of the infiltration dummy is
positive and significant for medium and small-size municipalities and the magnitude is
larger for towns below 2,000 inhabitants. By using the same sub-division by population
size, we replicate the estimates adopting the share of municipal police spending as the
dependent variable. In this case, the reduction of the investment share is larger in cities
with greater than 5,000 inhabitants (Table 2A.4). This result can be explained by the
fact that the investment budget for police forces managed by large cities is significantly
larger than those of small towns. The mafia has more interest in limiting expenses for
law enforcement where the latter can affect the productivity of police investigations.
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Table 2A.4: Effect of infiltration on capital account spending components by
municipal population, 1998-2013
 Dep. Variable: 
CA spending for Construction and waste 
management 
CA spending for Municipal Police 
 
population: population: 
 
below 
2000 
between 2000 and 
5000 
above 
5000 
below 
2000 
between 2000 and 
5000 
above 
5000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Infiltration 0.0951** 0.0795** 0.0199 0.00283 -0.00183 
-
0.00338** 
 
-0.0425 -0.0331 -0.0219 -0.00259 -0.0018 -0.00168 
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality 
dummies 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 6,817 6,514 7,447 6,564 6,299 7,258 
R-squared 0.193 0.222 0.234 0.139 0.157 0.175 
Municipalities 473 469 502 473 469 502 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; Commissioning years excluded in all specifications.
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Table 2A.5: Placebo – Dissolutions Unrelated to Organised Crime and Public
Spending
		 		
 Total Spending Total Capital Account Total Current Account 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Dissolution_No_Mafia -49.44 -41.92 -7.517 
 
(53.74) (52.79) (6.745) 
Mafia Controls 1,284 529.9 754.4 
 
(1,386) (1,086) (723.3) 
Municipalities dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time Trends ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,305 18,305 18,305 
R-squared 0.426 0.345 0.794 
	      
		 		 		 		
Dependent variable 
Public spending Revenues collection 
Constructions and 
Waste 
Management 
Capital Expenditure 
Police Waste Tax 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Mafia-unrelated 
dissolutions -0.00353 0.000313 -0.00469 
 (0.0143) (0.000820) (0.00782) 
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipalities dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,218 18,010 18,170 
R-squared 0.292 0.227 0.259 
Municipalities  1350 1350 1350 
     
A5.1.Organised Crime dissolutions and total public spending 
 
A5.2. Robustness check: Our Main Results and Organised crime non - related dissolutions 
.  
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. DIss_nomafia
refer to mafia-unrelated dissolved governments; other controls: agricultural employment, in-
dustry employment, tertiary education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample of 1350
municipalities from Campania, Calabria and Sicily: infiltration and commissioning years ex-
cluded.
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Table 2A.6: Placebo – Dissolutions Unrelated to Organised Crime and Public
Spending
	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
Administration Social Sector Constructions Transports Education 
 Municipal 
Police 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dissolution_No_Mafia 0.00183 -0.00295* 0.000624 -0.000238 0.000673 -0.000486 
 
(0.00211) (0.00164) (0.00197) (0.000743) (0.000988) (0.000657) 
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,296 18,299 18,295 17,152 15,987 18,295 
R-squared 0.839 0.774 0.821 0.850 0.888 0.761 
       
       
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
Administration Social Sector Constructions Transports Education 
 Municipal 
Police 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Dissolution_No_Mafia 0.00606 0.00836 -0.00353 -0.00892 -0.00125 0.000313 
 
(0.0102) (0.00749) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.00767) (0.000820) 
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,122 18,010 18,218 18,170 17,943 17,624 
R-squared 0.367 0.227 0.292 0.259 0.188 0.245 
       	
	
A6.1: Mafia-unrelated dissolutions and capital account spending by component 
	
A6.2: Mafia-unrelated dissolutions and current account spending by component 
	
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. DIss_nomafia
refer to mafia-unrelated dissolved governments; other controls: agricultural employment, in-
dustry employment, tertiary education degree holders, unemployment. Full sample of 1350
municipalities from Campania, Calabria and Sicily: infiltration and commissioning years ex-
cluded.
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Table 2A.7: Descriptive statistics – political variables
	
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Single candidate 2,869 0.023 0.149 437 0.059 0.237
Last mandate 2,869 0.203 0.402 437 0.327 0.470
Left party 2,869 0.320 0.467 437 0.316 0.465
Centre party 2,869 0.082 0.274 437 0.098 0.298
Right party 2,869 0.461 0.499 437 0.563 0.497
Civic list 2,869 0.510 0.500 437 0.584 0.494
All municipalities Infiltration years
Note: All municipalities: municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily that experienced at
least one government dissolution for mafia infiltration. Infiltration years: years classified as
infiltration for these municipalities
Table 2A.8: Political factors and public spending components during infiltration
years, 1998-2013
 VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single candidate -0.0347 -0.00460 -0.620
(0.190) (0.00536) (0.0722)
Last mandate -0.0494 0.00687 0.0553
(0.177) (0.00569) (0.0541 )
Right party 0.169 0.00146 -0.00198
(0.128) (0.00452) (0.0183)
Mafia homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
National government 
(Left)
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality control ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 432 432 432 425 425 425 382 382 382
R-squared 0.400 0.400 0.404 0.444 0.446 0.444 0.451 0.451 0.465
Municipalities 127 127 127 124 124 124 182 182 182
Waste tax
Construction and w aste 
management
Revenues collectionPublic spending
Municipal police
Dependent variable:
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of
infiltrated governments during 1998-2013.
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Figure 2A.5: Effect of Electing Right-Wing Governments on the Probability of
Infiltration
 												
 										 	
Unemploym
ent
Industry 
employment 
Human 
capital Pop
Total 
spending
Mafia-
related 
homicides 
White ballots Turnout Non-valid ballots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment vs. control-0.594 0.48 -0.0919 -0.269 -0.0195 5.45E-06 0.129 -2.397 0.8
(0.795) (0.551) (0.670) (0.364) (0.0263) (0.00233) (0.306) (2.428) (0.520)
Observations 620 620 620 620 614 620 619 621 619
Dep. Variable:
A5.1 Balance of Covariates 	
A5.2 McCrary Test 	
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. T student at the
discontinuity -0.9782 with robust estimation. There is no presence of non - random sorting at
the cutoff
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Figure 2A.6: Effect of Electing Right-Wing Governments on the Probability of
Infiltration
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Note:	Dep	Var:	Probability	of	Inﬁltra5on.	The	line	extends	to	the	lower	bound	to	the	upper	bound.	90%	conﬁdence	interval.		CCT	
-	op5mal	bandwidth.		
A6.1 Robustness Checks – points estimates at different cutoff points 	
A6.2 Robustness Checks – Moving bandwidths 	
Note: Figure A6.1 Dependent variable is Probability of infiltration. The line extends from the
lower bound to the upper bound. 90% confidence interval. Non-parametric estimates with
bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernels, linear local polynomials and optimal
bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014). Figure A6.2, Dependent variable is Probability of infiltration.
The line extends from the lower bound to the upper bound. 90% confidence interval. CCT:
optimal bandwidth.
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Table 2A.9: Selection into Treatment
 
 
Municipal Police_CA Municipal Police_CR 
Constructions and 
Waste Management 
Waste 
Tax 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Infiltration -0.00474* -0.000967 0.0609*** -0.0165** 
 
(0.00269) (0.00119) (0.0213) (0.00921) 
Mafia Homicides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio_Demographic 
Controls 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipal Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time Trends ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2,236 2,308 2,298 2002 
R-squared 0.423 0.774 0.335 0.401 
 Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Infiltration
refers to infiltration dummy; all municipalities for which the main reason for dissolusion was
related to distortions in the balance sheets are excluded. Commissioning years excluded in all
specifications.
Figure 2A.7: Local Fiscal Revenues Structure
	
Property	Tax		
35%	
Waste	Tax	
22%	
Other	Taxes	and	
Transfers	45%,	
LOCAL	FISCAL	REVENUES	STRUCTURE	
Note: Authors Elaboration - data from the Ministry of Interior.
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3 The Effect of News Media on Attitudes: Evi-
dence from Crime Perceptions in Italy
3.1 Introduction
A recent body of empirical literature suggests that media have a significant impact
on political and public policy outcomes (see, among others: Della Vigna and Ka-
plan, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009; Enikolopov et al., 2011; Barone et al., 2015). Yet,
little is known about the mechanisms through which media concretely manage to
influence collective decisions and policies. In this paper we explore one possible
channel: influencing individuals’ beliefs and perceptions about topics that are
salient in the political debate. Understanding the role of information provided by
the media on the formation of beliefs and attitudes is relevant for outcomes that
go well beyond voting. As Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) argue, the efficiency
of democratic and economic systems ultimately depends on the accuracy of indi-
vidual beliefs. One potential threat to the accuracy of perceptions steams from
the fact that, although people base their beliefs partly on direct observation, a
large share of information is provided by intermediaries - such as television, news-
papers, or Internet - who might themselves have some interest in the behaviour of
the receivers. In these cases communication is defined as persuasive (Della Vigna
and Gentzkow, 2010) and its effect on the receiver is uncertain. In this paper,
we investigate the influence of news media on beliefs and perceptions individuals
have about crime.
We do so in the context of Italy, a country where, for over a decade, a relevant
share of traditional analogue TV channels has been under the influence of Mr Silvio
Berlusconi in his dual role of media tycoon and Prime Minister.65We study if and
to what extent individuals revise their perceptions once exposure to news provided
by this group of channels is reduced. Obviously, estimating the causal effect of the
exposure to specific media on individuals’ perceptions poses difficult identification
issues, as people self-select into news media according to their news content (see
65As we will describe in details later on, of the 6 main TV channels holding about 85% of
viewing shares up until year 2007, three channels – Rai1, Rai2 and Rai3 - constituted the bulk of
the Italian public broadcasting system, which has a long tradition of alignment with the parties
in government (Larcinese, 2008) while other three channels – Rete4, Canale5 and Italia1 – were
privately owned by Berlusconi through his media conglomerate Mediaset.
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Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010 and Durante and Knight, 2012). Similarly to Barone
et al (2015), we identify causal effects by exploiting the introduction of digital TV
signal in Italy. We exploit the staggered introduction of the policy to extend
the design to all Italian regions and complement it with detailed channel-specific
viewership and news content data.66
Between 2008 and 2012, Italy has gradually shifted from analogue to digital TV
transmission: on specific dates, which varied by region, the analogue signal was
switched off and substituted with the digital one. Around the digital switchover
dates the number of nationally available free TV channels increased from about 7
to more than 50 within days. Such a supply shock was accompanied by a drastic
drop in the viewing shares of the six main traditional analogue channels (Rai
and Mediaset) from 82% in June 2008 to 60% in June 2012, mostly in favour of
the newly available digital channels. 67We exploit the exogenous shift in viewing
shares described above to study if and to what extent individuals revise their
perceptions about crime when exposure to potentially biased news is reduced. In
particular, we rely on a specific feature of digital introduction in Italy: the fact
that deadlines at which the signal switched from analogue to digital varied across
regions, and did so for plausibly exogenous reasons.
We focus on perceptions about crime for a number of reasons. First, crime
perceptions have been proven to be relevant for several economic outcomes such
house prices (Buonanno et al., 2013) mental health (Dustmann and Fasani, 2015)
and daily routines and behaviours (Braakman, 2012). Secondly, crime is at the top
of people’s concerns in many countries, and thus often at the centre of the political
debate68. Thirdly, it exists a puzzling mismatch between individual perceptions
and actual data when it comes to crime rates. Figure 3.1 provides evidence of
such mismatch for Italy, where despite a decreasing (or if anything stable) trend
in actual crime rates over the period considered (left panel), about 80% of re-
spondents believe that crime is on the rise (right panel).69These figures seem to
66Barone et al (2015) have been the first to use the introduction of digital TV signal in Italy
within the literature. They exploit, in particular, the case of Piedmont region where some
provinces introduced the digital TV signal before 2010 regional elections and some after. They
thus compare voting outcomes for municipalities on either side of such provincial boundaries in
a regression discontinuity design setting.
67Source: AUDITEL data. http://www.auditel.it
68As Appendix Figure A1 shows, people rank consistently crime among the first five (out of 15)
most important perceived problems in a number of European countries. Source: Eurobarometer.
69The famous line, ‘If it bleeds, it leads,’ is a well-known maxim for what determines news-
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reveal an information problem potentially deriving from the fact that people, by
having little observational experience about crime, might tend to collect a relevant
share of information about it through indirect and secondary sources. Thus the
providers of such information (i.e. the media) are likely to play an important role
in the formation of crime perceptions.
In the first part of the paper we document how a specific group of traditional
TV channels seem to systematically over-represent crime news compared to oth-
ers. We also show how individuals who select into TV channels characterised by
high crime news reporting are also more likely to believe crime is major problem.
We then test if individuals revise their perceptions about crime when exposure to
news programs broadcast by such specific group of channels is reduced, identifying
a reduced-form (ITT) effect of the Digital Reform. We find that the increase in
the number of available TV channels - and the consequent lower exposure to news
broadcast by partisan ones - led individuals to revise downward their perceptions
about crime. Estimated negative effects on crime concern are larger for individuals
who spend more time watching television while using less frequently other media
such as internet, radio and newspapers. Such individuals, by gathering informa-
tion mainly through TV and placing high weight to information coming from it,
were likely to be more exposed to the potential pre-reform bias, thus responded
more to changes in TV content. Older individuals spend more time watching TV
and have much less frequent access to other media than their younger counterpart.
In fact, individuals aged above 65 (and above age 51 in some specifications) drive
most of our estimated effect. For example, among those older than 65, the prob-
ability of mentioning crime as among the three priority problems in the country
drops with the introduction of the digital signal by 5.2 percentage points, i.e. 8.4
percent with respect to the average value.
In the second part of the paper, we attempt to quantify the effect of exposure
to crime news on crime perceptions. To do so, we combine unique data on prime-
time news programs for each TV channel on: a) the monthly amount of crime-
related news reported; and b) the region-specific monthly viewership. We use the
worthiness of crime. In fact, this gap between actual crime rates and people’s perceptions is
a feature common to other countries as well. Indeed, while crime levels have been decreasing
in many western countries during the last decade (see for example “The curious case of falling
crime” in The Economist, July 20th, 2013) a surprisingly large share of the population believes
that crime is actually increasing. Dustmann and Fasani (2014) provide similar evidence for the
UK. For an interesting review: Emanuelsson and Mele (2010).
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switch to digital signals to predict exogenous changes in the exposure to crime
news induced by the policy, and estimate the effect on crime perceptions through
a two-steps method. We find that the digital reform induced a reduction in
exposure to crime news of about 12 percent of the average value and that, under
the assumption that the switch-over affected crime perceptions only through such
changes in crime news exposure, a 1 standard deviation decrease in exposure to
crime news is associated with a 9.2 percent decrease in people’s concern about
crime, among those aged above 65.
In the last part of the paper we explore whether the change in crime perceptions
induced by the digital signal introduction might be relevant for voting behaviour.
We first show how, in our context, high concerns about crime are correlated with
support to the centre-right coalition. Then, using data from an electoral survey,
we run a back of the envelope analysis to show that the reduction in crime concern
caused by the digital reform might have induced up to about 2.4-2.8% of those
aged above 51 who voted for the centre-right coalition in the 2008 national election
to change their vote. Since individuals aged above 51 represent about 1 out of 3
of Italian voters (and usually show higher turnout rate), the effect we detect is
likely to be relevant for electoral outcomes.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on persuasive communication
in economics. In particular we fit into two main research clusters. First, the
group of studies that focuses on the effect of (biased) news media on political
outcomes.70A number of papers within this literature have provided empirical
evidence for the influence of (biased) media on voting outcomes. Among them,
Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) find that the introduction of Fox News has led to
a significant increase in the share of votes for the Republican Party in the U.S.
2000 election, while Enikopolov et al. (2011) show that Russian voters with access
to an independent TV channel were less likely to vote for Putin during the 1999
national election. Moving to the Italian case, Durante and Knight (2012) provides
evidence of the bias in favour of the Berlusconi’s coalition (centre-right) while he
was Prime Minister on five out of six of the above TV channels. Closest to our
paper, Barone et. al (2015) convincingly document the impact of such media
70See Pratt and Stromberg (2011) and Sobbrio (2014) for a review of the literature on me-
dia and electoral outcomes. A number of studies have also looked at the effect of persuasive
communication in other context such as: advertisement (Simester et al., 2007); non-profits or-
ganisations (Landry et al., 2006) and non-informative communication provided by leaders (Bassi
and Rasul, 2015).
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bias in favour of Berlusconi on his electoral support. They, exploiting for the
first time the policy change used in this paper, show how the availability of new
digital channels caused a drop in Berlusconi’s voting shares in the 2010 regional
elections.71
Second, there is a broader literature on the relationship between media (mainly
television) and beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. Among the earlier attempts, and
closely related to our paper, is the work from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) who
study the effect of exposure to different news outlet on anti-American sentiment
in the Muslim world. They find that increased exposure to information from
the media is not necessarily correlated with more accurate perceptions of world
events. Some of the other relevant papers are Jensen and Oster (2009); Chong et
al. (2012); Della Vigna et al. (2014); Rizzica and Tonello (2015); and Lim et al.
(2015).72
We address these research clusters and we contribute to both of them. Specifi-
cally, our study complements the first group of papers by studying another aspect
of partisan media, their influence on attitudes and perceptions with respect to po-
litically salient topics. Importantly, by producing causal evidence of the impact
of news media on individual perceptions we start shading light over one of the
possible mechanisms through which media ultimately affect voting outcomes.73In
71Another paper, Durante et al. (2015), investigates the effect of Berlusconi’s TV on voting
behaviour, yet from a different perspective. They analyse the long-term impact of early exposure
to Berlusconi’s commercial TV (Mediaset) and find that municipalities with a longer history of
exposure to it did show greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party. They argue in favour
of this effect being motivated by the decline in social capital and the diffusion of a culture of
individualism promoted by Berlusconi’s TV, and against the exposure to partisan news bias
story from the moment that during the period they focus on, prior to 1985, news programs were
not broadcast on Mediaset channels.
72Jensen and Oster (2009) study the effect of cable TV and women’s status in rural India;
Chong et al. (2012) study the role of soap operas in reducing fertility in Brazil while Della Vigna
et al. (2014) the effect of propaganda channeled through the radio on violence in Serbia; Rizzica
and Tonello (2015) study the relation between exposure to corruption news and corruption per-
ceptions in Italy; Finally, Lim et al. (2015) reveal that active newspapers coverage significantly
magnifies the influence of voters’ preferences on court decisions when judges are elected.
73The research on individual beliefs and perceptions is mostly theoretical with Bayesian beliefs
model (Eyester and Rabin, 2009) and Bayesian preference models (Nelson, 1970, Mullainathan
et al. 2005). Closer to our empirical approach, Chiang and Knight (2011) study whether
newspaper endorsements have an effect on individual voting intention. Schroeder and Stone
(2015) explore another possible mechanism, the effect of partisan media on political knowledge.
They find that Fox News increased knowledge for issues it covered more often, and negative
effects for issues it neglected. In our case, although suggestive of the potential role of crime
perceptions on voting in the Italian setting, quantitatively assessing the role of changes in crime
perceptions on voting vis-à-vis that of other possible channels is beyond the scope of this paper.
102
doing so, we also contribute to the second group of papers by providing a new field
of evidence about the impact of media: the one on crime perceptions. Exploit-
ing unique viewership and news content data, we are able to move the first step
towards a measurement of the elasticity of perceptions to specific news reporting
intensity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the institu-
tional background on Italian television market and the intensity in crime news
reporting on traditional channels; section 3 discusses our identification strategy
and presents the natural experiment; section 4 introduces the data and the es-
timating equations; section 5, 6 and 7 present different sets of results; section 8
concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Italian TV Market
Up until 2007 - the year before the switch from analogue to digital TV signal
transmission started - Italy presented a particularly concentrated television mar-
ket, with only about seven national channels freely available to viewers through
the analogue signal and the six main channels holding about 85% of total TV
viewing shares. Three channels – Rai1, Rai2 and Rai3 - constituted the bulk of
the Italian public broadcasting system (Rai), which has a long tradition of align-
ment with the parties in government (Larcinese, 2008).74 Other three channels
– Rete4, Canale5 and Italia1 – were privately owned by Mr Berlusconi through
his media conglomerate Mediaset. Finally, there was a seventh channel - LA7 -
that is private and can be considered independent from political influences.75 Mr
Silvio Berlusconi, in his double role of media tycoon and Prime Minister, was in
the position to influence five out of seven national channels while in government
- the 3 privately owned (Mediaset) plus Rai1 and Rai2 – during the periods 2001
to 2006 and 2008 to 2011. Indeed, Durante and Knight (2012) provide evidence
74Larcinese (2008) well explains the historical background. Initially there were two main
public channels and, only later on, a third one was added. This created the so call “lottizzazione”
for which the two main channels went to the government coalition (which at the time was a
coalition formed by Democrazia Cristiana and Partito Socialista) and the third one went to the
communist opposition.
75LA7, previously called TeleMontecarlo, was owned since 1999 by Telecom Italia Media Spa,
a telecommunication company specialized in television production and broadcasting, advertising
and other multimedia activities.
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of the news being biased in favour of Mr. Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition while
he was Prime Minister on the above five TV channels.76
3.2.2 Actual crime, crime news reporting, and perceptions
In this section we study the intensity of crime news reporting in Italian TV and
in particular in the six main traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) in comparison
with others. News programs in Italy (called telegiornali) are usually broadcast
between 6:00 and 8:30PM, the time slot labelled as prime-time. They last 30
minutes and contain between 10 and 15 news items. We have data on the monthly
number of crime news items (stories) broadcast by each TV channel during such
30-mins news programs. In Panel A of Figure 3.2 we compare, for the years from
2007 to 2013, the monthly averages of such crime related news for the six main
traditional channels with the same statistic for the only independent TV channel
nationally transmitted through the analogue signal (LA7). The figure shows large
differences in crime reporting intensity between the two groups, with the Rai and
Mediaset channels reporting a number of crime related news which is on average
double that reported by the independent channel LA7. One could argue that LA7
might be underreporting crime news rather than Rai and Mediaset channels over
reporting them although LA7, having no links with any political parties, should
have little incentive to under or over-report crime news. Such concern is partially
addressed by comparing monthly averages of crime related news broadcast by the
main Italian public channel (Rai1) with that of the main TV channel in a selected
number of European countries (TVE for Spain, BBC 1 for the UK, France 2 for
France and ARD for Germany). Panel B of Figure 3.2 shows that the main public
Italian channel (Rai1) broadcast an average of 73 crime related news per month
during the period 2010 to 2013. The number is larger for a factor that ranges
between 1.7 (Spain) to 18 (Germany) with respect to the same metric in the other
European countries considered. As (Panel B) shows, such difference in the amount
of attention dedicated to crime by news programs on specific Italian channels does
76Durante and Knight (2012) find evidence of bias toward the centre-right coalition in Berlus-
coni privately owned channels. When it comes to the three public channels, Rai 1 and Rai 2
exhibit bias toward the centre-right while that coalition is at the government, whereas Rai 3 is
generally closer to the opposition. As Larcinese (2008) points out “. . . .for having the owner of
a vast broadcasting corporation as the leader of one of the electoral coalitions, Italy is probably a
unique example in having such extreme selective exposure to television news” (Larcinese, 2008,
p.4).
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not seem to be justified by existing differences in crime rates (measured as murder
rate) across countries.
One legitimate question is whether the amount of crime related news reported
by a TV channel is associated with the perceptions about crime that individuals
who watch that specific channel hold. To provide an illustrative answer we make
use of the ITANES Survey and regress an indicator equal to one if an individual
reports crime as the most important problem in the country on a dummy for the
TV channel she declares to watch most regularly. 77 We then plot in Figure
3.3 the estimated coefficients against the level of crime news reporting of each
channel (measured as the monthly amount of crime-related news reported during
prime-time news programs). First, the figure shows relevant heterogeneity across
traditional channels in the amount of crime news broadcast. Interestingly, the
ranking of channels from the most to the least crime news intensive closely matches
the equivalent provided by Durante et al. (2012) from the most to the least
biased in favour of the centre-right coalition. Mediaset channels (directly owned
by Mr. Berlusconi) broadcast a higher number of crime news than Rai channels.78
Further, Figure 3.3 shows that individuals who watch TV channels characterised
by higher level of crime news reporting are indeed more likely to consider crime
as major problem in the country. Although suggestive, this evidence cannot be
interpreted as causal because individuals tend to self-select into news media with
an ideological leaning closer to their own, as shown by Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) for the US and by Durante and Knight (2012) for Italy.79We exploit the
drastic supply shock and the consequent shift in viewing shares induced by the
introduction of the digital TV precisely to tackle such identification issue and to
77ITANES is a survey similar in content to the American National Election Study Survey
in the US and representative of the entire Italian population, see section 4 for further details.
We use the wave collected before the 2008 national elections. In the regression, the reference
category is LA7, the main channel not referring to either Rai or Mediaset. Estimates of the
coefficients are stable to the inclusion of individual characteristics and region fixed effects.
78Also in line with results in Table 3.2 of Durante and Knight (2012) is the fact that Rai3 -
the channel usually granted to the opposition when the centre-right coalition is in government
- presents the lowest value of crime news intensity and is the only one with a lower crime news
intensity than LA7. Similarly, they find Rai 3 being the only channel with a negative bias
toward the centre-right coalition.
79Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) investigate whether ideological bias is driven by audience
or owner preferences and find that readers have a significant preference for like-minded news.
Durante and Knight (2012) show, in the Italian context, that viewers respond by switching to
a channels with an ideological leaning closer to their own in response to changes in content of
such channels.
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study the effect of an exogenous reduction in the exposure to crime news on crime
perceptions.
3.3 Identification: The Digital Reform as a Natural Ex-
periment
3.3.1 The Digital Reform
Italy started introducing terrestrial digital TV in 2008. On specific deadline dates,
which varied by region, the analogue signal was switched-off and substituted by
the digital one. Terrestrial digital TV technology enhances transmission efficiency
and allowed Italian households to freely receive more than 50 new channels pre-
viously not available through the analogue signal. 80 Terrestrial digital TV has
a low set-up cost (lower than cable or satellite TV) as it uses existing analogue
infrastructures. In order to receive the newly available digital channels people
needed a specific decoder (similar to a modem). The price of such decoders was
50 euros, and its cost was 100% subsidized by the government through vouch-
ers. The switch over was initiated in 2006 by the centre-left government as per
a compulsory European Union Directive (2007/65/EC). Indeed many other Eu-
ropean countries have gone through the same technological change, and switch
over from analogue to digital TV signal during the last decade. Importantly, in
Italy the deadlines to switch-off analogue signal differed across regions, allow-
ing us to analyse the effect of the policy using a difference-in-difference type of
strategy. Identification relies on the exogeneity of such switch-off deadlines, after
conditioning on region fixed effects, time fixed effects and time varying region
characteristics.
Specific deadlines were based on similarity of 1950s infrastructures and could
not be manipulated by local politicians or interest groups once set. 81 Italy was
divided into sixteen areas, to each of which a precise date for the analogue switch-
off was assigned. The digital switchover for the entire country was completed over
4 years, from November 2008 to June 2012 (Appendix Figure 3A.2). 82 To test
80The cost of the Decoder was entirely subsidized by the Government. For more information
see E-Media Institute, DGTVi.
81For more information please refer here for the EU directive legislation summary and here
for the official Italian Law on the introduction of digital TV signal.
82The switch over has been implemented gradually with patchwork pattern, alternating one
region from the South and one from the North. The first region was Sardinia in the South, the
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the orthogonality of switch-off deadlines to regional characteristics we perform a
balancing test and compare two groups of regions: early switchers (those switching
to digital before or at December 2009) and late switchers (those switching to
digital from January 2010 onwards). Table 3.1 shows that late and early switcher
regions are similar in dimensions such as unemployment and employment rates,
GDP per capita, share of tertiary educated, of immigrant residents and of internet
users, persons cited for crimes and murder rates per 100,000 people, suggesting
that area-specific deadlines seem to be largely idiosyncratic to the purpose of our
analysis.
3.3.2 The induced change in TV viewing shares and exposure to biased
news
Treatment induced by the digital reform. The switch from analogue to
digital TV signal caused an unprecedented increase in the supply of channels.
Such increase was accompanied by a drastic drop in the viewing shares of the
six traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) mainly in favor of the newly available
digital ones. The viewing shares during prime-time (the period between 6:00 and
8:30 pm when most news programs are aired) of the six main traditional channels
went down from about 82% in June 2008 to 60% in June 2012.83 At the same time,
viewing shares of the new digital channels jumped from 2% to 17% (see Figure
3.4). Since the two platforms are characterized by different crime news reporting
intensities, such shift generates arguably exogenous variation in exposure to crime
news. As shown above, the six main traditional channels broadcast higher number
of crime related news than that broadcast by independent Italian TV channel and
by most important channels in main European countries.
Ultimately, for those who reacted to the introduction of digital signal by
“changing” channel from traditional analogue to the new digital channels, we can
think of two alternative possibilities. The first is to switch from news programs
on traditional channels to news programs on digital ones. In this case individuals
would now be exposed to a different (it could be lower or higher) amount of crime
news. The second possibility is to switch from news programs on traditional chan-
second one was Trentino in the North.
83We focus on prime-time, as we are interested in capturing the time of the day when most
news programs are aired but, as we will show later, the drop in the viewing shares of traditional
channels shares is relatively homogeneous across all time slots during the day.
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nels to full-entertainment programs on digital ones. In this case, people would not
receive any information about crime through that specific channel anymore and
the exposure to potentially biased news is reduced. Data about the content of new
digital channels indicate that the latter case is indeed most common. Appendix
Figure 3.A3 plots the increase in the viewing share of new digital channels, split
into those that broadcast some news programs (News Channels) and those that
are full-entertainment (Other Channels). About 95% of the viewing shares of new
digital channels are of channels that do not broadcast news at all. As Appendix
Figure 3.A4 shows the most common programs broadcast by digital channels are
TV-shows, movies and programs for kids, and to a lower extent sport programs,
educational/history programs and life-style programs.
The Digital Reform could also induce individuals to increase/decrease the total
amount of time devoted to watch TV, and, consequently, to vary the time devoted
to other activities, a substitution mechanism that might potentially contaminate
our results. Appendix Table 3.A1 investigates whether the digital switchover
induced any change in the propensity to watch TV (columns 1-2) or in the average
viewing time per day, conditional on watching some TV (columns 3-4). Results
suggest that the Digital Reform might have slightly reduced the probability of
watching TV, although the estimates are significant only for the youngest group
of individuals (when not controlling for region time-varying controls). Further,
coefficients for the effect on the average daily TV watching time (in 10 minutes)
are positive for individuals aged below 41 and negative above, yet are significant
only for the group aged 41-51. Thus, although with some exceptions, the majority
of individuals seem not to have respond to the Digital Reform by watching more
or less TV.
In the next paragraphs we will show how the shift in viewing shares is clearly
triggered by the new technology introduction and takes place precisely in corre-
spondence of the region-specific switch-off deadlines, thus providing evidence of
its exogeneity.
Descriptive evidence. In order to further support the effectiveness of our
identification strategy, we would like to observe jumps in the region-specific shares
of the six main traditional and new digital channels in correspondence with the
region-specific switch-off deadlines. Figure 3.5 plots the evolution of prime-time
viewing shares, for respectively the six main traditional and new digital channels,
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in an exemplificative group of four regions around switch-off dates (the same
plot for all regions is provided in Appendix Figure 3.A8).84 For all of them it is
possible to observe a large and sudden increase (decrease) in the viewing shares
of new digital channels (traditional analogue channels) in correspondence with
the analogue switch-off deadlines (indicated by the vertical dashed lines). To
better show the variation we exploit in our empirical analysis, Figure 3.6 plots
the evolution of the prime-time viewing shares of new digital channels in two pairs
of neighboring regions that switched-off the analogue signal at different times. In
Panel A we compare Campania with Calabria (in the south) while in panel B
Emilia Romagna with Tuscany (in the center-north). Focusing on Panel A, the
trend in digital channels viewing shares is quite similar before November 2009,
when none of the two regions had switched off yet, and after May 2012, when
both regions have already switched to the digital signal. In between switch-off
deadlines (indicated by the dashed vertical lines) individuals who happened to
live in either of the two neighbouring regions have been exposed to a different mix
of TV channels. We exploit precisely such differential exposure, which we argue
is as good as random.
Evidence from regression analysis. In order to provide a more systematic
evidence of the effect of the digital switchover on TV watching behaviour we make
use of unique data on TV viewing shares collected for each channel at the month
by region level and estimate the TV viewing share during prime-time for various
groups of channels (labelled as c) in region r and month t as a function of the
digital switchover as follows:
Sharecrt = γ0 + γ1DigitalSwitchrt + γr + λt + urt (3.1)
We split channels into four groups: Main Traditional Channels (RAI + Me-
diaset), New Digital Channels, Satellite Channels and Residual Channels.85 In
equation (1) above DigitalSwitchrt is an indicator for the region having switched
over to digital signal in month t or before, while γr and γt are region and time fixed
84The plotted regions are Campania (switch-off deadline December 2009), Lombardy (switch-
off deadline October 2010), Umbria (switch-off deadline November 2011) and Sicily (switch-off
deadline June 2012).
85Satellite Channels are pay-per-view ones to which terrestrial digital TV does not automat-
ically provide access. The forth group, Residual Channels, include other digital and satellite
channels whose viewing shares are not recorded individually, as well as some minor local chan-
nels.
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effects respectively.86 Panel A of Table 3.2 reports estimates from equation (1)
for the group of Main Traditional Channels. The switch-over induces a decrease
in the viewing shares of these channels between 8.1 and 8.7 percentage points,
depending on the specification. This corresponds to more than a 10% decrease on
the baseline value. In Panel B, C and D we look at viewing shares of New Digital,
Satellite, and Residual Channels respectively. The switch-over is associated with
an increase in the viewing shares of New Digital Channels that ranges between 6.2
and 7.2 percentage points depending on the specification, while, as expected, has
only a tiny positive effect on the viewing shares of Satellite and Residual Channels.
In the table we deal in different ways with the potential confounding effect due to
time trends by including linear time trends (column 1), year fixed effects (column
2), month*year fixed effects (column 3) and month*year plus region-specific linear
trends (column 4). The digital switchover is very powerful in predicting values of
TV viewing shares with an F-stat equal to 89.9 and 110.8 in our most restrictive
specification (column 4) for respectively viewing shares of main traditional and
new digital channels.87
3.4 Data and Estimating Equation
3.4.1 Data
Individual perceptions of crime. Our primary data source is the Multipurpose
Household Survey, by the Italian National Statistical Agency (ISTAT). One of its
several modules gathers information about individual and household daily life.
The survey is carried out yearly (around March) and is a repeated-cross section
representative at the regional level of the entire Italian population. In addition
to the usual demographic, labour market, and education information, the survey
86We here exclude, as in the following of the paper the region of Piedmont from the analysis,
from the moment that some provinces switched over before others.
87Although most of the news programs are aired during prime-time (between 6:00 and
8:30pm), some news are also broadcast during other time of the day, for example at lunch-
time: between 12:00 and 15:00. One concern is that people might watch fewer news programs
on traditional analogue channels during prime-time, but more of them during other times of
the day. Such substitution across time-slots could potentially offset the decrease in crime news
exposure measured during prime-time In Appendix Table 3.A2 we test whether viewing shares
responses were homogeneous across different times of the day. Reassuringly, the switchover ef-
fect on the viewing shares of traditional analogue channels (negative) and on new digital ones
(positive) goes in the same direction in all and every time slot and estimates are very similar
across the board.
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asks a set of questions about the use of TV, Internet and radio, as well as about
beliefs and perceptions regarding a number of issues. From this survey, we employ
two measures of perceptions about crime. The first is the answer to the question
that asks “What do you think are the priority problems of the country?”.88
We construct an indicator variable for the individuals reporting crime as one of
the three priority problems in Italy and we call it Crime_Concern. This variable
captures individuals’ concern about crime, or, in other words, the level of salience
of crime as a priority problem to be tackled at the national level. In our estimating
sample 57% of individuals report crime as being among the three priority problems
in Italy, making crime the second most reported problem after unemployment
(mentioned by 72% of individuals) throughout the entire period. The average of
Crime_Concern by sub-group of population, alongside other descriptive statistics
for our main estimating sample, is reported in Appendix Table 3.A3. The share
of people particularly concerned about crime is higher among those aged above 65
than among those aged 65 or less, and is equal to 62 and 55 percent respectively.
The survey contains a second measure of crime perception, which derives from
the question “What level of crime risk does your area of residence present?”.
Respondents can choose from four categories that range from “absent” to “very
high”. This variable, named Crime_Risk_Local, is less suited to our purpose as
a) it refers only to the local area while we are interested in attitudes toward crime
at the national level, and b) it is reported only at the household level. However,
the question, unlike the previous one, has also been asked in year 2011 and 2012.
TV viewing shares. To measure the shift in audience shares induced by the
Digital Reform we gathered unique data about monthly, region-specific, viewing
shares for each TV channel available from year 2007 until 2013. The data have
been extracted from the official Auditel dataset.89 We have information about
88Respondents can choose three topics from the following list of ten: unemployment, crime,
tax evasion, environment/pollution, public debt, inefficiency of health sector, inefficiency of
school sector, inefficiency of judicial sector, immigration, poverty, others. Individuals are free
to mention fewer than, but no more than three topics.
89Auditel is an independent third party agency responsible for television audience measure-
ment in Italy. Viewing shares data are based on a sample of about 5200 households and 14000
individuals that is representative at the regional level of the entire Italian population. Auditel
has selected a sample of 20000 households. Every year they conduct a face to face interview
with each of them to check the type of technology they use (Satellite, DG, DVD, etc) and they
install the so-called people meter. The meter is based on the advanced technology Unitam
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viewing shares for five different time slots during the day including prime-time
going from 18:00 to 21:30. Such data are used in the analysis carried out in section
6.90
Individual level self-reported voting and TV watching behavior. We
further use data from the 2008 ITANES Survey , a survey similar in content to
the American National Election Study Survey in the US and representative of the
entire Italian population. It includes individual level information about the most
watched news-program, perceptions about crime, and voting behaviour.91 Such
data are used in the analysis in section 7.
3.4.2 Estimating Equation
In this section, we present our empirical strategy to estimate the reduced-form
effect of the increase in the number of available TV channels on individual per-
ceptions about crime. In order to identify the intention to treatment effect (ITT),
i.e. the effect of the switch-over from analogue to digital TV signal and the
subsequent increase in number of available channels, we exploit region specific
idiosyncratic deadlines to switch and implement a difference-in-difference design
that compares crime perceptions of individuals within the same region, before
and after the analogue switch-off occurred. More formally, we estimate various
versions of the following linear probability model:
CrimeConcernirt = α0 + α1DigitalSwitchrt +X
′
irtδ + Z
′
rt + γr + λt + εirt (3.2)
where i indexes individuals, r regions and t time periods. The variable
CrimeConcernirt is an indicator for the individual mentioning crime among the
three priority problems in the country. DigitalSwitchrt is a dummy that equals
1 if region r experienced the switch-off to digital signal at time (year) t or be-
fore. The switch-off might occur at any point in time during the year previous
to the annual household survey collected in March. Indeed, switching to digital
/ CTS (content tracking system) and collects data everyday on the number of TV minutes
watching per all the existing channels. More information on Auditel procedure is available at
http://www.auditel.it/come-lavora/.
90Slot1, from 07:00 to 11:59; slot2, from 12:00 to 14:59; slot3, from 15:00 to 17:59; slot4
(prime-time) from 18:00 to 21:30 and slot5, from 20:31 to 23:59.
91The 2008 ITANES Survey was collected right after the 2008 national election.
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TV just one month before the survey is likely to induce different treatment than
switching 11 months before it, as the share of time between two surveys during
which individuals have access to more TV channels differs. In order to take such
heterogeneity in (intention to) treatment intensity into account we also consider
an alternative measure for Digital_Switch, which is the fraction of months (over
the 8 previous to each annual survey) after the switch-off occurred. The coefficient
of interest is α1, which captures the impact of the increase in available TV chan-
nels on individual crime perceptions. Vector X ′irt denotes a set of individual and
household level characteristics including gender, age, marital status, education,
set of dummies for occupational status, family size, family structure, and major
source of household income. Vector Z ′rt includes a series of region time-varying co-
variates that might affect crime perception directly or indirectly, such crime rates
and unemployment rate. For our purpose it is crucial to control for region-specific
crime rates that are likely to be an important determinant of crime perceptions.
We measure it as the (log) crime rate, defined as number of crimes over 10’000
population, in region r during the calendar year previous to the collection of year
t survey. The coefficient on crime rates is of interest on its own as it will tell us
whether, and to what extent, crime perceptions respond to actual crime rates.
The γr are region fixed effects meant to capture any unobserved time-invariant
characteristics that affect crime perceptions and may also be correlated with the
timing of the switch-over to digital TV. The λtare year fixed effects meant to allow
for very flexible trend in crime perception common to all regions. Finally, εirt is
an idiosyncratic error term. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on
region and year fixed effects and on the time-varying controls, the timing of the
digital switchover is orthogonal to the error term. We will attempt to test the
plausibility of this assumption in the reminder of the paper. Finally, throughout
the empirical analysis, we cluster standard errors at the region level to allow for
an arbitrary correlation of residuals within regions.
3.5 The Effect of the Digital Reform on Crime Perceptions
3.5.1 Estimates
Overall Effect. Here we discuss results from the estimation of the reduced
form effect of the digital switchover on individual crime perceptions. Table 3.3
summarizes the results from our estimation of equation (2): a linear probability
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model of Crime_Concern on a post switch-over indicator Digital_Switch and
controls. Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual reporting crime as
being among the three priority problems in the country at the moment of the
survey. The coefficient on Digital_Switch, an indicator taking value 1 if the region
has switched-off in period t or before, captures the effect of the increase in the
number of available TV channels on crime perceptions. When we look at the effect
on the overall population (column 1) we find a negative coefficient, suggesting
that the Digital Reform induced a lower concern about crime. The coefficient
is not statistically significant though. However, we do not expect all groups of
the population to a) be exposed in the same way to the pre-existing bias, and b)
to respond in the same way to the partial removal of it. Indeed, individuals of
different cohorts are likely to gather information from different combinations of
media; for example, older individuals are likely to rely more on television and less
on new technologies such as internet, as we will show in more detail later.
Heterogeneity of the effect across age groups. We therefore turn and
study the heterogeneous effect of the Digital Reform for five different age groups
of the population (results reported in column 2). We do so by interacting Digi-
tal_Switch with a set of five age group indicators. While estimates for individuals
below age 41 are close to zero, they are negative for older individuals. Estimates
get larger as we move from younger to older groups and are significantly differ-
ent from zero at conventional levels for the group of individuals above age 65.
These results suggest that elderly individuals’ crime perceptions respond more
to the decreased exposure to potentially biased news programs broadcast by the
six main traditional TV channels. The stronger response for the group of elderly
individuals is consistent with findings from Barone et al., 2015 that detected a
stronger effect of media on voting in municipalities with higher share of elderly
individuals. One potential reason for such regularity might be higher amount of
time elderly individuals are likely to spend watching TV and the relatively lower
use they make of alternative sources of information. We will directly investigate
these potential explanations in the next section.
New specification: accounting for the length of treatment. From
column 3 onward we employ a more precise version of Digital_Switch: the share
of months the region has spent under the new digital regime during the 8 months
period previous to the survey. Such specification takes into account the length
of the (intention to) treatment we are interested in. Estimates (all negative)
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get larger, and are now significant also for the second oldest group of individuals,
those aged 52-65. The fact that when we account for the intensity of the treatment
estimates effects get larger suggests that in our empirical analysis we are not likely
to be picking up just some spurious correlation between year of switch-off and
changes in crime perceptions. We consider this specification more appropriate to
the purpose of our analysis and will use it from this point forward.
Robustness of estimates and magnitude of the effect. The coefficients
are very stable across specifications, suggesting that the introduction of digital
TV is not correlated with any individual characteristic (included from column 4)
or region time-varying characteristics (included from column 5). In particular, in
column 5 and 6, we add region-specific crime rates that do not affect the estimates
on the Digital_Switch. Crime perceptions respond to actual crime rates, but
only to specific crime categories: column 6 shows that individuals become more
concerned about crime only when violent and drug related crimes increase, while
property crimes and other crimes do not seem to affect individual concerns in any
significant way. In our most complete specification the increase in TV channels,
or better, having access for the entire pre-survey period to an increased number
of TV channels, is associated with a statistically significant decrease in crime
concern for individuals aged above 51 (the t-statistic for the next younger groups
is 1.636). The effect estimated is economically relevant: if we focus on the older
group of individuals, those aged above 65, the digital reform is associated with a
decrease in the probability of reporting crime as one of three priority problems
of 5.2 percentage points, corresponding to about 8.4 percent change with respect
to the average probability for that specific age group (equal to 0.62). These
results are consistent with the increase in the number of channels available - and
the induced lower exposure to partisan ones over-reporting crime news - leading
individuals to revise their crime perceptions downward.
Estimates of the group-specific Digital_Switch coefficients from the most com-
plete specification (column 6) together with 90% confidence intervals are also
plotted in Figure 3.7. This shows clearly how the effect of the reform gets larger
as we move from left to right of the age distribution. In Appendix Figure 3.A5
we also report estimates from regressions of the type in column 6 but estimated
separately for males and females. Among females the effect is negative and sta-
tistically significant for those aged above 40 and gets more precisely estimated as
age increases. The effect is negative and significant for males above age 65. As
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for interpreting the coefficients, for females aged above 65 the switch-off is associ-
ated with a decrease in the probability of reporting crime as priority problem of 3
percentage points, which represents a decrease of about 5 percent with respect to
the average probability for that specific group of individuals. Similarly the effect
of the switch-off on males above age 65 corresponds to a decrease of about 6.5
percent on their average probability.92
3.5.2 Interpreting results: TV watching time and other media usage
TV watching time. Why are elderly individuals more responsive to the increase
in TV channels availability? One potential reason might be related to different
amount of time spent watching TV. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that the
effect of a reduced exposure to partisan TV channels is larger the for those indi-
viduals who, on the one side, watch more television, and on the other one have
smaller access to other sources of information such as the internet, the radio and
newspapers. Our survey provides information about the daily amount of time
spent watching television, as well as how frequently other information sources are
used. In our setting, it is possible that TV watching time might be affected by the
Digital Reform itself, introducing a bias in the estimates of an interaction term
between Digital Reform and actual watching time. 93 To overcome this problem,
we predict the amount of time an individual spends watching TV by using a num-
ber of characteristics – age, gender, marital status and household size – which we
believe are unaffected by the digital reform.94 Table 3.4 reports estimates from
regressing our usual outcome on Digital_Switch, TV_time (which is measured in
10 minutes and de-meaned) the interaction between them, and the usual set of
controls. The effect of the digital reform on the likelihood to report crime as a
problem for the individual watching an average amount of TV is negative and sig-
nificant at the 10% level. The interaction term is negative and highly statistically
significant, suggesting that the negative effect of the digital reform is stronger for
92Average probability of reporting crime as a major problem is 0.62 and 0.61 for female and
males respectively above age 65.
93Indeed, in section 3 (see Appendix Table 3.A1) we show that we cannot rule out that some
groups of individuals have responded to the Digital Reform by modifying the total amount of
time spent watching TV.
94We calculate, using pre-reform data, averages TV watching time for each cell formed by the
interaction of the following variables: age, gender, marital status and household size. We then
predict TV watching time for individuals in our estimating sample based on such cell-specific
averages.
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individuals watching relatively more TV. Precisely, the probability of reporting
crime as a problem decreases by an extra 1.5 p.p. for every extra half hour spent
watching TV. Individuals who watch a lot of television were more likely to be
exposed to news programs in partisan channels before the introduction of the dig-
ital signal and this is likely to be a reason why they revise perceptions to a larger
extent. In column 2 we test the linearity of the interaction effect and although the
coefficient on the interaction with TV_time squared is positive we fail to reject
linearity.
Differential access to other sources of information. Television is not
the only source of information individuals use. Access to other media is equally
important. Individuals form their beliefs about the actual levels of crime through
two main different sources: direct observation of the reality and indirect channels,
such as television, the internet, newspapers and the radio. Hence, according to
simple Bayes Rule, an individual would update his perceptions every time a new
piece of information is received, and do so according to the weight attributed to the
specific information source. If many sources of information are available each one
will have little weight and contribute only marginally to the update of perceptions.
Hence, we would expect the weight attached to information coming from television
to be higher for individuals who have only limited access to other sources. To
explore this hypothesis we run regressions where we interact Digital_Switch with
an indicator variable equal 1 for individuals not using, respectively, the internet,
the radio, and newspapers.95Results (reported in columns 3-5 of Table 3.4) indicate
that the effect of the Digital Reform is stronger - more negative - for individuals
who do not use the internet (54% of the sample) or do not listen to the radio (37%
of the sample). In both cases the coefficients are negative, sizable, and highly
significant. The interaction with the dummy as for not reading newspapers (40%
of the sample) turns out negative but is not statistically different from zero. Thus,
the effect of the change in the information content provided through television
appear to be larger for individuals with a less diversified set of sources from
which gathering information, consistently with the simple updating mechanism
suggested above. To reconcile these estimates with our main results from Table
3.3 we compare average TV watching time and the share of individuals not using
internet, the radio and newspapers among individuals below and above age 51,
95Also in the case of internet, radio and newspapers, because of the reasons above we predict
values using characteristics not affected by the reform in the same way we did for TV_time.
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the age cut-off above which we find statistically significant effect of the Digital
Reform. Table 3.5 shows that individuals aged above 51 are used to watch TV
for almost one extra hour per day with respect to those aged 15-51 (193 vs 142
minutes per day). Individuals aged above 51 also show to have much less frequent
access to other media: 86% of them never use internet, 50% never listen to the
radio and 41% never read newspapers, while such percentages equal, respectively,
41%, 21% and 33% for their younger counterpart. The results above suggest that
older individuals, especially those aged above 65, by relying mainly on television
probably place high weight to information coming from it. As a consequence that
group of the population, more likely to be exposed to the potential pre-reform
bias, responded more to changes in TV content.
3.5.3 Further results and robustness checks
Effect on concerns about other topics. If individuals are less concerned
about crime after the introduction of digital TV, we might be interested in know-
ing what problems have substituted crime as priorities in their opinion.96 We
therefore look at the effect of the digital introduction on the likelihood of men-
tioning any of the other problems suggested by the question “What do you think
are the 3 priority problems of the country?”, and there are nine of them apart
from crime. The Appendix Table 3.A4 reports estimates for individuals aged
above 51 – those for whom we found significant impact on crime perceptions -
of the effect of the digital switchover for each of the other topics plus crime. In
the table problems are ranked from left to right from the most (unemployment)
to the least mentioned (inefficiency of education system). The lower concerns
about crime seem to be compensated for by higher concerns about most of the
other problems, such as poverty, inefficiency of health sector, tax evasion, envi-
ronmental issues, inefficiency of judicial system, public debt and inefficiency of
the educational system. However, estimates are statistically significant at con-
ventional level only for inefficiency of health sector. The introduction of digital
TV is also associated with lower concern about immigration and unemployment,
but in the first case estimates are very small and in the second standard errors
96Our outcome variable is a relative measure of concern as people are asked to report the
three priority problems. Given such relative nature we are not able to test whether the increase
in TV channels, and the consequent lower exposure to Berlusconi-influenced news programs,
induced a lower general concern about every problem.
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are quite large.
Effect of switch-over on unemployment and crime. The first robustness
check we perform is to test if, in correspondence with the switch-off deadlines, re-
gions have experienced changes in economic outcomes that are themselves relevant
for crime perceptions. We test such hypothesis by estimating, in a similar fash-
ion as above, the effect of the Digital Reform on unemployment and crime rates
where the unit of observation is the region*year. Estimates suggest (Appendix
Table 3.A5) that the Digital Reform is not statistically significantly associated
with any change in unemployment or crime rates at the regional level, regardless
of whether we use a specification with an indicator for Digital_Switch (columns
1 and 3) or the share of months (columns 2 and 4). In the case of unemploy-
ment share estimates even change signs when adopting the share of months as
explanatory variable.
Effect of switch-over on individuals not watching TV. A portion of
individuals in our sample (about 5% of the total) do not watch TV at all, and
we should expect not to find any effect of the digital switchover on them. As a
robustness check we thus estimate the same reduced-form regressions presented
in Table 3.3 on the sample of those individuals who report not to watch TV at
all. This exercise is only valid under the assumption that individuals did not
pass from not watching to watching TV (or vice versa) in response to the Digital
Reform. The Appendix Table 3.A6 reports results from such exercise, estimates
on Digital_Switch are significant at the 10% level in only one case out of twenty.
Timing of the switch-over effect: perceptions about local level crime.
We run a placebo test to check if we can detect any effect of the switch to digital
signal before it actually occurred. To do so we employ the second measure of crime
perceptions included in our dataset that refers to the level of crime risk in the area
of residence. The questionnaire asks to rate the risk of crime in the local area of
residence on a scale from 1 to 4 (highest level of crime) and we use answers to such
question to construct a measure of perception of the level of crime in the local area
called Crime_Risk_Local. Such variable is only reported at the household level
but is available until year 2012 enabling us to look at the effect of the increase
in the number of TV channels available also 1, 2 and 3 years after the switch-
off. The estimated leads and lags effects running from two years prior to two
years after the switch-off are plotted in Appendix Figure 3.A6. Estimates show
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no effect of the switch-off before it actually occurred and such result is reassuring.
They start to become negative right after the switch-off, and keep decreasing
with time (becoming statistically significant two years after it). This might be an
indication of individuals adjusting their viewing behavior gradually. Furthermore,
it could be that perceptions about the level of local crime might take longer to
adjust. Perhaps because individuals put larger weight on direct information when
forming such perceptions while relying more on secondary sources of information,
such as television, when forming perceptions at the national level.
Strategic editorial response to the change in market shares. The
interpretation of our results would be hindered if the amount of crime news items
broadcast by different channels responded to the digital switchover. This would be
the case if the editors of news programs responded to the change in the television
market’s structure by strategically increasing or decreasing the amount of crime
stories reported. To explore such possibility, we plot (Appendix Figure 3.A7) the
average number of crime news reported on channels directly owned by Berlusconi
(Mediaset) against the viewing shares of new digital channels, from 2007 until the
end of 2012. Despite the significant increase in digital channels viewing shares
(dashed blue line), the amount of crime news reported in Berlusconi’s channels
(red line) fluctuates around an average of about 100, and does not show any clear
trend during the period. In particular, the number of crime news reported does
not seem to change in any systematic way in correspondence with the various
waves when the digital signal is introduced (indicated in the figure by the grey
shaded areas).
3.6 Assessing the Effect of Crime News Exposure on Per-
ceptions
Our reduced-form estimates indicate that individuals tend to revise their concern
about crime downward once less exposed partisan TV channels. In this section
we try to measure to what extend such reduced-form effect can be linked to
the change in crime news exposure induced by the reform. In other words, we
now attempt to answer the question about what happens to individuals’ concern
about crime when their exposure to crime news varies. As discussed earlier, in our
setting the decrease (increase) in exposure to crime news might come together with
the decrease (increase) in exposure to other types of news, and with an increase
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(decrease) in exposure to full-entertainment contents. Therefore our measure of
exposure to crime news will naturally capture those additional elements as well.
3.6.1 Measuring crime news exposure
To construct a measure of exposure to crime news we combine unique data on:
a) region-specific monthly viewing shares of each TV channel during prime-time
news programs; and b) the monthly amount of crime-related news items reported
by each TV channel during prime-time news programs. With these two pieces of
information we construct the following region*time specific measure of exposure
to crime news:
CrimeNewsExposurert =
c∑
c=1
CrimeNewsct ∗ Sharecrt
where CrimeNewsctrepresents the number of crime news items reported dur-
ing prime-time news programs on channel c during period t; while Sharecrt is the
prime-time viewing share of channel c in region r during period t. The mea-
sure is the summation, over all TV channels, of the number of crime news items
broadcast during the period t weighted by the region-specific viewing share in the
region r during the period t. This weighted average delivers us the actual number
of crime news items the average individual who lives in region r is exposed to
at each point in time (during each month or year). Between two months, the
exposure to crime news of individuals living in a specific region can vary either
because the average amount of crime news broadcast changes or because of some
viewing shares reallocation across TV channels characterised by different crime
news reporting intensity.
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3.6.2 Estimating changes in crime news exposure induced by the Dig-
ital Reform
In order to measure the effect of the Digital Reform on individuals’ exposure to
crime news we estimate the following first-stage equation:
(
c∑
c=1
CrimeNewsct ∗ Sharecrt
)
= γ0+γ1DigitalSwitchrt+Z
′
rt+γr+λt+εirt (3.3)
Where t can be either month or year and Digital_Switch is an indicator for
the regions having switched to digital at time t or before.97 Estimates are re-
ported in Table 3.6. While we always include region fixed effects, from columns
1 to 4 we account for possible confounding factors due to the time dimension in
different ways. More precisely, in column 1 we only include a linear time trend;
in columns 2 year fixed effects; in column 3 year*month fixed effects to allow
for maximum flexibility in the (common) time trend; finally, in column 4, we es-
timate our tighter specification by including both year*month fixed effects and
region-specific linear time trends. In our context TV news programs are broad-
cast nationally, so any change over time in the amount of crime news reported is
absorbed by time fixed effects. Instead, the variation in Crime_News_Exposure
that is generated by the digital switch has to do with the reallocation of view-
ing shares away from traditional analogue channels and in favour of those with
fewer or no crime news. Furthermore, if we look within the six main traditional
channels (see Appendix Figure 3.A9) those characterized by higher crime news
reporting intensity lost relatively more viewing shares during the period of digital
TV introduction. Thus, because of this differential effect of the Digital Reform on
viewing shares of different traditional channels, even the group of individuals who
keep watching those traditional channels is, after the reform, on average exposed
to lower crime news intensity.
Estimates (reported in Table 3.6) suggest that the digital switchover induced a
decrease in the exposure of individuals to crime news. The coefficients on the Dig-
ital_Switch indicator are always negative, remarkably stable across specifications,
and very powerful in predicting changes in Crime_News_Exposure. They are all
97In this part of the analysis, because we often work with monthly level observations, we use
the dummy measure of the digital switch rather than the fraction of months after the switch-off
occurred.
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significant at the 1% level and the F-statistic associated with Digital_Switch al-
ways scores above 35 in our most complete specifications, from column 4 onward.
In column 5 we exclude from the analysis the residual TV channels, which we
cannot label as either digital, or satellite; while in column 6 we estimate the equa-
tion collapsing the data into a yearly dataset. Estimates are in both cases very
similar to those in the main specification. According to these results (see column
3) the digital switchover caused a reduction in the exposure to crime news equal
to 8.4 crime news items per month. This number corresponds to about 12% of the
average amount of crime news individuals are exposed to during a month, thus a
sizable reduction.
3.6.3 The effect of crime news exposure on crime perceptions
We then move on and use the predicted values of Crime_News_Exposure to mea-
sure the effect of the digital reform on crime perceptions. We do so by estimating
the following second-stage equation:
CrimeConcernirt = β0+β1Crimert+β2
(
c∑
c=1
CrimeNewsct ∗ Sharecrt
)
+X ′irtβ3+Z
′
rtβ4+ηr+kt+uirt
(3.4)
where the variable CrimeConcernirt is the same as the one used in equation
(2) and described above.
c∑
c=1
CrimeNewsct ∗ Sharecrt is our predicted measure of
Crime_News_Exposure. Vectors X ′irt and Z
′
rtare the same as in equation (2). As
usual robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level. In our first stage
the change in Crime_News_Exposure is driven by shifts in TV viewing shares
across channels, thus by individuals deciding to change channel in response to
the digital reform. These compliers allow us to identify a local average treat-
ment effect (LATE) for that part of the population whose viewing habits have
changed because of the digital switchover. In particular, because we observe
Crime_News_Exposure at the regional rather than at the individual level, the
estimates delivered by our model are a mixture of a zero effect for individuals
in treated regions who did not change channel and a possibly non-zero effect for
those who did change channel. In order to interpret as causal the scaling of our
reduced-from estimates by the first stage ones the exclusion restriction must hold,
i.e. that the only way the digital switchover affects crime perceptions is through
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the change in crime news exposure. However, crime coverage is only one of the di-
mensions in which content of the traditional Berlusconi-influenced and new digital
channels differ. Non-news related programs, such as movies, soap-operas, sport
programs etc. will, of course, also differ. Nevertheless it is fair to believe that
such entertainment programs are likely to have a minor direct influence on crime
perceptions. 98
OLS estimates of equation (4) as well as IV ones are reported in Table 3.7.
These are year level regressions where the exposure variable is calculated as the
average monthly number of crime news broadcast during the year before each sur-
vey. Both OLS and IV estimates on Exposure are positive suggesting that higher
exposure to crime news is associated with higher crime concerns. OLS are just
slightly larger than IV ones. This is due a first stage almost perfectly predicting
Crime_News_Exposure. In fact, once we account for region and time fixed ef-
fects, almost the entire variation in the exposure to crime news is explained by the
shift in viewing shares across TV channels induced by the digital TV introduc-
tion. In other words, because during the Digital Reform period the largest portion
of viewing shares reallocation was triggered by the digital switchover, the varia-
tion in viewing shares used by OLS estimator has already very little endogeneity.
When we allow the effect to vary across age groups our IV estimates (column 6)
indicate that, similarly to the reduced-form case, the effect gets stronger (more
negative) with age, and estimates are significant for individuals aged above 65.
According to these estimates a one standard deviation decrease in the exposure to
crime news (equivalent to 13 fewer news items per month) is associated with a 5.7
percentage point decrease in the probability of reporting crime as priority prob-
lem for individuals aged above 65. That is about a 9.2 percent drop with respect
to their average likelihood of being concerned about crime of 0.62. These results
suggest that, over and above actual crime levels (crime rates is included as control
in all specifications), people do seem to respond to changes in the number of crime
news they are exposed to in the intuitive way. That is, they are more concerned
98It might be the case, for example, that Berlusconi-influenced channels broadcast more violent
movie. Yet, Dahl and Della Vigna (2009) have shown no effect of violent movie on crime-related
outcomes. More generally non-news programs in Berlusconi-influenced channels might have a
direct effect on crime perceptions. Durante et al. (2015) find indeed that commercial-content in
those channels affected voting (although in a period anterior to our study) yet, they argue the
effect being due to the decline in social capital and the diffusion of a culture of individualism,
not mentioning possible change in perceptions with respect to politically salient topics.
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about crime when TV broadcasts higher number of crime news, regardless of the
actual amount of crime. The estimated elasticity of crime perceptions to crime
news is economically relevant and thus might have political economy implications.
We discuss this issue in the next section.
3.7 Priming, Crime Perceptions and Voting Behaviour
In this section, we want to first discuss to what extent the high level of crime
news reporting in Berlusconi-influenced channels can have a supply-side rather
than a demand-side explanation, and then analyse the potential implications that
the induced change in crime perceptions might have for voting behaviour.
A supply-side explanation: issue ownership. Reporting a high number
of crime news might be a rational strategy for TV channels under the influence
of Mr Berlusconi with the objective to increase people’s concern about crime
and eventually gain electoral advantage. Such strategy, called issue selection or
agenda setting (see Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder, 2011), is realised when media
choose which type of information to report (for example crime events) in order
to influence the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to
what extent. Thus, a coalition that can influence or partially control the media
might be incentivised to make a particular topic a salient one in the electorate’s
mind if the topic is perceived by the electorate as an area in which the coalition
has a competitive advantage.99 To gather evidence on whether crime is an issue
“owned” by the centre-right coalition in Italy we use data from the Italian National
Election Study Survey (ITANES). To the question “What coalition would be better
able to face the problem: crime?”, 51% of the respondents report the centre-right
coalition, only 20% the centre-left and the remaining 29% say that is indifferent.
Thus, making the topic of crime a salient one in voters’ mind might thus be a
rational strategy for the Italian centre-right coalition (CR coalition from now on),
which indeed has often based its past electoral campaigns around issues such as
crime and security.
Another piece of evidence in favour of the supply-side story is provided in
Appendix Figure 3.A10. The figure shows the number of crime news over time
99For example Larcinese et al (2011) shows that, in the US, the majority of people believe
the Republican Party being better suited at dealing with national security issues while the
Democratic Party with health care and social ones.
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broken down by the two main TV groups: Rai, i.e. the public channels and
Mediaset that is owned by Mr Berlusconi. Interestingly, the coverage of crime
stories drops on Rai channels but not on Mediaset ones following Berlusconi’s
resignation in November 2011 - at which point he still controls Mediaset but not
Rai – indirectly suggesting that supply of crime news might indeed partially driven
by political purposes.
Crime news exposure, crime perceptions and voting. Barone et al.
(2015) have provided convincing evidence that the Digital Reform had a negative
impact on voting for the centre-right coalition. Here our goal is not to quanti-
tatively assess the relative relevance of the induced change in crime perceptions
vis-à-vis other potential channels. Such analysis is indeed not feasible with the
data in hand and is left for future research100. Yet, by uncovering a relation-
ship between crime perceptions and centre-right voting behaviour we intend to
provide suggestive evidence that the manipulation of attitudes and perceptions
with respect to relevant topics such as crime might have been one of the channels
through which the effect of biased media on voting worked. Thus, we employ data
from the post-2008 election wave of the ITANES Survey, and regress an indicator
for the individual reporting having voted for the CR coalition (CR_Vote) on a
dummy equal one if the person reports crime as the most important problem in
the country (Crime_Concern). Table 3.8 shows that individuals who consider
crime as the most important problem are almost 25 percentage point more likely
to vote for the CR coalition that those who do not think so. These results are
coherent with the evidence provided above about the majority of Italian citizens
believing the CR coalition being better at tackling the crime issue. Estimates
of the coefficient are stable to the inclusion of individual characteristics and re-
gion fixed effects. Although we cannot give causal interpretation to these results,
they do point in the direction of a relationship in the Italian context between
being concerned about crime and security and the likelihood of voting for the CR
coalition.
In the same fashion, we then estimate the probability of CR_Vote on a dummy
indicating the most watched TV channel reported by the individual and plot (see
Appendix Figure 3.A11) estimated coefficients against channel-specific crime re-
100Unfortunately, the absence of national elections during the Digital Reform does not allow us
to directly test to what extent the change in perceptions induced by the introduction of digital
TV affected voting behaviour.
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porting intensity.101 The figure shows a strong and positive correlation: individu-
als who watch channels characterised by higher intensity of crime news reporting
are more likely to vote for the CR coalition.
Table 3.8 provides evidence that crime perceptions are relevant for voting
decisions and that the probability CR_Vote is correlated with individual crime
news exposure. Given the shock in the exposure to partisan channels induced by
the digital reform, it is natural to ask what could have been the impact of the
digital switchover on voting behaviour through the change in crime perceptions.
To provide a numerical illustrative answer, we focus on individuals aged above 51
and 65, the population groups for which we found significant effect of the Digital
Reform. For individuals aged above 65 the estimated coefficient of the digital
switchover effect on crime concern was -0.052 (Table 3.3, column 6). Assuming
a decrease of the same magnitude for the variable Crime_Concern and plugging
it into the regression presented in Table 3.8, we obtain that the induced change
in the latter likelihood would be equal to 1.3 percentage points, or 2.8 percent
with respect to the average probability of CR vote (0.47). 102 According to these
numbers almost 3% of 2008 national election CR voters aged above 65, and 2.4%
of those aged 52-65, could have been induced to change their vote by the decrease
in crime concern caused by digital TV introduction. Individuals aged above 51
represent almost one out of three of the Italian population entitled to vote and
they have on average higher turnout rates than younger individuals. Although
illustrative in its nature, this exercise seems to suggest that the change in crime
perceptions induced by the decreased exposure to partisan channels might have
relevant effects on voting outcomes.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
In modern democracies voters rely on media outlets to learn about politically
salient issues. This raises an important question: how strongly can media affect
public opinion? In this paper, we address this question by investigating the in-
101The reference category is La7 (as in Figure 4) the main independent channel before the
reform. Crime reporting intensity is measured as the monthly average of crime-related news
reported during prime-time news programs. Estimates of the coefficients are stable to the
inclusion of individual characteristics and region fixed effects.
102Similarly, for individuals aged 52-65, the induced change in the likelihood of CR vote would
be equal to 1 percentage points, or 2.4 percent with respect to baseline (0.42).
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fluence on news media on beliefs and perceptions individuals hold, with a focus
on crime perceptions. We do so by focusing on the case of Italy, a country where
the majority of TV channels have been under the influence of the former Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi for more than a decade. In the first part of the paper we
document the existence of a potential bias in the number of crime news reported
by the Berlusconi-influenced TV channels. We then test if individuals revise their
perceptions about crime once exposure to these channels is reduced. In order to
identify the causal effect, we exploit a natural experiment in the Italian television:
the introduction of the digital TV signal, which led to a drastic and sudden drop
in the viewing shares of partisan channels. Exploiting the staggered timing of such
introduction, and combining unique data on each channel’s crime news coverage
and prime-time viewing shares, we find that reduced exposure to crime-related
news broadcast by partisan channels decreased concerns about crime. The effect
is mainly driven by older individuals because, by watching more television and
using alternative sources of information (such as internet, radio and newspapers)
less frequently, represent the group more affected by the change in television news
content. Such a change in perceptions is likely to be relevant for voting behavior.
We predict that the reduction in crime concern caused by the digital introduction
might induce up to about 2.4-2.8% of those aged above 51 who voted for the
centre-right coalition to change their vote.
This paper contributes to the literature on persuasive communication by pro-
ducing causal evidence of the impact of information provided by motivated agents
(partisan media) on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. Although dif-
ficult to generalize to other settings, our results seem to suggest media outlet
do have the capacity to influence voters’ beliefs. Our findings also indicate that
manipulating people’s perceptions is more difficult when individuals acquire in-
formation from a variety of sources.
Further, this paper adds to the growing literature that looks specifically at the
effects of media on voting. First it starts shading light over one of the possible
mechanisms through which media ultimately affect voting outcomes: influencing
their beliefs and perceptions about topics that are relevant in the political debate.
Second, the use of unique data on viewing shares and news content of the differ-
ent TV channels allows us to measuring the effect of exposure to specific media
content. Individuals for whom we find a significant effect, those aged above age
51, make up about 30 percent of Italian voting population. Hence, for an office-
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seeking politician, being able to influence their beliefs about politically salient
issues might have relevant implications in terms of voting outcomes. Media are
nowadays a pervasive presence in people’s lives and the increasing availability of
data about them provides unique opportunity to further explore the mechanisms
through which they impact on economic decisions and outcomes.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Actual crime vs crime perceptions in Italy: 2004-2012
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Note. The left panel of the figure reports changes in crime rates between 2004 and 2012. Source:
Authors’ elaboration on Italian Home Office Data. The right panel reports the share of people
by answer to the question “Do you think that, with respect to five years ago, crime has gone
up/gone down/ stayed the same/ do not know” from 2009 to 2012. The shares referring to the
answers “stayed the same” and “do not know” are not reported.
Source: Eurostat (left panel) and UNIPOLIS Foundation (right panel).
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Figure 3.2: Intensity of Crime News Reporting
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Panel (A): Intensity of crime news reporting: Main Traditional Channels (Rai 
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Panel (B): Intensity of crime news reporting and murder rates: selected 
countries 
 
Note. Panel A. The graph shows the average monthly number of crime news broadcast during
prime-time news programs respectively by main traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) and
the new independent channel (La7). Data for LA7 channel are available only from year 2010
onwards. a.
Panel B. The graph compares the average monthly number of crime news broadcast during
prime-time news programs by the main public TV channel with the annual murder rate in a
selected number of European countries. Sources: Pavia Observatory (crime news data) and
Eurostat (murder rates). Years: 2010-2012.
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Pavia Observatory data
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Figure 3.3: Crime news exposure and concerns about crime
 
Note. The figure reports estimates from a LPM where we regress an indicator equal to one if
an individual reports crime as the most important problem in the country on set of dummies
for which of the 7 main analog TV channel the individual declares to watch most regularly. We
then plot the estimated coefficients together with the monthly amount of crime-related news
items reported by each TV channel during prime-time news programs. Estimated coefficients are
interpreted with respected to the TV channel LA7, which is excluded from the regression. The
regression includes age, male dummy, level of education, dummy for married, a set of dummies of
occupational status and region fixed effects. Sources: Pavia Observatory (crime news data) and
ITANES (Crime Perception Data) Year: 2008. Crime Perception measure with a pre-electoral
survey using the question “Which is the most important problem in Italy at the moment?”
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Figure 3.4: Prime time viewing shares: main traditional analogue channels (Rai
+ Mediaset) vs new digital channels
 
Note. The figure plots monthly TV viewing shares during prime-time (18:00-20:30) for main
traditional analogue channels (Rai and Mediaset) and new digital channels between 2007 and
2013. Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.
Figure 3.5: Prime time viewing shares around switch-off deadlines (selected re-
gions)
 
Note. The figure reports the evolution of monthly viewing shares (prime-time) before and after
the switch-over to digital TV signal in 4 selected regions. The light grey lines indicate viewing
shares of main traditional analogue channels while the dark grey ones indicate those of new
digital channels. The dashed vertical lines indicate switch-off dates for each specific region.
Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.
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Figure 3.6: Discontinuity in digital channels viewing shares (prime-time) around
switch-off deadlines (selected pairs of neighboring regions)
 
Panel A 
Panel B 
 
Note. The figures show the evolution of monthly TV viewing shares (prime-time) of new digital
channels in 2 pairs of neighboring regions, before, during, and after the switch to digital signal.
The dashed vertical lines indicate switch-off dates. In particular in Panel A the first line corre-
sponds to the deadline in region Campania (12/2009) while the second to the deadline in region
Calabria (06/2012). In Panel B the first line corresponds to the deadline in region Emilia-
Romagna (11/2010) while the second to the deadline in region Tuscany (11/2011). Source:
authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of Digital Reform on crime perceptions: heterogeneity across
age groups
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Note. The figure plots estimates and 90% confidence intervals by age groups from a LPM
regression of Crime_Concern on a post digital switch variable (Digital_Switch) and controls.
Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual reporting crime as one of the 3 priority prob-
lems in Italy. Digital_Switch equals the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each
survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. The specification is the
same used in column 6 of Table 3. Individual and family controls include: gender, age group
dummies, marital status, education, set of dummies for occupational status, family size, family
structure, and major source of household income. Region time-varying controls include un-
employment rate and crime rate. The regressions include year and region fixed effects. 90%
confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by region are reported.
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Balancing test: early vs late switcher regions
 
Early 
Switchers
Late 
Switchers
Difference p-value
Unemployment rate 0.063 0.064 -0.002 0.923
Employment rate 0.636 0.629 0.008 0.866
Share of tertiary educated 0.084 0.085 -0.001 0.121
Share of immigrant residents 0.039 0.042 -0.004 0.756
Share of internet users 0.388 0.355 0.033 0.213
GDP per capita (euros) 25,900 23,976 1924 0.550
Population density (people by square km) 186.3 182.9 -3.4 0.950
Persons cited for crimes (per 100,000 people) 1,149 1,137 -13 0.933
Murder rate (per 100,000 people) 1.010 0.881 0.129 0.546
Note. The table reports means of various characteristics for two groups of regions: those that
switched to digital before or at December 2009 (early switchers) and those that switched to
digital from January 2010 onwards (late switchers). Column 4 reports the p-values for tests of
the difference between means in the two groups.
Table 3.2: Effect of the Digital Reform on TV viewing shares
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Traditional Channels
Digital Switch -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.081***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
F-stat: Digital Switch 79.25 74.09 73.42 89.93
Panel B: New Digital Channels
Digital Switch 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
F-stat: Digital Switch 103.4 116.5 94.45 110.8
Panel C: Satellite Channels
Digital Switch 0.007 0.009** 0.009* 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
F-stat: Digital Switch 2.732 4.559 3.473 2.370
Panel D: Other Channels
Digital Switch 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
F-stat: Digital Switch 8.728 9.352 11.83 7.513
Region fixed effects X X X X
Linear time trend X
Year fixed effects X
Month*Year fixed effects X X
Region-specific linear trends X
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
Note. The table reports estimates from regressions of TV viewing shares (during prime-time)
on Digital_Switch The level of observation is the viewing share by channel*month*region. Dig-
ital_Switch equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at time
(month) t or before. Each panel reports estimates of the TV viewing shares (prime-time) of a
different group of channels. Rai and Mediaset channels are indicated as Traditional Channels.
Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.3: Effect of the Digital Reform on crime perceptions
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DigitalSwitch -0.014
(0.010)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 15-29 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 30-40 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 41-51 -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 52-65 -0.025 -0.040* -0.039* -0.039* -0.040**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
DigitalSwitch * Aged >65 -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.052**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
Crime rate: all 0.097
(0.091)
Crime rate: violent & drug 0.205**
(0.075)
Crime rate: property 0.035
(0.081)
Crime rate: other -0.025
(0.057)
Individual & family controls X X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
Digital: Indicator of 
switch-off occurred 
Digital: Share of months after switch-off
Note. The table reports estimates of the reduced-form effect of the digital switchover on per-
ceptions about crime. Estimates are from a linear probability model of Crime_Concern on a
post switch-over variable (Digital_Switch). Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual
reporting crime as one of the 3 priority problems in Italy. In order to take into account the
effective time passed since the region has switched to the digital signal we employ two alterna-
tive versions of the variable Digital_Switch. The first, which we employ in column 1 and 2, is
a dummy that equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at time
t or before. The second, which we employ from column 3 onwards, is the number of months
(as fraction of the 8 before each survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital
signal. Crime rates are calculated as logs of crimes per 10’000 individuals. Individual and fam-
ily controls include: gender, age group dummies, marital status, education, set of dummies for
occupational status, family size, family structure, and major source of household income. Re-
gion time-varying controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regressions include
year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: The role of TV watching time and other media access
Internet Radio Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DigitalSwitch -0.026* -0.032** 0.016 0.007 -0.019
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
DigitalSwitch * TV watching time -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
DigitalSwitch * TV watching time2 0.0005
(0.0004)
DigitalSwitch * No Internet -0.018***
(0.004)
DigitalSwitch * No Radio -0.093***
(0.025)
DigitalSwitch * No Newspapers -0.017
(0.036)
TV watching time 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TV watching time2 -0.0001
(0.0001)
No Internet -0.003
(0.004)
No Radio -0.003
(0.022)
No Newspapers 0.031*
(0.016)
Individual & family controls X X X X X
Regional time-varying controls X X X X X
Time & region fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 139,088 139,088 139,086 139,088 139,088
Television
 
Note. The table investigates whether the effect of the digital switchover on the probability to
report crime as one of the main problems depends on the time spent watching TV (columns
1-2), as well as on the use of other media (columns 3-5). DigitalSwitch is the number of
months (as fraction of the 8 before each survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch
to digital signal. TV watching time is the de-meaned daily amount of time spent watching TV.
No_Internet, No_Radio and No_Newspapers are indicator variables for the individuals not
using, respectively, Internet, the radio, and newspapers. We predict values for our estimating
sample using cell-specific pre-reform averages of the variables above, where the cells are formed
by all interactions of the following variables: age, gender, marital status and household size.
Individual and family controls include: gender, age, marital status, education, set of dummies
for occupational status, family size, family structure, and major source of household income.
Region time-varying controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regressions include
year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Descriptives about TV watching time and other media access by age
 
Aged 15-51 Aged >51
TV watching time (daily) 142 193
Share of never users for:
Internet 0.41 0.86
Radio 0.21 0.50
Newspapers 0.33 0.41
Observations 23,007 17,062
Note. Statistics are calculated on pre-Digital Reform sample (year 2007). TV watching time is
calculated in minutes. The other variables are indicators for individuals not using, respectively,
internet, the radio and newspapers.
Table 3.6: First–stage estimates: effect of Digital Reform on crime news exposure
 
No residual 
channels 
Yearly 
data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Digital Switch -15.895*** -8.306*** -8.436*** -8.130*** -7.783*** -8.154***
(4.515) (1.632) (1.388) (1.172) (1.083) (1.319)
F-stat: Digital Switch 12.39 25.92 36.92 48.16 51.64 38.23
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Linear time trend X
Year fixed effects X X
Month*Year fixed effects X X X
Region-specific lin. trends X X X
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 133
Note. The table reports estimates of the effect of the switch to digital signal on the exposure
to crime news. Estimates are from regressions of Crime_News_Exposure on a post switch-over
indicator Digital_Switch. The unit of observation is the TV viewing share by TV channel,
month (year in column 6) and region. Crime_News_Exposure is the summation, over all TV
channels, of the number of crime news items broadcast during period t weighted by the region-
specific viewing share in the region r during period t. Digital_Switch is a dummy that equals
one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at month (or year) t or before.
F-stats of the excluded instrument are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by region
and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.7: OLS and IV estimates: effect of crime news exposure on crime percep-
tions
 
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 0.0028** 0.0028* 0.0025 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Exposure * Aged 15-29 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0015) (0.0024)
Exposure * Aged 30-40 0.0018 0.0011
(0.0013) (0.0020)
Exposure * Aged 41-51 0.0024* 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0019)
Exposure * Aged 52-65 0.0033** 0.0035
(0.0015) (0.0026)
Exposure * Aged >65 0.0041** 0.0044**
(0.0015) (0.0019)
F-stat (excluded instr.) 29.80 29.29 18.76
Individual & family controls X X X X
Region time-varying controls X X X X
Region fixed-effects X X X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X X X
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
Note. The table reports OLS and IV estimates of regressions of Crime_Concern on
Crime_News_Exposure (simply Exposure in the table). Crime_Concern is an indicator for the
individual reporting crime as one of the 3 priority problems in Italy. Crime_News_Exposure
is the summation, over all TV channels, of the number of crime news items broadcast during
period t weighted by the region-specific viewing share in the region r during period t. Regres-
sions are estimated on yearly data. In column 4, 5 and 6 we employ the switch to digital signal
as an instrument for Crime_News_Exposure. In column 6 the digital switch is interacted with
each of the age group dummies. F-stats of the excluded instrument are reported in columns 4,
5 and 6. Crime rates are calculated as logs of crimes per 10’000 individuals. Individual and
family controls include: gender, age group dummies, marital status, education, set of dummies
for occupational status, family size, family structure, and major source of household income.
Region time-varying controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regressions in-
clude year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Crime concerns and voting for the centre-right coalition
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Concern 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.246***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Individual controls X X
Region fixed effects X
Observations 1,652 1,637 1,637
R-squared 0.030 0.071 0.098
Voted for the centre-right coalition 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from a linear probability model of an indicator for the
individual having voted for the centre-right coalition in 2008 election on a dummy for reporting
crime as most important problem in the country at the moment of the elections. Individual
controls include: age, male dummy, level of education, dummy for married and a set of dummies
of occupational status. Sample: ITANES Survey (2008) Robust standard errors are clustered
by region and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.11 Appendix - Figures
Figure 3A.1: Crime concerns in selected European countries (2008-2010)
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Note. This figure presents how crime is ranked, from 1st to 15th, among a list of major problems
in selected European countries. The ranking goes from 15th, indicating the least mentioned
topic, to 1st, indicating the most mentioned topic. Source: Authors elaboration from the 2008
and 2010 waves (pooled) of the Eurobarometer Survey.
Figure 3A.2: Timing switch-off across Italian regions
 
Source: Italian Ministry of Communication.
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Figure 3A.3: Viewing shares: new digital channels also broadcasting news pro-
grams vs full-entertainment digital channels
 
Note. The figure shows the evolution of viewing shares (prime-time) for new digital channels
split into channels also broadcasting news programs (news digital) and full-entertainment (other
digital channels). Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.
Figure 3A.4: Content of new digital channels: composition of total viewing shares
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Note. The figure reports the total viewing of new digital channels divided by type of channel,
for year 2010. The interpretation of the y axis scale is that, for example, almost 35% of the
entire digital viewing share during year 2010 refers to digital channels broadcasting TV shows
or movies.
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Figure 3A.5: Timing of change in perceptions of local area crime after digital
switch-over
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Panel B: Males 
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Note. The figure plots estimates and 90% confidence intervals by gender and age groups from
a LPM regression of Crime_Concern on a post switch-over variable (Digital_Switch) and con-
trols. Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual reporting crime as one of the 3 priority
problems in Italy. Digital_Switch equals the number of months (as fraction of the 8 before each
survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. The controls included
are the same as those in column 6 of Table 3. In particular. Individual and family controls
include: gender, age group dummies, marital status, education, set of dummies for occupational
status, family size, family structure, and major source of household income. Region time-varying
controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regressions include year and region
fixed effects. 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by region are
reported.
144
Figure 3A.6: Timing of change in perceptions of local area crime after digital
switch-over
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Note. The figure plots estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from regression of
the perception of crime level in the local area (Crime_Risk_Local) on a set of dummies from
t-2 to t+2, where t=0 is the year when the switch-over to digital signal has occurred. The
outcome variable ranges from 1 (crime absent) to 4 (crime level very high) and is collected at
the household level. . Individual and family controls include: gender, age group dummies,
marital status, education, set of dummies for occupational status, family size, family structure,
and major source of household income. Region time-varying controls include unemployment rate
and crime rate. The regression include year and region fixed effects. 90% confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors clustered by region are reported.
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Figure 3A.7: Crime news reporting in Berlusconi-owned channels and viewing
shares of new digital channels
 
Note. The figure plots the average number of crime news (per month) on TV channels owned
by Berlusconi (Mediaset) against the viewing shares (prime-time) of new digital channels, from
2007 to 2013. The grey shaded areas indicate different waves of switch from analogue to digital
signal. Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data and Pavia Observatory data.
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Figure 3A.8: Prime time viewing shares around switch-off deadlines: all regions
 
Note. The figure reports the evolution of monthly viewing shares (prime-time) before and after
the switch-over to digital TV signal in Italian regions. The light grey lines indicate viewing
shares of main traditional analogue channels while the dark grey ones indicate those of new
digital channels. The dashed vertical lines indicate switch-off dates for each specific region.
Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.
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Figure 3A.9: Crime news reporting intensity and viewing share drop during Digital
Reform
 
Note. The figure plots monthly average number of crime news against the change in TV viewing
shares (both between 2007-2013) for each of the six main traditional channels. Source: authors’
elaboration on AUDITEL data.
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Figure 3A.10: Crime news reporting on Rai/Mediaset during and after Berlus-
coni’s government
 
Note. The figure shows time series of average number of crime news (per month) on Berlusconi-
owned Mediaset channels and on Rai channels under his control while in power (Rai1 and Rai2).
The dashed blue line indicates the date when Berlusconi steps down from government. Source:
authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data and Pavia Observatory data.
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Figure 3A.11: Crime News Exposure and Voting
 
The figure reports estimates from a LPM where we regress an indicator equal to one if an
individual has voted Centre right in the last national elections on set of dummies for which
of the 7 main analog TV channel the individual declares to watch most regularly. We then
plot the estimated coefficients together with the monthly amount of crime-related news items
reported by each TV channel during prime-time news programs. Estimated coefficients are
interpreted with respected to the TV channel LA7, which is excluded from the regression. The
regression includes age, male dummy, level of education, dummy for married, a set of dummies
of occupational status and region fixed effects. Sources: Pavia Observatory (crime news data)
and ITANES (Voting Data) Year: 2008. Voting measure with a post-electoral survey using the
question “Which party/coalition did you vote in the last general elections?”
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3.12 Appendix - Tables
Table 3A.1: Effect of Digital Reform on total TV watching time
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 15-29 -0.014** -0.013 0.242 0.292
(0.005) (0.007) (0.346) (0.378)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 30-40 -0.016 -0.014 0.232 0.282
(0.016) (0.015) (0.366) (0.382)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 41-51 -0.007 -0.005 -0.565* -0.515*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.274) (0.280)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 52-65 -0.005 -0.004 -0.154 -0.102
(0.004) (0.005) (0.495) (0.483)
DigitalSwitch * Aged >65 0.002 0.004 -0.305 -0.254
(0.005) (0.006) (0.556) (0.559)
Individual and family controls X X X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region & year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 139,165 139,165 107,392 107,392
Indicator for 
watching TV 
Average TV viewing 
time per day 
Note. The table investigates whether the switch to digital signal induced any change in the total
amount of time people spend watching TV by regressing two measures of TV watching behavior
on a post switch-over variable. DigitalSwitch is the number of months (as fraction of the 8 before
each survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. Column 1 and 2
report estimates from regressions where the outcome is an indicator for the individual watching
at least some TV (columns 1 and 2), while columns 3 and 4 report estimates where the outcome
is the average daily TV viewing time for those who watch at least some TV. Individual and
family controls include: gender, age group dummies, marital status, education, set of dummies
for occupational status, family size, family structure, and major source of household income.
Region time-varying controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regressions include
year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3A.2: Effect of Digital Reform on TV viewing shares: all time-slots
 
Time slot: 18:00-20:30 
Prime-time 
news
All day 12:00-14:59 
Lunch-time 
news
7:00-11:59 15:00-17:59 20:31-23:59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Traditional Channels
Digital_Switch -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.064*** -0.120*** -0.103*** -0.078***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010)
F-stat: Digital Switch 73.42 68.97 43.92 41.06 52.13 62.04
Panel B: New Digital Channels
Digital_Switch 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
F-stat: Digital Switch 94.45 154.1 140.5 90.33 179.1 110.3
Panel C: Satellite Channels
Digital_Switch 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
F-stat: Digital Switch 3.473 3.177 3.613 1.406 1.401 1.222
Panel D: Other Channels
Digital_Switch 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.006 0.025** 0.020*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
F-stat: Digital Switch 11.83 9.460 1.677 6.504 10.77 7.251
Month*year fixed effects X X X X X X
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
Note. The table reports estimates from regressions of TV viewing shares on Digital_Switch
for different time slots during the day. The level of observation is the viewing share by chan-
nel*month*region. Digital_Switch equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to
digital signal at time (month) t or before. In each panel the TV viewing shares of a different
group of channel is adopted as outcome variable. Month-by-year and region fixed effects are
included in all regressions, as in column 3 of Table 2. Rai and Mediaset channels are indicated
as Traditional channels. Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3A.3: Descriptive statistics
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 139,165
Age 49 19 15 87 139,165
Married 0.60 0.49 0 1 139,165
Tertiary education or more 0.10 0.30 0 1 139,165
Employed dummy 0.43 0.49 0 1 139,165
Retired dummy 0.22 0.41 0 1 139,165
Dummy for not watching TV at all 0.05 0.21 0 1 139,165
Average daily TV watching time (minutes) 165 114 0 930 136,382
Family size 2.98 1.30 1 12 139,165
Crime_Concern: dummy for reporting crime as 
one of 3 main problems in the country
0.57 0.49 0 1 139,165
          Individuals aged <= 65 0.55
          Individuals aged > 65 0.62
          Females 0.57
          Males 0.56
Crime_Risk_Local: perception of crime level in 
the local area
2.01 0.90 1 4 201,923
Individuals
Note. Descriptive statistics of the main estimating sample from the Multipurpose Household
Survey (ISTAT) for the years 2007 to 2010. The variable Crime_Risk_Local is available also
for the years 2011 and 2012.
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Table 3A.4: Effect of Digital Reform on concern about other topics
 
Unemployment Crime Poverty Immigration
Inefficiency of 
health sector
Tax evasion
Environment/ 
Pollution
Inefficiency of 
judicial  
system
Public debt
Inefficiency of 
education 
sector
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Effect of DR on aged >51 -0.090 -0.045*** 0.024 -0.003 0.062*** 0.004 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.004 -0.005
-0.072 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.010) (0.027) (0.014) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005)
Individual and family controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Region time-varying controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Region & year fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X X
Mean of outcome 0.73 0.57 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.02
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
Note. The table investigates the effect of the switch to digital signal on the likelihood for
individuals aged above 51 of mentioning each of the other problem suggested by the question
“What do you think are the 3 priority problems of the country?”. Suggested problems are
ordered from left to right from the most to the least mentioned. The independent variable is the
number of months (as fraction of the 8 before each survey) elapsed since region r experienced
the switch to digital signal. Individual and family controls include: gender, age group dummies,
marital status, education, set of dummies for occupational status, family size, family structure,
and major source of household income. Region time-varying controls include unemployment
rate and crime rate. The regressions include year and region fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3A.5: Effect of Digital Reform on crime and unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Digital Switch (indicator) -0.245 -0.019
(0.340) (0.016)
Digital Switch (fraction) 0.118 -0.022
(0.302) (0.018)
Region fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 114 114 114 114
Unemployment share 
(*100)
log (Crime rate)
 
We regress the unemployment rate (multiplied by 100) and the crime rate in a specific region
and year on Digital_Switch. Crime rates are calculate as logs of crimes per 10’000 individuals.
We use two versions of the variable Digital_Switch: a dummy that equals one if the region r
experienced the switch-over to digital signal at year t or before (columns 1 and 3); the number
of months (as fraction) in the calendar year to which the outcomes refers, elapsed since region r
experienced the switch to digital signal. Observations are at the region by (calendar) year level.
The regressions include year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by
region and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3A.6: Effect of Digital Reform on individuals who do not watch TV
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 15-29 -0.011 0.006 -0.076 -0.053
(0.082) (0.073) (0.085) (0.079)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 30-40 -0.011 -0.004 -0.041 -0.031
(0.039) (0.031) (0.044) (0.041)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 41-51 -0.052 -0.036 -0.100 -0.079*
(0.056) (0.041) (0.061) (0.045)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 52-65 -0.018 -0.003 -0.047 -0.024
(0.042) (0.034) (0.051) (0.045)
DigitalSwitch * Aged >65 -0.061 -0.060 -0.122 -0.121
(0.088) (0.082) (0.096) (0.091)
Individual and family controls X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region & year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 5,822 5,822 5,822 5,822
Indicator Fraction of months
Note. The table investigates the effect of the Digital Reform on those individuals who do not
watch TV. It reports estimates from a linear probability model of an indicator for the individual
reporting crime as one of the 3 main problems in Italy (Crime_Concern) on the number of
months (as fraction of the 8 before each survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to
digital signal. The sample includes individuals who report to never watch television. Individ-
ual and family controls include: gender, age group dummies, marital status, education, set of
dummies for occupational status, family size, family structure, and major source of household
income. Region time-varying controls include unemployment rate and crime rate. The regres-
sions include year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by region and
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 The Power of News: Coordination and Crisis
4.1 Introduction
For crisis to occur, there is a need for coordination. This is well known: what is
less known is what triggers coordination among actors? This question proved to
be particularly relevant in the context of the European Sovereign Crisis. Why did
the Greek spread escalate from 140 basis points in early November 2009 to nearly
600 basis points in late March 2010?103 And, more generally, why did the crisis
happen when it did?
In this paper, I tackle this question by arguing that, in order to understand
the outbreak of the debt crisis, there is a need to go beyond a mere analysis of
economic fundamentals. First, I present evidence that a significant part of the
surge on the government bond spreads in the Eurozone was disconnected from
underlying changes in a number of standard economic indicators.104 I then study
whether the amount and the type of news related to sovereign debt might have
played a role in the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of coordination
among investors.105 Precisely, I focus on political information which, by their
nature, are not immediately quantifiable, more subjective and difficult to interpret.
I define political information as all the news about political stories related to the
country sovereign debt.106 This includes, but it is not limited to, news reports
on economic policy uncertainty, stability of the government, policy making and
legislative behaviours. In this paper, I document a change in the frequency of
news media related to sovereign debt in the months and weeks preceding the
103For the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds, the spread to the benchmark German bund had
been on average just about 30 bps.
104The analyis will cover the standard measure of economic fundamentals (De Grauwe 2012).
Precisely: Budget Deficit (as % of GDP); Debt (as % GDP); current account; inflation; unem-
ployment. Also I look at measure of international risks such as VIX Index, CDS derivatives
market.
105The interactions between politics and financial markets have been so far studied assuming
full rationality and perfect information (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991). However empirical evidence
clearly reveals that many investors do react to irrelevant information in forming their demand
for investments; as Fisher (1986) put it, “they trade on noise rather than on information”.
106The Data Section will outline more precisely the type of search. However examples of search
outcomes are: “Raising concern over the coalition government in Italy. Doubts on the reforms to
cut public spending”, “La Spagna ad un passo dalla crisi istituzionale. Riforme economiche un
fallimento dichiara Zapatero”, “La situation polique Grecque est pire que la situation economique,
“La deuda italiana y su sostenibilidad depende de la fortaleza del Gobierno, “La deuda italiana
y su sostenibilidad depende de la fortaleza del Gobierno”
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crisis (when markets were not in turmoil) and I empirically investigate whether
the noise, the signal and the uncertainty generated by these information flows
might have boosted cordination among investors and anticipated the outbreak of
the debt crisis.
In order to test these hypotheses empirically, I collect a unique and new dataset
on news from the main media outlets in a set of European Countries from Septem-
ber 2007 to September 2014. I restrict my search to news related to sovereign debt
and, in particular, to media stories related to political aspects of the debt. Fur-
thermore, I also gathered data on “opinion pieces” written by prominent opinion
makers.107 In order to select which authors to follow, I have run qualitative in-
terviews among a sample of traders and asked them to provide a list of opinion
makers which are most commonly read by investors. I then manually coded the
tone of each news and opinion in my dataset. 108
Time series and dynamic panel estimations reveal that, conditional on a full
set of controls and falsification tests, the frequency of news is correlated to an
increase in bond prices. Specifically, dynamic panel regressions show a positive
and significant variation of the bond yield in countries whereby there was a change
in the number of sovereign related news per day compared to countries whereby
there was no change. The estimates reveal a significant correlation between both
news at time t and t-n on variation of spreads at time t. Interestingly, I find
a similar effect when I analyse the correlation between articles written by a set
of opinion makers (which are followed daily by traders) and the movements in
spreads. The results are robust to the introduction of a full set of controls, past
values of the dependent variable and of the explanatory variables, country fixed
effects, time fixed effect and linear time trends. Both time series and panel analysis
reveal a certain extent of country heterogeneity in the effect. More precisely, both
an increase in the total number of news and an increase in the country related
news do have a differential effect with peripheral countries exhibiting more severe
consequences on the spread.
It is not just the amount of news that matters, but also their tone. Basman
107An opinion piece is an article, published in a newspaper or magazine, that mainly reflects the
author’s opinion about the subject. Opinion pieces are featured in many periodicals. Examples
are the A list and the Exchange of the Financial Times or Project Syndicate or Paul Krugman’s
blog on the NYT.
108Figure 10 provides the answer to the question “Which are the opinion makers that you read
the most?” Respondents can list 3 posssible names.
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et al. (2015) investigates the effect of the tone of news on investors’ expectations
and beliefs. I adopt a similar approach by studying whether positive news have
different impact on bond yield than negative news. More precisely, I coded every
daily news and opinion pieces into 3 main categories: positive, negative and un-
certain. I find that the tone of the news does indeed have a significant effect on
bond yields. More precisely, negative news in country i at time t − 1 increases
significantly the sovereign spread of country i at time t. On the opposite positive
news leads to a decrease in sovereign spread. The results are remarkably stable
across specifications and to the introduction of a full set of controls, municipal
fixed effects, time fixed effect and linear time trends.
This paper fits into the literature looking at the determinants of bond yields.
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2014) provides a good overview and argue that most
studies (Manganelli and Wolwswijz, 2009; Alesina et al., 1992, Bayouni et at.,
1995) have focused on two main factors. First, measures of international risk such
as the Vix index or the derivatives market, arguing that high value of interna-
tional risk leads to an increase in yields spread (Geyer et al., 2004, Longstaff et al.
2007, Favero et al., 2010, Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Second, the fiscal position of a
country (in particular measures of debt and deficit) and its impact on the credit
risk of the sovereign debt. As the government debt as a % of GDP (debt/GDP
ratio henceforth) increases, investors realize that the probability of a default is
higher and their elasticities to changes in debt/GDP ratio increases (Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1996). Bernoth et al. (2004) and Faini (2006) finds a significant effect for
fiscal deficit on the sovereign bond spreads. Similar results are obtained by Haller-
berg and Wolff (2006) using fixed effects panel estimations. In the US, Goldsetin
and Woglom (1992) finds evidence that the level of public debt in America has a
positive impact on their bond yields relative to that of other states.
These studies share two common characteristics. First, in both these clusters
politics is not considered as an important factor. Second, they rely on the assump-
tion that markets have perfect information about the status of fundamentals. The
global financial crisis, and the European Debt Crisis, have challenged the heart
of these assumptions: developed economies are not immune from the financial
markets contagion and volatility triggered by political uncertainty (Leblang and
Satyanath, 2013 and Phillips, 2014). There is a limited set of studies on the im-
pact of politics on sovereign spread. However, they mostly operate at high level of
institutional aggregation, employing indicators for electoral system, partisanship
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or policy institutions (Bachman, 1992, Bernhard and Leblang, 2002, Eichengeen,
Rose and Wyplosz, 1995, Freeman, Hays and Stix, 2000, Leblang and Bernhard,
2000, 2001, Leblang and Mukherjee, 2004, Lobo and Tufte, 1998, Alesina and
Drazen, 1991, Leblang and Satyanath, 2013, Phillips, 2014). In this paper, I ar-
gue that, while concepts of institutions and partisanship provide a fundamental
context of analysis for market actors, they do not capture the day-to-day pro-
cesses of policy making which are indeed responsible for most of the uncertainty
investors’ mind.109 Goidel and Langley (1995) suggest that investors know very
little about real economic conditions and heavily rely on news from mass media.
Markets learn about politics and they do it dynamically, not statically.
As a consequence, this paper differs from these studies in several dimensions.
First, it provides evidence that, although important in the unfolding of the crisis,
neither proxies of economic fundamentals nor measures of international risk can
be used to explain the outbreak of the European sovereign crisis. Second, it
incorporates the important role of politics in the analysis of the onset of the
European crisis. It does so not by looking at standard institutional proxies but
rather at the day to day policy making processes express by news media. Third, it
provides a new dataset to measure the political uncertainty generated by variation
in the frequency, types and availability of information flows.
I’m not the first in studying and measuring uncertainty nor in focusing on news
media when it comes to the debt crisis. Bloom et al. (2013) recently developed
a new index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) that draws on the frequency
of newspaper references to policy uncertainty and other indicators. They then
investigate the effects of EPU on investment and hiring, finding negative effects for
firms heavily exposed to government contracts. As far as the studies on political
news and financial volatility is concerned. Tetlock (2007) has used a dictionary
approach to consider the ability of verbal text to predict stock prices. Gade et
al. (2014) investigates to what extent and why political communication has had
an impact on the sovereign bond spreads of selected euro area countries over the
German Bund.110 Interestingly, they find that, on the short term, certain type of
109Calvo and Mendoza 2000a argues “trading market securities requires collecting detailed
information about the countries involved. This information is costly and ‘depreciates’ quickly.
Moreover, fixed information costs are large because assessing country risk requires gathering
and processing information about all key macroeconomic and political variables on a recurrent
basis, independently of investment size”
110Gholampour and Wincoop (2017) use 633 days of tweets about the Euro/dollar exchange
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political communication does have an effect on bond spreads. In this paper, my
analysis differs from this paper to the extent that the focus here is not on political
communication from political leaders but on political information flows which are
measured daily (and not monthly as in Bloom et al., 2013). The rest of the paper
is organised as follows: section 2 provides background on the European Debt
Crisis and the main motivation of this paper; section 3 presents the theoretical
framework of the analysis by presenting the Morris and Shin model of currency
crisis and explaining its relevance for the European Sovereign Crisis; section 4
discussed the data and section 5 present the main results; section 6 concludes.
rate to determine their information content and the profitability of trading based on Twitter
Sentiment.
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4.2 Background and Motivation
The efficiency market theory [Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991] predicts that people make
rational decisions about the future performance of stocks based on concrete data,
and prices adjust accordingly. When information arises, they are incorporated into
the prices of stocks and securities without delay. However, the idea that stock
prices represent and incorporate rational responses to information seems unlikely.
John Mayard Keynes notoriously referred to the “animal spirits” to describe the
instincts, the beliefs and the emotions that constantly guide human behaviours.111
Empirical evidence indeed suggest that the receipt and interpretation of news is
linked to investors psychology, sociology, and personal characteristics. However,
it is still unclear whether the news media induces, amplifies or simply reflects
investors’ expectations and beliefs.
This paper contributes to this debate by studying the case of the European
Sovereign Crisis. The sudden outbreak of the government debt crisis in the Euro-
zone area in 2009 posed serious problems for the survival of the entire European
project (De Grauwe, 2012). In explaining the unfolding of the crisis, conven-
tional accounts resort to the relationship between default risk and a number of
economic fundamentals. More precisely, according to standard economic theory
(Alesina et al., 1992; Manganelli and Wolsijk, 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas,
2010) sovereign yields/spread are conditioned on two main variables. Firstly,
credit risk and the quality of the national accounts. This is typically measured
with indicators such as debt/gdp ratio, budget deficit, current account, unem-
ployment and consumers’ confidence indexes (Barrios et al., 2009). Second, an
international risk factor which is used to capture the market sentiment at the
global level. Although important in the unfolding of the crisis, I present evidence
that both these variables cannot explain its outbreak.
Figure 4.1 shows the overtime trend in Debt/GDP ratio 2007-2015 for a group
of 6 European Countries. As largely documented, the Debt/GDP ratio has con-
stantly increased for all the countries considered. The so called peripheral coun-
tries are the ones that have experienced the most drastic increase in debt, with
Greece that reached 180% of its Gross Domestic Product. The economic theory
tells us that when the government Debt/GDP Ratio increases, the burden of ser-
111Animal spirits is the term John Maynard Keynes used in his 1936 book The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money to describe the instincts, proclivities and emotions that
ostensibly influence and guide human behavior.
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vicing the debt increases leading to an increasing probability of default (Giavazzi
and Pagano, 1996). This subsequently translates into an increase in the spread,
which is the risk premium investors will charge to compensate them for the in-
crease probability of default (De Grauwe, 2012). Indeed, several studies have
shown how, during the unfolding of the crisis, markets have been particularly
severe toward those countries characterised by poor quality of their underlying
economic fundamentals. However, what is also quite evident is that the levels
of debt/GDP ratio were significantly different among these countries well before
than the crisis.
Hence, why did the attack happen when it did? As already shown by De
Grauwe (2012), the drastic increase in sovereign spread seems to be dissociated
from any drastic shock in proxies of fiscal position such as the Debt/GDP ratio.
In order, to provide more formal evidence of this phenomenon, Table 4.1 presents
ARMA time series regressions which aims to more formally correlate the spreads
with a number of fundamental variables. Specifically, I have selected standard
proxies of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances such as debt (as% of GDP) ratio,
current account, GDP growth rate and budget deficit (as % of GDP). The analysis
is for 6 European Countries and it goes from September 2007 to June 2014 on a
monthly dataset.112 The dependent variables are the 10 years government bond
yields and, in the analysis, I control for their lag values.113 Since the purpose
of this analysis is to test whether changes in fundamentals are correlated to the
triggering of the crisis, I express all the independent variables in first difference
values. As a consequence, each observation represents the difference from the
previous month. The estimates reveal no significant coefficients between monthly
changes in economic fundamentals and related change in sovereign bond yields.
The results seem to support De Grauwe’s (2012) conclusion on financial bubbles,
where they argue that markets may have mispriced the sovereign risk and, as
a consequence, spreads moved independently from fundamentals. However, this
analysis might suffer from different types of bias. In particular, timeseries cross
sectional datasets present an omitted variables bias. These estimates do not take
into account time varying specific factors, country level fixed characteristics and
112Importantly the same results hold if we restrict the analysis to the onset years of the crisis,
2008 - 2012
113To chose how many past variables to include, I run a correlogram analyisis exploiting the
time series feature of the dataset. Results are reported in the regression table.
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any shocks that vary across countries. To correct for this, Table 4.2 presents sim-
ilar estimates in a panel dataset where the units of observation are country_day
over time. The dependent variable is, as before, the 10 years government bond
yield and the independent variables are debt/gdp ratio, current account and bud-
get deficit with their respective lagged values. I employ a fixed effects dynamic
model which controls with a full set of year dummies. Estimates reveal that
none of the economic fundamentals variables, nor their lagged values, exhibit any
statistically significant relationship with movements in prices.
The second variable that is commonly used in the literature points to the im-
portance of international risk factors. These are typically measured using indexes
of stock volatility such as the VIX Index. The VIX Index is a popular measure
of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options and it used as proxy for global
financial instability. Another measure which is commonly used to capture the
international risk appetite is the Credit Default Swap contracts (CDS). The CDS
are credit derivatives that provide an insurance against the risk of default. Ac-
cording to standard theories (Cacere, Guzzo and Segoviano, 2010), the derivative
market, and CDS in particular, anticipates fluctuation on the spreads. More pre-
cisely, the purchase of CDS contracts raises the cost of insurance against sovereign
default leading to a rise in the underlying government bond yield. In Figure 4.2
and 4.3 we plot respectively the correlation between spread and the VIX index
and between the spreads and their respective CDS.
Figure 4.2 plots the 10 years sovereign bond yield of Italy, Spain, Greece and
Portugal against the VIX index which is colloquially referred to as the fear index
or the fear gauge.114 At the onset of the crisis, “fear” was not really a factor:
the VIX index was in its sharp decreasing, signalling a more positive judgment
of market makers on the status of international markets. This trend appears
significantly disconnected with the European spread which starting increasesing
in November 2009.
I then turn my attention to the derivatives market and, in particular, the
CDS contracts. Figure 4.3 shows a set of 4 panels whereby the CDS are plotted
together with the respective underlying security. I focus on Italy, Spain, Greece
and Portugal over the period 2009-2014. The derivative markets did not anticipate
the crisis. The CDS contracts follows very closely the trend of the underlying
114In this analysis, I focus on peripheral countries because these countries experienced the
hardest market turmoil
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sovereign bond. Although, this seems to reinforce the hypothesis that the CDS
might be blamed for the deterioration of the sovereign spreads once the divergence
from the German Bund had started, they cannot explain the outbreak of the crisis.
In short, it seems that the usual suspects, proxies of international risk factors
and standard economic fundamentals, cannot explain the onset of the European
Debt Crisis. This puzzle raises the question of what triggered such a wake up
call among international investors. Why did the crisis start when it did, without
warming and any apparent change in the underlying economic fundamentals? In
this paper, I investigate whether a change in the amount and type of news media
might have played a role in the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of
uncertainty among investors. Figure 4.4 is crucial in explaining the motivating
force behind this project. It shows the overtime variation of the 10 years govern-
mental bonds yields of 5 Eurozone Member States in both the beginning and the
years preceding the crisis. Together with the spreads, I plot the daily count of
the political news stories related to sovereign debt. The picture shows a striking
spike in the number of news that has anticipated the divergence of the spreads.
Most of the news are clustered around June, July, August and September 2009
when there were no signs of turmoil on the yields and well before the revelation
of Greek public finance problems which took place in December 2009. In the next
two sections, I’m going to analyse more formally whether this sudden increase
in the amount of information might have had an impact on the outbreak of the
European Sovereign Crisis.
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4.3 Theoretical Framework
Information has played a very subtle role in the European Sovereign Crisis. During
the months before the outbreak of the crisis in November 2009, all market actors
did have the possibility to observe economic fundamentals, but this was not a
sufficient condition to avoid turmoil. As Morris and Shin put it “everyone may
know that the fundamentals are sound, but it may not be that everyone knows
that everyone knows this”.115It is not the amount of information that matters,
but whether it is common knowledge. There might indeed a situation whereby
investors are well informed about the fundamentals, but they are unsure on the
information received by others.
This is important in the context of this study because, for crisis to occur,
there is a need for coordination. This is well known. What is less known is what
triggers coordination among actors. In this paper, I present evidence of a spike in
news related to sovereign debt before the beginning of the crisis and I argue that
this might have fostered coordination among investors. News Media constituted
a focal point that triggered a “wake up call” in international markets.
Theoretically, this intuition might be explained by the literature on Global
Games (Morris and Shin, 1998). This is because their informational assumptions
are more realistic than standard studies on crisis in the literature (Flood and
Garber, 1984, Obstfeld 1986, 1994, 1996; Calvo, 1988; Eaton Fernandez, 1995;
Cole and Kehoe, 1996). By relaxing the common knowledge assumption, they are
able to derive a unique equilibrium as well as comparative statics on a) the arrival
of information and the probability of a crisis and b) the variations in speculators’
beliefs to the probability of a crisis.
More precisely, within this literature there are two different research clusters
that constitute an ideal framework for the empirical intuition of this paper. One
research cluster, led by the seminal work of Morris and Shin (1998), has argued
that, in order to understand the onset of a crisis, what matters is not the amount
of information, but how noisy it is. Noisy signals (such as political information)
generate uncertainty among investors because they are unsure of each other beliefs
and interpretation of the same news. As Morris and Shin put it “Although market
participants each have a window on to the world, the imperfect nature of such
a vantage point generates a failure of common knowledge of the fundamentals.
115Morris and Shin, 1998. p. 558
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Thus, everyone may know that the fundamentals are sound, but it may not be that
everyone knows that everyone knows this”.116Information, in this setting, increase
uncertainty among investors and eventually serves ad focal point for the beliefs
of the group as a whole. In Appendix A.1, I outline Morris and Shin (1998)
model and I run a simple comparative exercise to shed light on the theoretical
mechanisms behind their analysis.
A second strand of the literature (Metz, 2000, Morris and Shin, 2002) sees
information as a coordination device, independently by its quality. Even when the
news media is noisy, and has no direct nor precise information on fundamentals,
its very public nature constitutes a signal which boosts coordination and allows
full play to self-fulfilling beliefs in determining economic outcomes.
These two research clusters reach different conclusions on the role of informa-
tion in fostering coordination.117 In one case, news generate uncertainty, which
in turn boost coordination. In the second cluster, information represents a signal
that constitutes a crucial factor in coordinating investors’ actions. Although by
following different intuitions, both these models share two different hypothesises
that this paper aims to test. First, an increase in the amount of news media that
investors receive, increases the probability of an aggregate short sell of the debt.
Second, there might be cross country heterogeneity, with a different reaction of
the markets in countries whose government is perceive as credible. As Leblang
and Satyanath (2002) argue, the coordination among speculators increases when
they all believe that the government’s announcement, stability or economic policy
are sound and stable. In these situations, investors’ elasticity to the arrival of
news media is lower because a common focal point is already present.
This paper will empirically test these hypotheses. The next section will present
the data upon which the analysis is based.
116Morris and Shin, 1998. p. 559
117This paper it is not able to disantangle between the two of them
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4.4 Data and Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Data
Measuring uncertainty. As a way to measure uncertainty, I focus on news
related to sovereign debt and, in particular, to media stories related to political
aspects of the debt. As already explained above, this is because “political news”
are less straightforward to interpret since they encompass elements of subjectivity
and time inconsistency. This subjectivity and imprecision of political informa-
tion increase the possibility that despite good underlying economic fundamentals,
imprecise information will lead to unstable market equilibria.
This study applies two different research methodologies to collect a new and
unique dataset. The first method involved the analysis of professional news
database, Factivia Dow Jones. Factiva is the best database of political, economic
and financial news available in the market118. Its search engine allows not just to
select from multiple options, but also to insert a manually generated algorithm
with which the search is performed. To retrieve the articles, I have looked for
the two major newspapers (measured as per copies sold) in each of the selected
countries.119I then formulated a query looking at some specific keywords such as
uncertainty, bond market, spread, debt, deficit, increasing, legislative crisis, leg-
islature, political stability, economic policy, vote of no confidence etc. Figure 4.5
provides an example of the search. The search algorithm is specified in the text
box and must be written in all the languages of the selected newspapers. The
propositions AND/OR/NOT are logical functions that define the arguments of
the algorithm. This specific type of research is able to retrieve 2012 articles. I then
run a human audit of all the articles looking at length and style, keywords used,
most mentioned subjects, most mentioned regions, most mentioned institutions
and articles distribution by date. Figure 4.6 provides a sample of the search’s
results.
118Factiva is a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company. Factiva
aggregates content from both licensed and free sources, and provides organizations with search,
alerting, dissemination, and other information management capabilities. Factiva products pro-
vide access to more than 32,000 sources (such as newspapers, journals, magazines, television and
radio transcripts, photos, etc.) from nearly every country worldwide in 28 languages, including
more than 600 continuously updated newswires
119 In Italy: La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera. In Spain: El Mundo and El Pais. In
France: Le Monde and Le Figarò. In Germany: Faz and Handelsblatt. In UK: Times and
Financial Times. In Greece: Estia and Naftemporiki.
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The second methodological approach involves the use of social media and, more
precisely, Twitter. Today, almost all the news providers and newspaper have and
use a twitter account when they present and anticipate their articles with a brief
description and the link to them. The 140 characters rule is very useful not just
because it summarises the main message of the article, but also because it very
often expresses the tone of it.
Collecting data from Twitter is not trivial. The entire procedure is based
on the Streaming Search Real Time Application Programme Interface (API). The
public twitter API allows interacting with the twitter platform. It allows to set
up a query for specific data of specific accounts in a specific time frame. Figure
4.7 explains the architecture I’m exploiting to retrieve the data. Using Python
programming, I interacted directly with the twitter API interface and, using the
same keywords described above, I have retrieved 3640 news. In addition, I have
set the search to collect data on articles written by prominent opinion makers. In
order to select across opinion pieces, I have run interviews with a sample of traders
and asked them to provide a list of opinion makers which are most commonly read
120. Figure 4.8 provides the results of the interviews.
Dependent Variable and Control Variables
Dependent Variable The dependent variable is the daily 10-year govern-
ment bond yieldy for the following countries: UK, France, Germany, Spain, Por-
tugal, Italy and Greece.
Since late November 2009, the 10-year government bond yields for euro area
countries diverged and differentials vis-à-vis Germany started to widen consid-
erably, as shown in Figure 6. In particular, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy
experienced the largest increase in their bond spreads.
The data for the dependent variable come from Bloomberg. They are daily
and they cover the period September 2007 - July 2014.
120I have run the survey with an open answer typology. Traders were free to mention whoever
they read most often. Each trader had 2 options. I then counted the answer and coded them in
order to come up with the final set of opinion makers. Those are Nouriel Roubini, Jim O’Neil,
Paul Krugman, Martin Wolf, Mohammed El Erian, Mario Draghi, Jean Paul Trichet and Bill
Gross
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Control Variables. The set of control variables that I include in the
paper can be divided in into two broad categories: a group that clusters together
financial risk indicators and a group for the economic fundamentals variables.
Financial risk indicators Both Data on the Credit Default Swap and the
VIX Index are taken from Bloomberg. These are the Last Price of the CDS and
VIX. They are recorded daily and they cover the period September 2007 - July
2014.
Data on the EU Confidence Index are taken from the European Commission
Consumer Confidence Indicator. The index tracks sentiment among household,
investors and consumers. The results are based on surveys conducted among a
random sample of households and investors. The data are monthly from Septem-
ber 2007 to July 2014.
Economic Fundamentals The unemployment, real gdp, debt and inflation
data are collected by Eurostat. They are monthly and they cover the period
September 2007 - July 2014.
The deficit (as a % of GDP) is collected by the European Commission on a
monthly level. They are reported on an annualised base to avoid seasonal issues.
The current account (as a % of GDP) and the household saving are collected
by the OECD.
Both the time series and dynamic panel model analysis will be at the daily
level. Controls variable at monthly level are therefore transposed in daily data by
interpolation.
Selection of Countries The countries chosen for this paper represent the
most important economies of the Eurozone. Germany, Italy and France are re-
spectively the first, second and third economy for manifacturing output. Italy,
Spain and Greece are also the economies that have been more exposed and hit by
the markets during the crisis. Moreover, I follow the Iversen, Soskice and Hope
(2016) by looking at Italy and France in distinction from a “pheripheral country”
such as Spain and Greece and from a coordinated market economy (CME) such
as Germany. As these scholars explained, these are countries with very different
institutional settings and it is therefore very interesting to study whether markets
reacted differently to a common shock in news. This study acknoweledges that a
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larger sample of countries would be needed to improve the analysis, but collecting
data to measure political news is very challenging and demanding. I have also
collected data for the UK, but the news dataset is limited for this country because
the UK, with its own currency and central bank, was insulated from the European
Sovereign Crisis.121
4.4.2 Empirical Analysis
The effect of the amount of news media on sovereign spread This section
introduces the estimation models to analyse the determinants of sovereign bond
yields and to assess whether political information might be correlated with the
onset of the sovereign debt crisis. The theoretical framework presented in section
3 has provided us with two basic intuitions. First, an increase in the amount and
type of information that speculators receive might lead to an increase probability
of an aggregate short sell. Second, there might be cross country heterogeneity,
with the level of volatility being higher in countries whose government is not
perceived as credible. This paper measures noise with the amount and the tone
of news related to sovereign debt published in a given day. Hence, empirically I’m
going to test whether, conditional to a full set of controls, an increase in news has
an effect on bond yields. More precisely, I will estimate my model both with a
dynamic panel technique and with cross sectional time series.
I start by running my analysis using a time series dataset and the reason is
twofold. First, econometrically, high frequency data on daily prices exhibit some
empirical regularity, including fat tailed distributions and volatility clustering.
Given this high persistency of the dependent variable, the level of bond yield
spread today might also depends on its past values. Hence, as an attempt to
control for these features of the data, I estimate a time series model where I
regress the bond yield of 6 European countries on the amount of news related to
sovereign debt. More precisely, I estimate various version of the following general
form:
Yit = βo + β1Newst + β2Yi,t−n + β3News,t−n + β4Xit + εit (4.1)
121The paper decided to include the UK despite the data limitation to follow De Grauwe
(2012) and study whether there is a differential effect from Eurozone country and a standing
alone country such as the Uk.
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Where Yitis the bond yield of the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece and
France over the period 2007-2014. Newst is the overall amount of news related
to sovereign debt that have been published at time t. I perform a daily and
monthly estimation. The model also include lag variables for Yit and for Newst.
Xit is a vector of control variables which include the following country variables
at the monthly level: inflation, Gdp per capita, debt, deficit, current account (%
gdp), confidence index, household saving, Vix Index and CDS for the 10 years
government bond. εit is the error term. As both prices and news are serially
correlated, I estimate the standard errors with the Newey - West Estimator.122
The interesting feature of this estimation is that it allows me to test the im-
portance of the total number of news published in a given day over the bond yield
of each of the country in my sample. This is a parameter that I am able to recover
exploiting the over time variation of the number of news published. 123
Table 4.4 provides the results of the estimates. The 6 columns represent the
daily bond yield of the countries in my sample. The variable of interest is News
which, importantly, represents the total number of political news per day. The
estimates reveal a positive and significant coefficient for Spain, Italy and Greece,
but not for the UK, France and Germany. The interpretation of the coefficient
is the following: increasing the number of news by one unit per day leads to an
increase in the yield of the sovereign debt. Following the theoretical intuition from
section 2, it seems that there is heterogeneity across countries in the impact that
news has on prices. A high amount of news related to sovereign debt increases
noise. Each investor will be unsure to what other investors would do. The effect
that this noise has on the decision to attack the sovereign debt, however, is differ-
ent depending on the investors’ perceptions of the government (in the model, the
presence of a focal point). This is the intuition behind the coefficients in Table
4.4 124. The governments of Italy, Greece and Spain were not perceived as credi-
122A similar strategy is used by Durante and Zhuravskaya, forthcoming Journal of Political
Economy
123The panel dimension cannot be used to identify the effect of the overall number of news
because there is no variation in the explanatory variable.
124Of course the coefficients can simply be driven by the fact that more news have been
published for these countries compared to the others. However, in order to test this I have
checked in Factiva whether the toal number of news published in the 2 major newspapers in the
countries of my sample is different. The answer is that the avarage is very total with France
having slighly more news per day that the other countries. This is of course encouraging because
it constitutes a implicit normalisation of the results.
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ble, strong and stable. In normal times, and without any change in the economic
fundamentals, this had not triggered any reaction from the markets. However,
when confronted with an increase in uncertainty caused by more daily news, in-
vestors decided to firstly short sell the debt of these countries.125The estimation is
conditional to a range of economic controls, and the lag values of the bond yields
and the news. The past values of bond yield represent an important control due
to the autocorrelation of prices over time, particularly with high frequency data.
The past values of news are not just an important control, but they are also an
outcome of interest because it might take some time for the news to affect prices.
In column 2, the estimates reveal a significant correlation between the amount of
news at t-1 and the yield of the spanish governmental bond at time t. In column 2
and 3 a similar effect is present and visible for Italy and Greece where the amount
of news at t-2 seems to significantly affect the spread at time t.
In table 4.5, we replicate the same analysis but with a lower frequency of
data. When we move to a monthly level, we can observe that the main effect
does not change. Columns 2, 3 and 5 show that, for Italy, Spain and Greece, an
increase in the amount of monthly news related to sovereign debt is positively and
significantly correlated with an increase in yields. As before, the estimates are
conditional to a full set of controls, including lag values of the dependent variable
and of the main explanatory variable.
Time series estimations help to control for seasonality, autocorrelation across
time and non stationarity in the errors. However, although conditional on control,
the resulting variation in price is likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias.
Specifically, equation 5 does not account for time varying country specific sectors,
country level fixed characteristics and any shocks that varies across countries. In
order to solve these problems, I run a dynamic panel model with time fixed effect,
country level fixed effects and linear time trends. I estimate various form of the
following specification:
Yit = βo + β1Newsit + β2Yi,t−n + β3Newsi,t−n + β4Xit + µi + λt + εit (4.2)
Where, as above, Yit represents the bond yield of Italy, France, Spain, Ger-
125News does not represent the number of news per country - I am going to use this measure
in the dynamic panel model.
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many, Uk and Greece. Differently from equation 1, Newsit represents the number
of news per country published at time t. As before the estimation included lagged
values of the dependent and main explanatory variables and a full set of controls.
µi represents country level fixed effects. λt is a parameter for the time fixed effects.
Errors are clustered at the country level.
β1 represents our outcome of interest and it will recover the variation in price
in a country whereby there was a change in news compared to a country where at
the same time there was a different change in news or the was no change at all.
Table 4.6 presents the results of the estimation. In column 1, I present an
OLS regression to test the correlation between Newsit and Yit. The coefficient is
positive and strongly significant. In column 2, I perform a country fixed effect
estimation where I control for past values of the dependent variable and of the
main explanatory variable. The coefficient loses in magnitude but remains positive
and significant. Interestingly, the amount of news published in country i at time
t-2 seems to have a strong effect on variation in prices at time t. Column 3
performs the same speficication, but including important controls such as measure
of international risk, the VIX Index, and proxies for the fiscal position of the
country, such as debt and deficit. In column 4, I also add the lag values of both
debt and deficit. Both the coefficients of Newsit and Newsit−2 remains stable,
positive and significant. Finally, column 5 represents my most completed and
preferred specification where the effect of Newsit on Yit is estimated conditional on
a full set of controls, lag values of dependent and independent variables, time fixed
effects, country fixed effects and linear time trends. The coefficients of interest
remain remarkably stable and significant. The interpretation is the following: the
coefficients of Newsit and Newsit−2 in Column 5 represent the within variation
in price in a country whereby there has been an increase in the number of news
compared to a country where, at the same time, there was either no change or
different variation in the number of news published.
In Table 4.7, I replicate the same analysis looking at Opinionsit which repre-
sents the count of opinion pieces published by a set of leading opinion makers126.
Differently from the average news article, opinion pieces do take a position and it
is therefore very interesting to test the elasticities of prices these types of informa-
tion. The coefficient for Opinionit is positive, significant and remarkably stable
126See Data section to read how opinion makers have been chosen
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across specification. It remains so even in the most stringent estimation (column
5) where we include a full set of controls, country fixed effects, time fixed effects
and linear trends. Interestingly, both Opinionit−1 and Opinioni,t−2 are positive
and significant across all specifications. In particular, Opinioni,t−2 exhibits the
larger magnitude and it is always significant at the 1% level. This suggests us
that, for a given country, an increase in the number of opinion pieces published
at time t-2 leads to an increase in the bond yield of that country at time t.
I then turn my attention to estimate whether the effect of the number of news
published in each country on the respective bond yield is heterogeneous across
country. In order to do that, I estimate an interaction model whereby the main
effect is identified out of fixed effect strategy. More precisely, I estimate the
following equation:
Yit = βo + β1(Newsit ∗ Countryit) + β2Yi,t−n + β3Xit + µi + λt + εit (4.3)
This is similar to what I have done in equation 1 but with one crucial difference.
In equation 1, Newst represented the total number of news published in a given
day. Hence, the estimation was indeed exploiting only the time variations of the
explanatory variable. In the interaction model, the variable Newsit ∗ Countryit
represents the number of news published in a given day in a given country. The
estimation is therefore exploiting both the country and time variation of the data.
I present the result in Table 4.8. All estimations are conditional on a full set of
controls ( Debt/GDP, Deficit/GDP, Vix Index, CDS) their respective lag values,
lag values of the dependent variable, country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
Errors are cluster at the country level. The results seem to confirm what emerged
in the time series estimation and the economic intuition of Morris and Shin Model.
Increasing the number of news published in a given country does have an effect
on the bond yield for that country. However, the effect varies across countries.
Column 1, 4 and 5 of Table 4.8 shows how increasing by one unit the amount of
news published per days has a a positive and significant effect on bond yields of
Italy, Spain and Greece, but no Germany and France.
Table 4.9 replicates the same interaction model, but with a focus now on
Opinionit. The results are similar except for the coefficient of Italy which is
not statistically different from zero. This is not surprising as most of the leading
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economic commentators have always described the italian debt crisis as severe but
curable. Column 2 shows how the interaction of Opinioni,t ∗ Greecet is always
significant at time t, t-1 and t-2.
The “tone effect” of news on sovereign spread It is not just the amount of
news that matters, but also their tone. As Basman et al. (2015) puts it, readers
might form their beliefs over a topic by reading an article without picking up the
actual real facts about that article. In addition, different framing of the same
news might trigger different reactions. The “tone effect” (Basman et al. 2015) of
information has been studied in the literature (Kahenneman and Tversky, 1986;
Barbeis and Thaler, 2003). News media have become a powerful tool in influencing
people’s opinion. This is particularly true in financial markets where very often,
decisions and analysis risk to be “impression driven” rather than “data driven”.
Basman et al. (2015) investigates the effect of the tone of news on investors’
expectations and beliefs. I adopt a similar approach by studying whether positive
news have different impact on bond yield than negative news. More precisely,
I coded every daily news and opinion pieces into 3 main categories: positive,
negative and uncertain. In days whereby multiple news are present, I assign a
tone category to each of them and I then compute the daily tone average. Table
4.10 provides examples of negative, positive and uncertain news.
I then create a variable Tone − Newsit = Newsit−1 ∗ Tone where Tone127
captures whether a news is positive, negative or uncertain. I then estimate various
versions of the following specifications:
Yit = βo+β1NegativeNewsit−1+β2PositiveNewsit−1+β3UncertainNewsi,t−1+β4Yi,t−n+β5Xit+µi+λt+εit
(4.4)
In table 4.11, I present the dynamic panel estimations. Column 1 reports the fixed
effect modelling controlling for past values of bond yields. Both the coefficients
for positive news and negative news are significant and their sign goes toward the
expected direction. An additional negative news in country i at time t−1 increases
the spread of country i at time t. On the opposite, an additional positive news in
country i at time t−1 decreased the sovereign spread of that respected country at
127When multiple news are published in a given day, Tone is the avarage between the numbers
of negative, positive and netrual news.
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time t. Uncertain news do not seem to have any impact on the dependent variable.
The estimates for negative news are remarkably stable across specifications when
I include lagged values of news (Column 2), a full set of controls (Columns 3
and 4), time fixed effects and linear time trends (Column 5). The coefficients for
positive news losses its significance when we include time fixed effects. It is quite
interesting to observe the magnitude and the significance of past values of positive
news on bond yields today.
Table 4.12 replicates the same analysis for opinion pieces. As far as the neg-
ative opinion pieces is concerned, we observe similar results. The coefficients
are strongly significant and stable. When an additional negative opinion piece is
published in country i at time t − 1, the spread of country iat time t increases.
Interestingly, positive opinion pieces at t− 2 (2 days before the bond yield data)
seems to have an effect on the spreads (they are highly significant and stable
across specifications). This might suggest that the effect of negative news on
prices is almost simultaneous, whereas the markets’ elasticity to positive news is
more delayed.
As previously shown, different countries have been treated differently by the
markets. It is therefore natural to investigate whether the “tone effect” of news
media on sovereign spread exhibits some cross country heterogeneity. In light
of the previous results, we should probably expect that bond yields of countries
whose governments are perceived as less credible by the markets will be more
elastic to the publication of negative news than “stronger” countries. I test this
hypothesis in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, which respectively report the analysis for
news and opinion pieces. The estimates in Table 4.13 indeed reveal a level of
heterogeneity in the effect, and most importantly how strongly Greece has been
hit by the crisis. Greek bond yields increase after the publication of negative
news and do not react to positive news. Italian sovereign spread is also quite
elastic to the arrival of negative news but it also improves when positive news
are published. It is interesting to note that Spain seems to be immune to related
news with negative tone, but very elastic to positive news. Countries whose
governments are perceived as more credible such as France and Germany are not
affected neither by negative nor positive news. Table 4.14 reports the results for
opinion pieces. It is interesting to note that exactly the same pattern emerges,
with similar cross country heterogeneity.
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Threats to Identification This study is very cautious in claiming causality.
Measuring the effect of news media on investors’ behaviour independent of actual
fundamentals is not trivial. The ideal scenario would be an experiment in which
we randomly vary that type of news to which investors are exposed. Consider an
ideal design where the same group of investors is exposed to both an increase in
news and a change in their tone or to a situation where there is no change in the
new media. Why should we expect different reactions from investors holding fixed
the actual underlying fundamentals (Eggers and Fouirnaies, 2014)? Obviously ob-
servational data cannot convincingly answer to this question since it is difficult
to isolate exogenous variation in news (Eggers and Fouirnaies, 2014). This paper
is aware of these limitations and tries to set the most rigorous empirical analysis
as possible given the data limitation. To this end, a discussion of two concerns is
in order. First, the above estimates are not credible if it not news in country i at
time t-1 anticipating a variation in bond yield in the same country at time t, but
the other way around. This would constitute a serious problem of simultaneous
causality and would clearly invalidate our estimates. The concept of causality
with high frequency data in time series analysis is slightly different than the clas-
sic applied microeconomic approach (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin ,1996). In time
series, the direction of causality is tested with a Granger Causality Test. This is a
procedure that has not much in common with causality as understood in the po-
tential outcomes framework, rather it focuses on the concept of time precedence.
More specifically, a Granger Causality test allows us to observe whether cause
happen before consequences, or vice versa. It therefore provides an important
control for simultaneous causality that analyses the dynamic evolution over time
of bond yields in response to news. Table 4A.1 shows the results by performing
a Wald Test. A Wald Test is a way to find out if additional explanatory vari-
ables in a model are significant. In table 4A.1 this is applied in the context of a
Granger Test and therefore additional lags for both the dependent and indepen-
dent variables are added. The top two lines of every table show the results when
x is used to explain y. The bottom two lines show the results for a model where
the causality is inverted. I run the test for the 3 peripheral countries, Greece,
Italy and Spain.128 The results show that for all the three countries the vari-
128I restrict the robustness checks for the three countries for which I have the main results of
the paper. There is no evidence of simultaneous causality when I extend the Granger Test to
France and Germany.
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ables news is never predicted by lag values of bond yield. The p values in the
bottom panel of the three tables suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that
past values of bond yields predict news. It is always difficult to rule completely
out concerns on simultaneous causality, but the results of Table 4A.1 certainly
provide an important step toward this direction. Another important reassurance
to address this problem is via the construction of my dataset whereby information
on bond yields are collected at the end of the day whereas information on news
are collected on news releases during the day. Finally, in Table 4A.5 I perform
a dynamic panel estimation restricting the sample to the years January 2009 -
May 2010. With this excercise I aim to test whether my results hold when I focus
exclusive on the onset of the crisis. Importantly this helps to tackle simultaneous
causality concerns because, as shown in section 4.2, bond yields of the countries
under analysis were bundled together until November 2009. In other words, from
January to November 2009 there was no turmoil on the market and therefore it
is unlikely that, during this period, movements in prices were the causing an in-
crease in the number of news media (simultaneous causality). Table 4A.5 shows
that the results hold even when the sample is restricted. The coefficients for News
are positive, significant and remarkalbly stable across specifications.
A second concern might be related on the reliability and external validity of
the newly collected dataset that this paper presents. There might be something
peculiar or inherently different in the way the data have been collected that drives
the above results. Hence, I replicate my analysis using the Economic Policy Un-
certainty Index (EPU Index) created by Bloom et al (2013). 129 The EPU index
represents a remarkable achievement in constructing the first measure of economic
policy uncertainty. It is ideal to test the validity of my results because 50% of
it is constructed using the frequency of references to economic and political un-
certainty in 10 leading European newspapers (La Repubblica, il Corriere della
Sera, El Pais, El Mundo, Le Monde, Le Figaro, the Financial Times, The Times,
Handelsblatt and FAZ). The other 50% of the index is composed by disagreement
among economic forecasters about policy relevant variables as a proxy for uncer-
tainty. To construct the news index, Bloom et all performed a month-by-month
search of each of the above paper from January 1985 to October 2011. Unfor-
tunately the countries analysed are Italy, Spain, France and UK. Although it is
129Bloom et all (2013) “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty”. European Data available at
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html
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a limitation to not have the same sample of countries, I can still test whether
my results for Spain, Italy and France are confirmed using this dataset.130 Table
4A.2 in appendix shows the replication of the results using monthly time series
regressions analysis conditional on a full set of economic fundamentals, measures
of international risks, and lag values of both controls and dependent variables.131
The coefficients of interest are the Policy Index variables. The estimates seem to
confirm what this paper has shown in its empirical analysis. An increase of one
standard deviation in the level of uncertainty expressed by the Policy Index leads
to a significant increase in bond yields in Italy and Spain but does not have any
effect for France and the UK. This is reassuring not just because it confirms that
direction of the results with different data but also, because the analysis of Table
4A.2 is not performed daily but monthly. This constitutes an additional robust-
ness check that the results of this paper are not driven by the high frequency of
the data.132
One final concern is represented by the stationarity of the data which is the
crucial assumption in time series estimation to properly estimate the parameter of
interest. All the estimations presented so far have tested for stationarity, but, to
produce an alternative robustness checks, I replicated the main results expressing
all the variables in first differences. The first difference of a time series is the
series of changes from one period to the next. Table 4A.3 and Table 4A.4 provide
130The EPU loooks specifically for articles containing the words “uncertainty” or “uncertain”,
the terms “economic” or “economy” and one or more of the following terms: “congress”, “deficit”,
“federal reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation” or “white house”. In other words, to meet the crite-
ria for inclusion, the article must include terms in all three categories pertaining to uncertainty,
the economy and policy. To measure forecasters’ disagreement (which composed the second
part of the index) EPU used Consensus Economics, which is a forecast database for European
countries. Precisely: “For each country, we use data on individual forecasts for the following
calendar year of CPI and federal budget balances, taking the interquartile range of each set of
country-month forecasts. Due to the nature of the forecasts, asking about the following calendar
year and not 1 year ahead, the forecasts become mechanically more accurate as months progress
in a year. To correct for this, we deseasonalize the series of interquartile ranges. For the CPI
disagreement measure, we then use the raw values. For the budget balance, we scale by a coun-
try’s GDP. Each country’s index is then scaled to standard deviation 1 and summed to create a
single European-wide index ”
Finally, Bloom, Baker and Davis have normalized each of the two components – news and
forecasts disagreement –by its standard deviation. They then compute the average value of the
components, using weights of ½ for each of the two. The result is the overall index of policy
related economic uncertainty
131I employ the same control variables as in section 4.4
132I have indeed performed the same analysis with weekly and monthly data. The results do
not change.
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an overview of the results. Precise Table 4A.3 shows the replication of the results
with time series regression when all the variables are in first difference. Table
4A.4 looks at the dynamic panel estimation. The results are remarkably stables
across specifications.
4.5 Conclusion
For crisis to occur there is a need for coordination. This is well known: what is less
clear is what trigger coordination? This paper has investigated the role of news
in affecting investors’ beliefs and in anticipating the beginning of the European
Sovereign Crisis. In doing so it has introduced a series of contribution which
ranges from the provision of a newly collected dataset and to a new approach to
the analysis of the European Sovereign Crisis. The study attempted to provide a
rigorous explanation on why did the crisis start when it did. In doing so it argues
that, in order to understand the onset of the crisis, there is a need to go beyond
a mere analysis of economic fundamental. I build on the existing literature on
sovereign crisis, by showing that a significant part of the surge on government bond
spreads in the Eurozone was disconnected from underlying changes in a number
of economic indicators. I then propose a new approach by studying whether the
amount and the type of news related to sovereign debt might have played a role in
the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty among investors.
Testing these claims empirically is not trivial because there is no existing attempt
to measure news media that might be relevant for financial investors. Hence, this
paper has proposed a unique and newly collected dataset on news from the main
media outlets in a set of 5 European Countries from September 2007 to September
2014. I have mostly focused on political information which, by their nature, is
not immediately quantifiable, more subjective and difficult to interpret. I defined
political information as all the news about political stories/events related to the
country sovereign debt. Using different estimation techniques, which range from
time series to dynamic panel estimations, my estimates shows that the amount
of news fosters the coordination between investors and eventually leads to an
increase in bond prices.
It is not just the amount of news that matters, but also its tone. I study
whether positive news has a different impact on bond yields than negative news
and I find that the tone of the news does indeed have a significant effect on
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bond yields. More precisely, negative news in country i at time t-1 increases
significantly the sovereign spread of country I at time t. On the contrary, positive
news leads to a decrease in sovereign spread. The results are remarkably stable
across specifications and to the introduction of a full set of controls, municipal
fixed effects, time fixed effects and linear time trends.
This paper differs from these studies in several dimensions and it makes a
number of contributions. First, it provides evidence that, although important in
the unfolding of the crisis, neither proxies of economic fundamentals nor measures
of international risk can be used to explain the outbreak of the European sovereign
crisis. Second, it incorporates the important role of politics in the analysis of the
onset of the European crisis. It does so not by looking at standard institutional
proxies but rather at the day to day policy making processes. Third, it provides
a new dataset to measure the political uncertainty generated by variations in the
frequency, types and availability of information flows.
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4.6 Figures and Tables
4.6.1 Figures
Figure 4.1: Debt to GDP Ratio Over Time
	
Note: Eurostat - Authors’ elaboration. Data are from Eurostat.
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Figure 4.2: Bond Yields and Vix Index
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Note: Eurostat - Authors’ elaboration. The Chart reports the overtime trend of the sovereign
bonds for Italy, France, Greece, UK, Spain and the VIX index. Data are from Bloomberg
Professional Services.
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Figure 4.3: Bond Yields and CDS Index
	
Note: Eurostat - Authors’ elaboration. Each chart reports the overtime trend of the sovereing
bond and of the related CDS. Data are from Bloomberg Professional Services
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Figure 4.4: Bond Yields and News
	
Note: Source: Bloomber - Author’s own dataset. Author’s elaboration. Together with the
spreads, I plot the daily count of the political news stories related to sovereign debt. The
picture shows a striking spike in the number of news that has anticipated the divergence of the
spreads. Most of the news are clustered around June, July, August and September 2009 when
there were no signs of turmoil on the yields and well before the revelation of Greek public finance
problems which took place in December 2009. Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional
Services. Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Figure 4.5: Search Sumary - Text
 
Search Summary 
Text ((uncertainty or uncertain) and (debt or deficit) and (bond market or spread) not (decrease or 
decreasing or reduction or improvement) politics or legislature) or (stability or political stability) or 
(economic policy) ) or ((incertezza or incerto) and (debito or deficit) and (titoli di stato or spread) not 
(riduzione or miglioramento or calo) or(stabilita’ politica or legislature) or (politica economica) ) or 
((incertitude or incertain) and (dette or déficit) and (marché obligataire or spread) not (diminuer or 
diminuant or réduction or amélioration)) or ((incertidumbre or incierto) or riesgoso and (debito or 
deficit) and (mercado de bonos or spread) not (reduccion or disminucion or disminuir)) or 
((Unsicherheit or Unsicher) and (die Schulden or das Defizit) and ( der Rentenmarkt or 
Volkswirtschaft) not (die abnahme or fallend or Absenkung or die Verbesserung)) or ((Αβεβαίοτητα or 
αβέβαιος) and (χρέος or έλλειμμα) and (αγορά or πτώση) not (βελτίωση or πολιτική or πολιτικά or 
νομοθετικό)) 
Date 01/05/2008 to 20/06/2013 
Source Le Figaro - All sources Or Le Monde - All sources Or Financial Times - All sources Or Bloomberg - All 
sources Or El Pais - All sources Or El Mundo - All sources Or La Repubblica - All sources Or Il Sole - 
All sources Or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - All sources Or Handelsblatt - All sources 
Author All Authors 
Company All Companies 
Subject Debt/Bond Markets Or Routine Market/Financial News Or Government Borrowing Or Euro 
Zone/Currency Or Central Bank Intervention Or Government Borrowing Requirement Or Dow 
Jones/Reuters Top Wire News 
Industry All Industries 
Region Germany Or France Or Italy Or Spain Or United Kingdom 
Language All Languages 
Note: Author’s elaboration. The table reports an example of search code using Factiva Tech-
nology
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Figure 4.6: Search Results - Text
	
Note:Author’s elaboration. the Charts reports a set of outcomes results from the Factiva Search.
The first chart reports the most mentioned keywords. The Second the most captured newspapers
and, finally, the most mentioned institutions.
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Figure 4.7: Twitter API Technology
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Note: Author’s elaboration. The Figure shows the structure and interface of the Twitter API
Interface.
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Figure 4.8: Opinion Makers
 
             
 
Name  Mentioned 
 
 
 
Krugman 16 
 
 
Mohamed Elarian 14 
 
 
Wolf 12 
 
 
Roubini 12 
 
 
Bill Gross 9 
 
 
Ezra Klein 8 
 
 
Daniel Altman 8 
 
 
Stiglitz 5 
 
 
Sachs 3 
 
 
Catherine 
Rampell 
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Heide Moore 2 
 
 
Josh Barro 1 
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Note:Author’s elaboration. The table and the chart shows the result of the interviews that I
have conducted with a sample of traders in the city of London. The question I posed was “Which
is the opinion maker that you read the most?”
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4.6.2 Tables
Table 4.1: Bond Yield and Economic Foundamentals (Time Series Model)
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Bond Yield 
Portugal 
Bond Yield 
Italy 
Bond Yield 
Spain 
Bond Yield 
Greece 
Current Account Portugal  0.0197 
   
 
(0.0325) 
   Deficit Portugal 0.00600 
   
 
(0.0176) 
   Debt (as % GDP) Portugal 0.00343 
   
 
(0.00869) 
   GDP Growth Portugal  -0.00465 
   
 
(0.0134) 
   Current Account Italy 
 
0.0307 
  
  
(0.0361) 
  Debt (as % GDP) Italy 
 
0.00487 
  
  
(0.00502) 
  Deficit Italy 
 
-0.00705 
  
  
(0.0168) 
  GDP Growth Italy 
 
-0.00882 
  
  
(0.00680) 
  Debt (as % GDP) Spain 
  
0.000590 
 
   
(0.00515) 
 Deficit Spain 
  
-0.0208 
 
   
(0.03753) 
 Current Account Spain 
  
-0.00617 
 
   
(0.0228) 
 GDP Growth Spain 
  
-0.0335 
 
   
(0.0243) 
 Debt (as % GDP) Greece 
   
0.0102 
    
(0.0190) 
Deficit Greece 
   
0.0102* 
    
(0.00575) 
Current Account Greece 
   
-0.0767 
    
(0.0531) 
GDP Growth Greece 
   
-0.01000 
    
(0.0129) 
Constant 0.00665 0.00583 0.00574 0.0215 
  (0.00928) (0.00903) (0.00756) (0.0257) 
Observations 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 
R-squared 0.998 0.995 0.995 0.997 
      Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Indipendent variables are the first difference
of debt, deficit, current account for Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Estimates included past
values of bond yields (t-2). The model is estimated with ARMA Time series regressions.
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Table 4.2: Bond Yield and Economic Foundamentals (Panel Model)
 
    
 
(1) 
VARIABLES Bond Yield 
Debt (as % GDP) 0.00844 
 
(0.00530) 
Deficit (as % GDP) 0.00186 
 
(0.0134) 
GDP Growth -0.00887 
 
(0.00889) 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.0133 
 
(0.0126) 
GDP Growth (t-2) -0.00397 
 
(0.00896) 
Debt (t-1) -0.00809* 
 
(0.00465) 
Debt (t-2) -0.000476 
 
(0.00328) 
Deficit (t-1) 0.000362 
 
(0.0190) 
Deficit (t-2) -0.00377 
 
(0.0134) 
Bond Yield (t-1) 1.092*** 
 
(0.00728) 
Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0939*** 
 
(0.00728) 
Constant 0.0109 
  (0.00685) 
Observations 18,725 
Number of country 7 
R-squared 0.997 
  
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Indipendent variables are the first difference
of debt, deficit, current account for Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Estimates included past
values of bond yields (t-2), fixed effect and time effect. The model is estimated with a dynamic
fixed effect regressions.
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Table 4.3: Heterogeneity across Countries - Theoretical Predictions
	
Quality	of	the	Government Level	of	Noise	 Probability	of	Currency	Crisis
0,7 0,32
0,8 0,38
0,9 0,39
0,7 0,42
0,8 0,48
0,9 0,5
0,7 0,6
0,8 0,71
0,9 0,79
	“Weak	Government”
	“Medium	Government”
	“Strong”	Government
Note: Calibration of the comparative statics of the model. 4
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Table 4.4: News and Bond Yields - Time Series Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Bond	Yield	Uk Bond	Yield	Spain Bond	Yield	Italy Bond	Yield	Greece Bond	Yield	France Bond	Yield	Germany
Total	News 4.42e-05 3.04e-05* 0.00220* 0.00164* 5.18e-05 -5.49e-05
(0.000279) (0.000764) (0.00121) (0.00108) (0.000250) (0.000294)
Total	News	(t-1) -0.000299 0.000984* 0.00148 -0.00152 7.41e-05 0.000225
(0.000294) (0.000557) (0.00124) (0.00236) (0.000253) (0.000337)
Total	News	(t-2) 2.30e-05 0.000281 0.00253** 0.00335* -8.79e-05 -9.01e-05
(0.000222) (0.000363) (0.00117) -0.00256 (0.000178) (0.000215)
Bond	Yield	(t-1) 1.021*** 1.126*** 0.453*** 1.084*** 1.070*** 1.023***
(0.0272) (0.0311) (0.0860) (0.0342) (0.0284) (0.0250)
Bond	Yield	(t-2) -0.0515 -0.142*** -0.0969 -0.0726* -0.0902*** -0.0412
(0.0371) (0.0417) (0.123) (0.0385) (0.0318) (0.0343)
Bond	Yield	(t-3) 0.0226 0.0102 0.188** -0.0191 0.0115 0.00795
(0.0203) (0.0249) (0.0877) (0.0142) (0.0197) (0.0200)
Inflation -0.000682 0.00352* -0.113*** 0.00797 0.000989 0.00137
(0.00230) (0.00196) (0.0126) (0.00679) (0.00256) (0.00215)
GDP	Growth 0.00530* -0.000885 -0.0288*** 0.00912* 0.00104 -0.00127
(0.00318) (0.00146) (0.00240) (0.00469) (0.00234) (0.000894)
Unemployment 0.00248 0.00395 -0.151*** 0.00787 0.00368 0.0103***
(0.00323) (0.00260) (0.0149) (0.00859) (0.00489) (0.00357)
Confidence	Index -0.000149 0.000377 0.0167*** -0.000641 5.78e-05 0.000237
(0.000214) (0.000293) (0.00133) (0.000852) (0.000164) (0.000200)
Household	Saving 0.00134 0.000722 -0.128*** 0.000136 0.0111
(0.00144) (0.00100) (0.00747) (0.00376) (0.00715)
Current	Account -0.00502* 0.00665 -0.0195** 0.00690**
(0.00286) (0.0100) (0.00808) (0.00274)
Debt/GDP -0.000726*** -0.000919* -0.0374*** 0.00222 -0.00120** 0.000348
(0.000276) (0.000506) (0.00262) (0.00142) (0.000519) (0.000513)
Deficit	 -0.000341 0.00134 0.151*** -0.00207 -0.000909 -0.00182
(0.00112) (0.00160) (0.00936) (0.00442) (0.00151) (0.00182)
Constant 0.0276 0.0119 9.618*** -0.594*** 0.0831 -0.293**
(0.0215) (0.0172) (0.300) (0.188) (0.0615) (0.142)
Observations 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676
R-squared 0.998 0.995 0.933 0.997 0.998 0.998
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
	
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Total News represent the total amount of
news (count) published at time t. Estimates includes past values of Bond Yields (t-2) and past
values of Total News. Results are conditional to a full set of controls, fixed effect and time
effect. The model is estimated with ARMA Time series regressions. Data on Bonds are from
Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.5: News and Bond Yields - Time Series Analysis - Monthly Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Bond	Yield	Uk Bond	Yield	Spain Bond	Yield	Italy Bond	Yield	Greece Bond	Yield	France Bond	Yield	Germany
Monthly	News -0.000897 0.00138* 0.00134* 0.000167 0.0115** 0.0269
(0.0129) (0.000831) (0.000710) (0.000405) (0.00541) (0.0225)
Monthly	News(t-1) -0.000775* -0.00118 -0.000337 -0.000284 -0.0106** -0.000410
(0.000443) (0.000722) (0.000625) (0.000506) (0.00459) (0.000406)
Monthly	News(t-2) 7.26e-05 0.000116 3.90e-05 -0.000484 0.00801* -0.000489
(0.000387) (0.000575) (0.000543) (0.000352) (0.00436) (0.000320)
Bond	Yield	(t-1) 1.069*** 1.027*** 0.954*** 1.086*** 1.108*** 1.041***
(0.143) (0.150) (0.132) (0.110) (0.167) (0.121)
Bond	Yield	(t-2) -0.362* -0.198 -0.254* -0.323*** -0.414** -0.340***
(0.193) (0.207) (0.128) (0.112) (0.168) (0.124)
inflation_uk -0.0351 0.0828 -0.0183 0.0654 0.210* 0.0897
(0.0657) (0.0546) (0.0455) (0.0594) (0.111) (0.0617)
gdpgrowth_uk 0.105 -0.00482 0.0134 -0.0167 0.0515 0.0129
(0.0718) (0.0419) (0.0136) (0.0235) (0.159) (0.0541)
unemployment_uk 0.120 0.0932 -0.0208 0.222** 0.369 0.0818
(0.0842) (0.0932) (0.0914) (0.0989) (0.229) (0.149)
condidenceindex_uk -0.00108 0.00216 -0.00962 0.00568 -0.0158 -0.00399
(0.00505) (0.00661) (0.00715) (0.00442) (0.0222) (0.00504)
householdsavings_uk 0.0447 0.0253 -0.0795 0.300** -0.552* -0.0667
(0.0372) (0.0282) (0.0546) (0.139) (0.289) (0.113)
currentaccount_uk -0.0796 0.0199 -0.0890 0.0535 0.204
(0.0712) (0.104) (0.0676) (0.0657) (0.124)
ukdeficit 0.0105 0.0411 0.0732 -0.00723 -0.00242 -0.0486
(0.0321) (0.0646) (0.0543) (0.0496) (0.1000) (0.0491)
ukdebt -0.0171** -0.0225 -0.00986 0.0127 0.0343 -0.0347**
(0.00658) (0.0282) (0.0173) (0.0134) (0.0333) (0.0147)
Constant 0.451 0.327 3.445 -7.123** -14.46** 3.714*
(0.737) (1.544) (2.188) (2.893) (6.425) (2.026)
Observations 85 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.967 0.940 0.938 0.982 0.963 0.972
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
	
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Total News represent the total amount of
news (count) published at time t. Estimates includes past values of Bond Yields (t-2) and past
values of Total News. Results are conditional to a full set of controls, fixed effect and time
effect. The model is estimated with ARMA Time series regressions. Data on Bonds are from
Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.6: News and Bond Yields - Dinamic Panel Estimation
	
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield
News 1.086*** 0.00402* 0.00388* 0.00384* 0.00204*
(0.0634) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00185)
price	(t-1) 1.088*** 1.088*** 1.087*** 1.084***
(0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00968)
price	(t-2) -0.0783*** -0.0783*** -0.0776*** -0.0723***
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0143)
price	(t-3) -0.0117 -0.0114 -0.0116 -0.0141
(0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00968)
news	(t-1) -0.00237 -0.00247 -0.00244 0.000670
(0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00297)
news	(t-2) 0.00585** 0.00572** 0.00572** 0.00664**
(0.00232) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00285)
vixindex 0.000356* 0.000354* -0.000736
(0.000194) (0.000194) (0.0259)
debt 4.78e-05 0.00909** 0.00566
(0.000136) (0.00408) (0.00483)
deficit -0.000865 0.00317 0.00175
(0.000795) (0.0177) (0.0201)
Debt	(t-1) -0.00651 -0.00507
(0.00576) (0.00683)
Debt	(t-2) -0.00254 -0.000409
(0.00408) (0.00483)
Deficit	(t-1) 0.000623 0.00715
(0.0250) (0.0284)
Deficit	(t-2) -0.00464 -0.00909
(0.0177) (0.0201)
Country	Dummies no yes yes yes yes
Time	Dummies no no no no yes
Time	Trends no no no no yes
Constant 4.859*** 0.00823*** -0.00842 -0.00792 0.0273
(0.0432) (0.00301) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.565)
Observations 13,385 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370
R-squared 0.027 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998
Number	of	country 5 5 5 5 5
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. The main variable is News which represents
the amount of news published at time t in country i. Estimates included past values of bond
yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time trends. Column 1 reports the OLS estima-
tion. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values of dependent and indipendent variables
are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control variables. In column 4 I include the
past values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include linear time trends and time fiexed
effects. The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect regressions. Data on Bonds are from
Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.7: Opinion and Bond Yields - Dinamic Panel Estimation
	
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield
opinion 0.773*** 0.0166** 0.0160** 0.0159** 0.0140*
(0.119) (0.00679) (0.00679) (0.00679) (0.00775)
price	(t-1) 1.087*** 1.080*** 1.079*** 1.077***
(0.00865) (0.00867) (0.00868) (0.00970)
price	(t-2) -0.0781*** -0.0738*** -0.0729*** -0.0682***
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0142)
price	(t-3) -0.0112 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0140
(0.00865) (0.00863) (0.00863) (0.00965)
opinion	(t-1) 0.0115* 0.0113* 0.0118* 0.0141*
(0.00686) (0.00686) (0.00687) (0.00784)
opinion	(t-2) 0.0271*** 0.0266*** 0.0268*** 0.0281***
(0.00686) (0.00686) (0.00686) (0.00784)
vixindex 0.000224 0.000220 -0.000396
(0.000194) (0.000194) (0.0259)
cds 4.61e-05*** 4.68e-05*** 4.38e-05***
(5.66e-06) (5.67e-06) (6.24e-06)
debt -0.000309** 0.0102** 0.00686
(0.000142) (0.00407) (0.00482)
deficit -0.000962 0.00455 0.00311
(0.000793) (0.0176) (0.0200)
debt_l1 -0.00636 -0.00488
(0.00575) (0.00681)
debt_l2 -0.00414 -0.00214
(0.00407) (0.00482)
deficit_l1 0.000238 0.00708
(0.0249) (0.0283)
deficit_l2 -0.00572 -0.0107
(0.0176) (0.0200)
Constant 5.047*** 0.00816*** 0.0321** 0.0333** 0.0545
(0.0310) (0.00300) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.564)
Observations 13,384 13,366 13,366 13,366 13,366
R-squared 0.003 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998
Number	of	country 5 5 5 5 5
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. The main variable is Opinion which represents
the amount of opinion pieces published at time t in country i. Estimates included past values
of bond yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time trends. Column 1 reports the
OLS estimation. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values of dependent and indipendent
variables are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control variables. In column 4 I include
the past values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include linear time trends and time fiexed
effects. The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect regressions. Data on Bonds are from
Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on opinion makers are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.8: News and Bond Yields - Heterogeneity Across Countries - Dinamic
Panel Estimation
Bond	Yield	 Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield
News_Italy 0.00778***
(0.00257)
News_Italy	(t-1) -0.00399
(0.00269)
News_Italy	(t-2) -0.00301
(0.00257)
News_France 0.00294
(0.0139)
News_France	(t-1) 0.00215
(0.0141)
News_France	(t-2) 0.00125
(0.0139)
News_germany 0.00333
(0.0110)
News_Germany	(t-1) 0.00405
(0.0111)
News_Germany	(t-2) -0.00139
(0.0110)
News_Greece 0.00684**
(0.00339)
News_Greece	(t-1) -0.00317
(0.00367)
News_Greece	(t-2) 0.0121***
(0.00339)
News_spain 0.00129*
(0.00102)
News_spain	(t-1) -0.00448
(0.00483)
News_Spain	(t-2) -0.00466
(0.00472)
Bond	Yield	(t-n) yes yes yes yes yes
Vix	Index yes yes yes yes yes
Economic	Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Economic	Controls	(t-n) yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.00528 -0.00523 -0.00520 -0.00810 -0.00364
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Number	of	country 5 5 5 5 5
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
	
4
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Indipendent variables are the amount of news
published in country i at time t. Estimates include past values of bond yields (t-2), past values
of the news variable, a full set of controls, fixed effect and time effect. The model is estimated
with a dynamic fixed effect regressions.Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional Services.
Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.9: Opinion and Bond Yields - Heterogeneity Across Countries - Dinamic
Panel Estimation
Bond	Yield	 Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield Bond	Yield
Opinion_Italy 0.00220
(0.00500)
Opinion_Italy	(t-1) -0.00139
(0.00515)
Opinion_Italy	(t-2) -0.00367
(0.00500)
Opinon_Greece 0.0254***
(0.00842)
Opinion_greece	(t-1) 0.0337***
(0.00842)
Opinion_Greece	(t-2) 0.0163*
(0.00860)
Opinion_Spain 0.023*
(0.0143)
Opinion_Spain	(t-1) 0.00965
(0.0214)
Opinion_Spain	(t-2) -0.00606
(0.0213)
Opinion_France 0.0195
(0.0683)
Opinion_France	(t-1) -0.0209
(0.0700)
Opinion_France	(t-2) -0.000235
(0.0683)
Opinion_Germany 0.00498
(0.0209)
Opinion_Germany	(t-1) 0.000399
(0.0209)
Opinion_Gergmany	(t-2) -0.00423
(0.0209)
Bond	Yield	(t-n) yes yes yes yes yes
Vix	Index yes yes yes yes yes
Economic	Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Economic	Controls	(t-n) yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.00528 -0.00523 -0.00520 -0.00810 -0.00364
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Number	of	country 5 5 5 5 5
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
	
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Indipendent variables are the amount of
opinion peices published in country i at time t. Estimates include past values of bond yields
(t-2), past values of the news variable, a full set of controls, fixed effect and time effect. The
model is estimated with a dynamic fixed effect regressions. Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg
Professional Services. Data on news are manually collected by the author.
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Table 4.10: Examples of News Coding - Positive, Negative, Uncertain
 
Negative News Positive News Uncertain News
La incertidumbre castiga la dueda 
publica espanola
Government bonds recover 
losses as market fears ease
Eurozone Weighs 
Bailout Plan for Greece
Euro Under Pressure As Greek Crisis 
Becomes A 'Huge Game Of Chicken'
Trichet Says ECB 'Confident' 
Greece Can Cut Deficit: Audio
ECB Set for First Rate 
Split With Fed in 40 
Years: Euro Credit
The pain in Spain will reveal itself very 
soon
Eurozone Leaders Agree on 
Bailout Plan for Greece
EU Said to Consider 
Requiring Collateral for 
More Greek Aid
Note: The analysis has been run on 5 different languages.
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Table 4.11: The Effect of the “Tone Effect” of news on Bond Yields
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield Bond Yield Bond Yield Bond Yield
Positive News -0.0102** -0.00717* -0.00754* -0.00754* -0.00697
(0.00413) (0.00425) (0.00425) (0.00425) (0.00533)
Uncertain News 0.00167 0.00322 0.00342 0.00333 0.00108
(0.00442) (0.00455) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00555)
Negative News 0.00768*** 0.00890*** 0.00906*** 0.00903*** 0.00501**
(0.00179) (0.00197) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00236)
Bond Yield (t-1) 1.088*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.085***
(0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00862) (0.00964)
Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0897*** -0.0889*** -0.0895*** -0.0892*** -0.0876***
(0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00862) (0.00964)
Uncertain News (t-1) -0.00700 -0.00719 -0.00715 -0.00706
(0.00456) (0.00465) (0.00465) (0.00561)
Negative News (t-1) -0.000132 -0.000639 -0.000620 0.00190
(0.00197) (0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00244)
Positive News (t-1) 0.0147*** 0.0162*** 0.0160*** 0.0166***
(0.00425) (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00540)
Uncertain News (t-2) 0.000299 0.000325 0.00122
(0.00461) (0.00461) (0.00557)
Negative News (t-2) -0.000269 -0.000299 -0.000985
(0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00235)
Positive News (t-3) 0.00922** 0.00918** 0.00876*
(0.00426) (0.00426) (0.00532)
Vix Index 0.000315 0.000313 -0.0156
(0.000194) (0.000194) (0.0231)
Debt/Gdp 4.30e-06 0.00861** 0.00527
(0.000136) (0.00407) (0.00483)
Deficit/Gdp -0.00118 0.00274 0.00258
(0.000794) (0.0177) (0.0201)
Debt/Gdp (t-1) -0.00861** -0.00514
(0.00407) (0.00483)
Deficit/Gdp (t-1) -0.00390 -0.00300
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time Dummies no no no no yes
Time Trends no no no no yes
Constant -0.00570 -0.00368 -0.00460 -0.00428 0.320
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.511)
Observations 13,375 13,375 13,375 13,375 13,375
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998
Number of country 5 5 5 5 5
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield. The explanatory variables of interest are Negative, Positive and Un-
certain News. They represent the tone of the news of country i at time t-1.Estimates included
past values of bond yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time trends. Column 1
reports the OLS estimation. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values of dependent and
indipendent variables are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control variables. In
column 4 I include the past values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include linear time
trends and time fiexed effects. The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect regressions.
Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on Tone_News are manually
collected and coded by the author.
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Table 4.12: The Effect of the “Tone Effect” of opinon pieces on Bond Yields
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield Bond Yield Bond Yield
Negative Opinion Piece 0.00875*** 0.00992*** 0.00989*** 0.00766**
(0.00238) (0.00260) (0.00260) (0.00317)
Positive Opinion Piece 0.00290 0.00388 0.00389 0.000594
(0.00330) (0.00334) (0.00334) (0.00399)
Uncertain Opinion Piece 0.00117 0.00317 0.00310 -0.000582
(0.00248) (0.00266) (0.00266) (0.00314)
Bond Yield (t-1) 1.088*** 1.088*** 1.087*** 1.085***
(0.00862) (0.00862) (0.00862) (0.00964)
Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0899*** -0.0896*** -0.0892*** -0.0872***
(0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00964)
Negative Opinion Piece (t-1) 0.00234 0.00244 0.00290
(0.00256) (0.00256) (0.00311)
Positive Opinion Piece(t-1) -0.00754** -0.00755** -0.00537
(0.00344) (0.00343) (0.00411)
Uncertain Opinion Piece(t-1) -0.00633** -0.00633** -0.00343
(0.00264) (0.00264) (0.00312)
Vix Index 0.000321* 0.000319* -0.0155
(0.000194) (0.000194) (0.0231)
Debt/Gdp 2.15e-05 0.00919** 0.00563
(0.000135) (0.00408) (0.00483)
Deficit/Gdp -0.00103 0.00318 0.00229
(0.000791) (0.0177) (0.0201)
Debt/Gdp (t-1) -0.00917** -0.00549
(0.00408) (0.00483)
Deficit/Gdp (t-1) -0.00419 -0.00266
(0.0177) (0.0201)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
Time Dummies no no no yes
Time Trends no no no  yes
Constant -0.00691 -0.00589 -0.00552 0.318
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.511)
Observations 13,375 13,375 13,375 13,375
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998
Number of country 5 5 5 5
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield. The explanatory variables of interest are Negative, Positive and
Uncertain Opinon Pieces. They represent the tone of the opinion pieces of country i at time
t-1.Estimates included past values of bond yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time
trends. Column 1 reports the OLS estimation. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values
of dependent and indipendent variables are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control
variables. In column 4 I include the past values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include
linear time trends and time fiexed effects. The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect
regressions. Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on Tone_News are
manually collected and coded by the author.
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Table 4.13: The Effect of the “Tone Effect” of news on Bond Yields - Heterogeneity
Across Countries
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield
negative_news_italy 0.00612*** 0.00937*** positive_news_italy -0.0126 -0.0135*
(0.00228) (0.00260) (0.00774) (0.00787)
negative_news_greece 0.0154*** 0.00977** positive_news_greece -0.00818 -0.00512
(0.00362) (0.00380) (0.00560) (0.00574)
negative_news_spain 0.00292 0.00570 positive_news_spain -0.0334*** -0.0313**
(0.00505) (0.00529) (0.0129) (0.0130)
negative_news_france 0.000424 -0.000956 positive_news_france 0.00852 0.00848
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0227)
negative_news_germany 0.00286 0.00167 positive_news_germany 0.00498 0.00495
(0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Bond Yield (t-1) 1.088*** 1.086*** Bond Yield (t-1) 1.089*** 1.088***
(0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00861) (0.00862)
Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0900*** -0.0882*** Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0904*** -0.0897***
(0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00862)
Negative News (t-1) Yes Positive_News (t-1) yes
Negative News (t-2) Yes Positive News (t-2) yes
Controls Yes Controls yes
Municipal Dummies Yes Municipal dummies yes
Time Dummies Yes Time Dummies yes
Constant -0.00685 -0.00689 Constant -0.00443 -0.00295
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Observations 13,375 13,375 Observations 13,375 13,375
R-squared 0.997 0.997 R-squared 5 0.997
Number of country 5 5 Number of country 0.997 5
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield. Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on
Tone_News are manually collected and coded by the author.
203
Table 4.14: The Effect of the “Tone Effect” of opinion pieces on Bond Yields -
Heterogeneity Across Countries
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield VARIABLES Bond Yield Bond Yield
negative_news_italy 0.00612*** 0.00937*** positive_news_italy -0.0126 -0.0135*
(0.00228) (0.00260) (0.00774) (0.00787)
negative_news_greece 0.0154*** 0.00977** positive_news_greece -0.00818 -0.00512
(0.00362) (0.00380) (0.00560) (0.00574)
negative_news_spain 0.00292 0.00570 positive_news_spain -0.0334*** -0.0313**
(0.00505) (0.00529) (0.0129) (0.0130)
negative_news_france 0.000424 -0.000956 positive_news_france 0.00852 0.00848
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0227)
negative_news_germany 0.00286 0.00167 positive_news_germany 0.00498 0.00495
(0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Bond Yield (t-1) 1.088*** 1.086*** Bond Yield (t-1) 1.089*** 1.088***
(0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00861) (0.00862)
Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0900*** -0.0882*** Bond Yield (t-2) -0.0904*** -0.0897***
(0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00862)
Negative News (t-1) Yes Positive_News (t-1) yes
Negative News (t-2) Yes Positive News (t-2) yes
Controls Yes Controls yes
Municipal Dummies Yes Municipal dummies yes
Time Dummies Yes Time Dummies yes
Constant -0.00685 -0.00689 Constant -0.00443 -0.00295
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Observations 13,375 13,375 Observations 13,375 13,375
R-squared 0.997 0.997 R-squared 5 0.997
Number of country 5 5 Number of country 0.997 5
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield. Data on Bonds are from Bloomberg Professional Services. Data on
the tone of the opinions are manually collected and coded by the author.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Summary of Morris and Shin Model
This section summarises the setting, the timing and the main results of Morris and
Shin model. Section 4.7.2 develops a simple comparative statics exercise based on
Morris and Shin’s Framework.
Setting In Morris and Shin the economy is characterised by a state of funda-
mentals θ, which is uniformly distributed over the unit interval [0,1]. Being a
model of currency crisis, they characterised the exchange rate in the absence of
government intervention as f(θ). In our setting this might be considered as the in-
terests to be paid on the outstanding governmental debt. Importantly f is strickly
increasing in θ, so that higher values of θ correspond to stronger fundamentals.
Market actors have two possible actions. They may attack the country by
short selling its sovereign debt or they may refrain to do so. Attacking has a cost
which in Morris and Shin is modelled as t > 0. If market actors succeed in short
selling the debt, they gain a payoff of ε∗ − f(θ) − t where, once again, in our
setting ε∗ is the gain from debt repayment interests.
If their attack fail, their payoff is −t. The government derives a value of ν > 0
in defending the country from the speculative attack on its debt. There is also a
cost in defending which, depends on the strenght of the fundamentals and by the
size of the attack. The different outcomes for the Greek and Italian governments
during the crisis can indeed be seen under this perspective. The solvency of the
sovereign debt of both countries was put under serious questions by international
markets, but the size and effectiveness on the attack on Greece, which had very
bad economic fundamentals, was not comparable to the Italian case. The cost of
defending the debt is therefore modelled as c(α, θ) where α is the size of the attack
and θ the state of fundamentals. Hence the government’s payoff in defending the
country is ν − c(α, θ) with c continuous and increasing in c and decreasing in θ.
Morris and Shin subsequently derive a tripartite classification of fundamentals
(Morris and Shin, 1998). They define θ as the value of θ that solves c(0, θ)
which is when the government is indifferent between rescuing the sovereign debt
in absence of a speculative attack. They then define θ as the value of θ that solves
f(θ) = ε∗−t so that the coupon on the bond yield is below the expected gain from
an attack by the cost ot the attack itself. Using these two benchmarks, Morris
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and Shin derive a tripartite classification of fundamentals that forms the basis for
their main results.
• The interval [0,θ] is defined as unstable because the government has no
incentive to take any action on the sovereign debt.
• The interval [θ, θ ] is interesting. The value of defending the solvency of the
debt is greater than the cost but this is conditional on the size of the attack.
• The interval [θ ,1], the fundamentals are so good that the rational action is
not to attack.
The interesting space is [θ, θ ]. Morris and Shin defines it as the Ripe of Attack
area, whereby it is not clear ex ante which actions will follow (Morris and Shin
1998). In this interval multiple equilibria are possible because of the sell-fulfilling
nature of the market actors perceptions. However, the crucial contribution of
Morris and Shin is to show that when information are noisy and more difficult to
interpret, each state of fundamentals gives rise to a unique equilibrium.
Timing and Main Results Here is the timing as per Morris and Shin (1998):
• Nature chooses the state of fundamentals θ
• Market actors, observe a signal x which is drawn uniformly from the interval
[θ−ε, θ+ε]. In our setting, based on the signal received, a speculator decided
whether to short sell the sovereign debt or not.
• The government observed the realised proportion of speculators who attack
the debt, α, and observes θ.
Once the assumption of common knowledge is relaxed, the model generates a
unique equilibrium as well as comparative statics on market makers’ perceptions
about other speculators perceive the state of fundamentals. In particular, Morris
and Shin derive a unique θ∗such that the government does not defend the sovereign
debt if and only if θ ≤ θ∗. The location of θ∗is determined by the crossing of
two lines: the s(θ, Ix) line which shows the proportion of speculators who decide
to attack the sovereign debt at any given level of fundamentals, and the a(α)
line which depicts the proportion of attackers who would make the government
indifferent between defending or defaulting on the debt. When θ < θ∗, then
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s(θ, Ix) >a(α) the government cannot credibly commit to defend its pending debt
and the outcome is a sovereign crisis.
The unique equilibrium crucially depends on the (perceived) quality of the
fundamentals and on the size of the attack, which Morris and Shin defines as
the aggregate short sales s(θ, Ix∗)133. It is useful to report the derivation of the
aggregate short sales because I will use it in my comparative statics.
s(θ, Ix∗) =

1if(θ < x∗ − ε)
1
2 −
1
2ε(θ − x
∗)if(x∗ − ε ≤ θ < x∗ + ε)
0if(θ > x∗ + ε)
(4.5)
The extremes are self explanatory. If the fundamentals are very bad there is prob-
ability of an aggregate shortsell is very high. If, on the opposite the fundamentals
are good, the probability of a shortsell is very low. The interesting area is the
“ripe of attack” whereby the situation is unstable and it depends on the quality
of the signal/information which, in turn, is conditioned by the amount of noise.
4.7.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, I apply Morris and Shin framework (1998) to provide an additional
theoretical intuition to the research question of this paper. More precisely, I focus
on the ripe for attack interval and perform a simple comparative static exercise
to understand how variations in noise, ε, impact the probability of an aggregate
short sales point, θ∗. In other words, how can we explain this sudden wake up
call that induced the markets to shortsell the sovereign debt of a precise group of
countries? What is the relationship between the level of noise in the information
and the probability of an aggregate short sell of the debt?
To analyse these questions, it is necessary to firstly understand the relationship
between the level of noise and the final signal x that investors receive. 134
One of the main prediction from Morris and Shin Model is that variations in
noise, ε, do have an effect on x∗ which determines whether market actors will
133Ikis an indicator short function which defined a costant parameter k which crucially depends
on the quality of the signal x
134 This can be done in two different ways. The first is by consider x as exogenous and not
dipendentent on ε. The second is the most realistic case whereby the signal x that investors
receive is endogenous since it depends on how noisy is the information. Appendix XXX deals
with the former of the two possibilities and I will now focus on the latter.
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decide to shortsell the debt or not (Lemma 3, Morris and Shin 1998). In the
model, x∗is the threshold below which a speculator, with whichever x smaller
than x∗, will decide to attack. By construction the model assume that variations
in noise change not just the quality of information that investors receive, but it
also increases the interpretability of the signal which, in turn, causes uncertainty.
Hence, before turning our attention to the impact that variations in noise might
have on investors decisions, it is crucial to understand how ε affects x∗.
In the model x∗is the value of x according to which U(k, Ik) = 0 where U,
according to Lemma 2, is continuous and strickly decreasing function of k, where
k and Ik are simply two indicators according to which the speculators attach the
debt if and only if the message xis less than some fixed number k.
Precisely
U(k, Ik) =
1
2ε [
ˆ
A(pi)∧[x−ε,x+ε]
ε∗ − f(θ)dθ]− t (4.6)
where f(θ) increasing and convex. Hence, I numerically simulate the above
expression giving the following values, f(θ) = ε∗ θ22 +
1
2 and therefore:
U(k, Ik) =
1
2ε [
ˆ
A(pi)∧[x−ε,x+ε]
ε∗ − ε∗ θ
2
2 +
1
2dθ]− t (4.7)
Now, in order to solve the above integral and find the value of x∗and its relation
with ε, we need the integration bounderies which are given by the intersection of
A(pi)and the interval x − ε, x + ε. 135. Following Morris and Shin definition
(reference), let’s assume that a(θ) = 0.2 + 12 , I can write our final integra
U(k, Ik) =
1
2ε
x+εˆ
x
A
(1−θ
2
2 )dθ−t = [
1
12(
1
A3
−1)]x3−14x
2+[ 112ε(1−
1
A
)−ε4]x+(
1
2−
ε2
12−
t
2ε) = 0
(4.8)
This integral is too complex to be solved analitically. Since the result will be
an equation of third grade, we will have three possible solution for x∗.Given the
Morris and Shin model implies that x∗must be inside the interval (θ − , θ + ε),
I will consider simply the positive solution. Figure 4.5 shows the results of the
numerical simulation. 136On the vertical axis I report the values of x∗and on
135A(pi)denote the event where the government abandons the currency peg if the speculators
follow their best response strategy
136In the simulation, I employed values of εbigger than 0.65. For any value of noise smaller
than this value, the corresponding value of x∗would have been outside the interval θ − , θ + ε)
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the orizzontal axis the value of ε. An increase in the level of noise ε increases
the resulting level of x∗. This is an important results because we know from
Morris and Shin that markets will opt for an aggregate short sells if x < x∗ and
hence, the arrival of more noisy information increases the probability of an attack.
Interestingly, the numerical simulation reveals a threshold of 0.5 above which an
increase in noise does not affect x∗.
Now, defined the relationship between εand x∗, I turn to my attention to the
question on whether these variations in noise affect θ∗ given x∗(ε). Morris and
Shin defines θ∗such that the government does not defend the sovereign debt if
and only if θ ≤ θ∗. The location of θ∗is determined by the crossing of two lines:
the s(θ, Ix) line which shows the proportion of speculators who decide to attack
the sovereign debt at any given level of fundamentals, and the a(α) line which
depicts the proportion of attackers who would make the government indifferent
between defending or defaulting on the debt. I’m now able to measure the effect
of a variation in noise on θ∗ keeping into consideration that x∗ is endogenous in
ε. In order to find values of θ∗, I will cross s(θ,Ix) with a set of values a a(θ).
Note that a(θ), in Morris and Shin, represents the threshold whereby the
government is indifferent in defending the peg. Hence, it is commonly (Leblang
and Bernard, Leblang And Satahia) seen as not just a measure of strength of
the government, but also as a focal point. In the model this implies that market
actors will be relatively certain about the beliefs of other speculators regarding
the state of fundamentals when a common focal point is present which, in this
context, is a credible government.
I give to a(θ) three different values that express three different types of govern-
ment. A “strong” government, a “medium” government and a “weak” government.
This tripartite classification will allow me to test for any heterogeneity of changes
on the probability of an attack across different “institutional settting”. 137 Figure
4.6 shows the results which are then summarised in Table 4.3. When the signal
x∗ does depend on the level of noise ε, the effect of an increase of the noise on the
probability of a currency attack is positive: an increase in noise increases the prob-
ability that the markets will decide to attack the sovereign debt. Nevertheless,
varying the level of the “quality of the government” a(θ), the numerical simulation
reveals that the same increase of noise does not lead to the same increase in θ*.
and therefore not interpretable.
137write down the different values of a(θ)
209
As Table 4.3 shows, the worse the government is, the bigger is the effect of the
increase in noise on θ*. This is consistent with Leblang and Satyanath (2006)
who interpret this parameter has a “focal point” which is crucial to reduce the
uncertainty generate by noisy information or by political events which are very
difficult to interpret.
Figure 4A.1: Information Signal and Noise
	
Note: Author’s elaboration
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Figure 4A.2: Information Signal and Noise and Cross Country Heterogeneity
	
Note: Author’s elaboration
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Table 4A.1: Granger Causality Test
            
Equation Excluded  F df df_r Prob > F 
Bond Yield Spain News 4.4012 2 2671 0.0124 
Bond Yield Spain ALL  4.4012 2 2671 0.0124 
News Bond Yield Spain 4.227 2 2671 0.1047 
News ALL  4.227 2 2671 0.1047 
      
  
 
   Equation Excluded     F df df_r Prob > F | 
Bond Yield Italy News 3.9943 2 2671 0.0185 
Bond Yield Italy ALL 3.9943 2 2671 0.0185 
News Bond Yield Italy 1.332 2 2671 0.2641 
News ALL 1.332 2 2671 0.2641 
      
      Equation Excluded  F df df_r Prob > F | 
Bond Yield Greece News 1.1634 2 2671 0.0521 
Bond Yield Greece ALL 1.1634 2 2671 0.0521 
News Bond Yield Greece 2.9606 2 2671 0.3126 
News ALL 2.9606 2 2671 0.3126 
       Note: Wald Test Estimation for Granger Causality Test. Tables report results respectively for
Spain,Italy and Greece. The top two lines of every table shows the results when x is used to
explain y. The bottom two lines show the results for a model where the causality is inverted.
Results show that for all the three countries the variables news is never predicted by lag values
of bond yield. The p values in the bottom panel of the three tables suggest that we can reject
the hypothesis that past values of bond yields predict news.
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Table 4A.2: News and Bond Yields using Bloom et al EPU Index
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Bond Yield_Italia Bond_Yield_Uk Bond_Yield_France Bond Yield_Spain 
          
Bond Yield Italia (t-1) 1.149*** 
   
 
(0.107) 
   Bond Yield Italia (t-2) -0.344*** 
   
 
(0.104) 
   Policy_Index_Italia 0.607*** 
   
 
(0.182) 
   Bond Yield Uk (t-1) 
 
0.964*** 
  
  
(0.132) 
  Bond Yield Uk (t-2) 
 
-0.126 
  
  
(0.137) 
  Policy_Index_Uk 
 
0.00325 
  
  
(0.0297) 
  Bond Yield France (t-1) 
  
0.902*** 
 
   
(0.228) 
 Bond Yield France (t-2) 
  
0.0127 
 
   
(0.200) 
 Policy_Index_France 
  
0.0475 
 
   
(0.0441) 
 Bond Yield Spain (t-1) 
   
1.116*** 
    
(0.201) 
Bond Yield Spain (t-2) 
   
-0.148 
    
(0.197) 
Policy_Index_Spain 
   
0.182* 
        (0.108) 
Economic Fundamentals yes yes yes yes 
Economic Fundamentals (t-n) yes yes yes yes 
Vix Index CDS  yes yes yes yes 
Constant -38.16** 6.335 -2.562 -10.21 
 
(17.85) (6.596) (7.761) (17.71) 
Observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.954 0.740 0.867 0.958 
      
Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent
variables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. The variables of interest are the Pol-
icy_Indexes and they represent the EPU index per country i at time t. . Estimates includes
past values of Bond Yields (t-2) and are at the monthly level. Results are conditional to a full
set of controls, fixed effect and time effect. The model is estimated with ARMA Time series
regressions.
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Table 4A.3: News and Bond Yields - Time Series Analysis - Correction for Sta-
tionarity
            
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield 
d_News_Italy 0.00778*** 
    
 
(0.00247) 
    d_News_Italy (t-1)  0.00403 
    
 
(0.00273) 
    d_News_Italy (t-2) 0.00156 
    
 
(0.00247) 
    d_News_France 
 
0.00200 
   
  
(0.0126) 
   d_News_France (t-1)  
 
0.00353 
   
  
(0.0140) 
   d_News_France (t-2) 
 
0.00467 
   
  
(0.0126) 
   d_News_Greece 
  
0.00301* 
  
   
(0.00214) 
  d_News_Greece(t-1)  
  
-0.00209 
  
   
(0.00329) 
  d_News_Greece (t-2) 
  
0.00946*** 
  
   
(0.00314) 
  d_News_Germany 
   
0.00254 
 
    
(0.01000) 
 d_News_Germany(t-1)  
   
0.00607 
 
    
(0.0114) 
 d_News_Germany (t-2) 
   
0.00417 
 
    
(0.00999) 
 d_News_Spain 
    
0.00320** 
     
(0.00244) 
d_News_Spain(t-1)  
    
0.000256 
     
(0.00497) 
d_News_Spain (t-2) 
    
-0.00290 
          (0.00444) 
Bond Yield (t-n) yes yes yes yes yes 
Vix index yes yes yes yes yes 
Economic Controls  yes yes yes yes yes 
Economic Controls (t-n) yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.000566 -0.000567 -0.000564 -0.000567 -0.000567 
 
(0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) 
Observations 13,365 13,365 13,365 13,365 13,365 
R-squared 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 
Number of country 5 5 5 5 5 
       Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. Total News represent the total amount of
news (count) published at time t. Estimates includes past values of Bond Yields (t-2) and past
values of Total News. Results are conditional to a full set of controls, fixed effect and time effect.
The model is estimated with ARMA Time series regressions. All variables are here expressed
in first differences.
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Table 4A.4: News and Bond Yields - Dynamic Panel Analysis - Correction for
Stationarity
 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield D_Bond Yield 
        
D_News 0.00429*** 0.00572*** 0.00376* 
 
(0.00155) (0.00166) (0.00193) 
D_Debt (as % GDP)  0.00975** 0.00935** 0.00590 
 
(0.00409) (0.00407) (0.00483) 
D_Deficit 0.00300 0.00166 0.000548 
 
(0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0200) 
D_CurrentAccount -0.0483* -0.0465* -0.0467 
 
(0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0286) 
D_Bond Yield (t-1)  
 
0.0890*** 0.0857*** 
  
(0.00864) (0.00966) 
D_Bond Yield (t-2)  
 
0.0143* 0.0162* 
  
(0.00867) (0.00969) 
D_Bond Yield (t-3)  
 
-0.0302*** -0.0258*** 
  
(0.00865) (0.00967) 
D_News (t-1) 
 
0.00333 0.00475* 
  
(0.00234) (0.00282) 
D_News (t-2) 
 
0.00998*** 0.0124*** 
  
(0.00241) (0.00295) 
D_News (t-3)   0.0111*** 0.0156*** 
Country Dummies yes yes yes 
Time Dummies no no yes 
Time Trends no no yes 
Constant -0.000625 -0.000571 -0.0766 
 
(0.00173) (0.00172) (0.0875) 
Observations 13,380 13,365 13,365 
R-squared 0.001 0.013 0.238 
Number of country 5 5 5 
    Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. The main variable is News which represents
the amount of news published at time t in country i. Estimates included past values of bond
yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time trends. Column 1 reports the OLS estima-
tion. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values of dependent and indipendent variables
are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control variables. In column 4 I include the past
values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include linear time trends and time fiexed effects.
The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect regressions. All variables are here expressed
in first differences.
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Table 4A.5: Dynamic Panel -Restricted Sample
		 		 		 		 		
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
VARIABLES	 Bond	Yield	 Bond	Yield	 Bond	Yield	 Bond	Yield	
		 		 		 		 		
News	 0.00483**	 0.00397**	 0.00394**	 0.00114*	
	 (0.00197)	 (0.00199)	 (0.00199)	 (0.00100)	
price	(t-1)	 1.087***	 1.086***	 1.085***	 1.083***	
	 (0.0101)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0113)	
price	(t-2)	 -0.0784***	 -0.0784***	 -0.0778***	 -0.0719***	
	 (0.0149)	 (0.0149)	 (0.0149)	 (0.0167)	
price	(t-3)	 -0.00313	 -0.00349	 -0.00348	 0.000447	
	 (0.00286)	 (0.00287)	 (0.00287)	 (0.00349)	
news	(t-1)	 0.00596**	 0.00541*	 0.00539*	 0.00658*	
	 (0.00276)	 (0.00278)	 (0.00278)	 (0.00340)	
news	(t-2)	 	 0.00154***	 0.00154***	 -0.00323	
	  (0.000444)	 (0.000444)	 (0.0146)	
debt	 	 0.000101	 0.00890*	 0.00580	
	  (0.000232)	 (0.00500)	 (0.00574)	
deficit	 	 9.06e-05	 0.00667	 -0.000160	
	  (0.00177)	 (0.0246)	 (0.0278)	
Debt	(t-1)	 	  -0.00641	 -0.00539	
	   (0.00706)	 (0.00812)	
Debt	(t-2)	 	  -0.00240	 -0.000512	
	   (0.00500)	 (0.00574)	
Deficit	(t-1)	 	  0.00867	 0.0122	
	   (0.0348)	 (0.0392)	
Deficit	(t-2)	 	  -0.0152	 -0.0129	
		 		 		 (0.0246)	 (0.0278)	
Country	Dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Time	Dummies	 No	 No	 No	 yes	
Time	Trends	 No	 No	 No	 yes	
	 (0.00419)	 (0.0319)	 (0.0319)	 (0.365)	
Observations	 9,740	 9,740	 9,740	 9,740	
R-squared	 0.996	 0.996	 0.996	 0.997	
Number	of	country	 5	 5	 5	 5	
	     
	Note: Cluster standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are the bond yield of “peripheral countries”. The main variable is News which represents
the amount of news published at time t in country i. Estimates included past values of bond
yields (t-2), fixed effects, time effects and linear time trends. Column 1 reports the OLS estima-
tion. In Column 2 countries dummies and past values of dependent and indipendent variables
are included. In Column 3 I include a ful set of control variables. In column 4 I include the past
values of the control variables. In Column 5 I include linear time trends and time fiexed effects.
The model is estimated with dynamic fixed effect regressions. Sample is restricted to January
2009 and May 2010-
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5 Conclusion
This thesis studies, theoretically and empirically, distortions and inefficiencies that
impede the correct functioning of democratic systems. By focusing on organised
crime and media bias, this thesis has specifically addressed the following research
questions:
1. What is the impact of organised crime on the provision of public goods and
on the allocation of public resources?
2. How strongly can media bias affect public opinion?
3. What is the role of information in fostering coordination?
These questions are examined in three different papers that constitute the chapters
of this thesis. Taken together the answers to the above questions suggest that both
media bias and organised crime represent severe risks to the democratic stability of
any country. In order to be tackled, both of these phenomena have to be properly
measured and analysed. This is, ultimately, the overall aim of this thesis.
In the first Chapter, I have presented an analysis of the consequences of the
collusion between criminal organisations and politicians over the allocation of
public resources and the collection of fiscal revenues. By using sophisticated
econometrics strategies, the first Chapter not just operationalised a new way to
measure organised crime presence, but also shed light on the consequent impact
on public policy decisions. The collusion between criminal organisations and
local politicians does not have an effect on total spending, but it does affect
the allocation of public resources towards sectors of specific interests for criminal
organisations.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I have turned my attention to the second important theme
of this thesis: media bias and persuasive communication. Chapter 3 has presented
a study of the impact of information on individuals’ perceptions of salient topics
in political debate, and how this might affect their ultimate voting decisions. We
showed that, when individuals are less exposed to biased news, they appear to
be less concerned about crime. In Chapter 4 I have investigated the impact of
information on perceptions but in a very different setting. I study the case of the
European Sovereign Crisis and I test whether different amounts and types of news
media might be correlated with the outbreak of the crisis. In this conclusion, I
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will summarise the findings of each Chapter and broaden my discussion of the
implications of this research. I conclude by commenting on the limitations of the
analyses, and outline a number of potential avenues for further work.
Substantive contributions and further implications
The three chapters of this thesis aim to innovate and contribute to the academic
literature on organised crime and media bias. The first and most important
contribution borne out of this PhD is a new conceptualisation in the study of the
above phenomena. Second, I build my analysis of a set of newly-collected datasets
which will constitute a public good for all the researchers interested in the study
of these topics. The chapters of this thesis are structured as stand-alone papers
and therefore they each provide their own share of new results for the research
community.
Chapter 2 has provided three significant contributions to the literature. First
is a new conceptualisation and measurement of the relationship between criminal
organisations and politicians. Most of the political economy literature has mea-
sured the presence and intensity of mafia activity by employing proxies such as
the number of mafia-related crimes, murders, and violent attacks (Alesina et al.,
2016; Daniele and Marani, 2011; Olivieri and Sberna, 2014; Barone and Narciso,
2015), historical or geographical indicators (Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012;
De Feo and De Luca, 2013; Buonanno et al., 2015; Buonanno et al., 2016), or
artificial constructs for counterfactual analysis (Pinotti, 2015). These measures
aim to capture the impact of organized crime in a broad sense, encompassing the
entire range of possible actions perpetrated by such criminal groups. They do not,
however, take into consideration an important fact: organised crime, particularly
in developed countries, has evolved over time, progressively reducing the use of vi-
olence and becoming increasingly integrated within the boundaries of democratic
society, to the point that mafia activities may no longer even be recognisable as
criminal enterprises. As stated by Schelling (1971), “burglars may operate in the
underworld, but they seek to govern the real world”.138 While in conflict with
the State, criminal organisations do not wish to displace the latter but rather
to co-exist with it through the creation of a network based on mutual interests.
Criminal organisations use violence only as a last resort when previous strategies
138Choice and Consequences. Thomas Schelling, p. 179
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have failed. By studying the case of Italy, Chapter 2 has introduced a new non-
violent base measure of organised crime presence: its “infiltration” within local
governments. We have then compared municipal governments with and without
infiltration before and after such infiltration has occurred. The second contri-
bution of Chapter 2 is the use of a highly-disaggregated dataset through which
we are able to provide the first rigorous evidence of the impact of the collusion
between organised crime and local politics on the allocation of public resources
and on the collection of fiscal revenues. Difference–in–differences estimates reveal
that infiltrated local governments not only spend more on average on construc-
tion and waste management and less on police enforcement but also collect fewer
fiscal revenues. The third substantive contribution of Chapter 2 is an analysis
of key elements of local elections associated with government-mafia collusion. In
particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates (RDD) provide the first causal ev-
idence of the relationship between organised crime and politics: more precisely,
they show that infiltrations are more likely to occur when right-wing parties win
local elections.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the nature of the relationship be-
tween the mafia and the State has changed: rather than representing an enemy to
fight, the government has instead become an opportunity to exploit. In studying
this phenomenon, researchers have to take this into account in order to identify
the real consequences of this distortion and how best to tackle it.
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation I have moved to an analysis of me-
dia bias and persuasive communication. Chapter 3 fits into a growing literature
that has examined the impact of news media on political outcomes. Most of the
studies (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikopolov et al., 2011; Durante and
Knight, 2012) exploited a shock in media provision to study the effect on elec-
toral outcomes. Yet the mechanisms through which news affects individual voting
decisions are still unclear. We contribute to these studies by looking at attitudes
and perceptions of politically salient topics. More precisely, the first significant
contribution of Chapter 3 is to provide the first causal evidence of the impact
of news media on individual perceptions. In doing so, we shed light on one of
the possible mechanisms through which the media might ultimately affect voting
outcomes. We overcome the standard problem of identification by exploiting the
staggered introduction of the digital TV signal across Italian regions. Chapter 3
has used a Difference –in- Differences strategy to compare regions with access to
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the new TV technology to regions still exposed to the old channels. We find that
the increase in the number of available TV channels - and the consequent lower
exposure to news broadcasts by partisan outlets - led individuals to revise down-
ward their perceptions of crime. The estimated negative effects of crime concern
are larger for individuals who spend more time watching television while using
less frequently other media sources such as the internet, radio and newspapers.
The second significant contribution of Chapter 3 is that, by exploiting unique
viewership and news content data, we are able to make the first step toward a
measurement of the elasticity of individuals’ beliefs to specific news reporting in-
tensity. We then show that crime is a salient topic of the political debate and, as
a consequence, is likely to be one of the drivers of voters’ decisions. We indeed
provide evidence that high concerns about crime are correlated with support for
centre right coalitions. Then, using survey data we provide descriptive evidence
to show that 2.4% of individuals older than 51 would have changed their vote
from centre right to centre left once exposed to a reduced amount of crime news.
The study of the role of the media in affecting individuals’ opinions is central to
my thesis. This is reflected in Chapter 4 where I have investigated the role of news
in affecting investors’ beliefs and in anticipating the beginning of the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis. Chapter 4 has introduced a series of contributions which
range from the provision of a newly collected dataset to a new approach to the
analysis of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Chapter 4 attempts to provide a
rigorous explanation of why the crisis started when it did. In doing so it argues
that, in order to understand the onset of the crisis, there is a need to go beyond
a mere analysis of economic fundamentals. I build on the existing literature on
the sovereign crisis, by demonstrating that a significant part of the surge of gov-
ernment bond spreads in the Eurozone was disconnected from underlying changes
in a number of economic indicators. I then propose a new approach by studying
whether the amount and the type of news related to sovereign debt might have
played a role in the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty
among investors. Testing these claims empirically is not trivial because there is
no existing attempt to measure news media that might be relevant for financial
investors. Hence, Chapter 4 of the dissertation has proposed a unique and newly
collected dataset on news from the main media outlets in a set of 5 European
Countries from September 2007 to September 2014. I have mostly focused on
political information which, by its nature, is not immediately quantifiable, and
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more subjective and difficult to interpret. I defined political information as all the
news about political stories/events related to the country’s sovereign debt. Using
different estimation techniques, which range from time series to dynamic panel
estimations, my estimates show that the amount of news fosters coordination be-
tween investors and eventually leads to an increase in bond prices. The effect is
stronger if the tone of the news is negative. Results also show interesting cross
country heterogeneity of the results.
The empirical findings presented in this thesis are based on specific case stud-
ies. Chapters 2 and 3 focused on Italy whereas Chapter 4 presented a cross country
study that looked at a set of European Countries. As argued in the introduction
and, in each of the chapters, making credible inferences requires a careful choice of
a case study and of an identification strategy. Nevertheless, we might be worried
about the external validity of these results and therefore their applicability and
relevance to other contexts. In Chapter 2, we provide evidence of the importance
of the object under study for a variety of countries. Particularly in developed
countries, the nature of the relationship between organised crime and politics has
evolved and it is not more complicated than it used to be. As discussed in Chapter
2, illegal earnings are now heavily re-invested in the legitimate economies in the
United States, Spain, Japan and Russia. Hence, in this thesis I argue that the
choice of Italy as a case study does not undermine the relevance of the results for
similar developed countries with comparable institutional settings. Chapter 3 has
continued in the study of Italian case by investigating the influence of news media
on individuals’ beliefs and perceptions about crime. The reasons for choosing Italy
are twofold. First, for over a decade, Italy presented an incredibly concentrated
television market with a tendency to over-report crime-related news. Second, to
identify the causal effect of biased news on individual perceptions we rely on the
peculiar implementation of a television reform which has been introduced across
Italian Regions at different points in time. However, similarly to Chapter 2, the
external validity of the results is not limited to Italy. The mismatch between
perceptions and reality is extremely relevant and applicable to a number of dif-
ferent countries (Della Vigna and Kaplan„ 2007; Enikopolov et al., 2011; Durante
and Knight, 2012). Finally, Chapter 4 has studied the role of information, but
it has done so in a cross country setting which has inevitably forced me to trade
precision in the identification for more external validity given that I examine five
different countries.
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In conclusion, this thesis has offered different angles and approaches to study
crucial topics such as organised crime and media bias. Moreover, it has introduced
a number of quantitative measures derived from newly collected datasets and from
new observational data which can constitute a public good for all the researchers
with an interest in working on these important themes. The papers in this thesis
have offered a small contribution to a broader and important research agenda,
and represent the very first step for further theoretical and empirical research on
organised crime and media bias.
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